Geoffrey William Radford (Plaintiff v Fiona Samuel and Another (Defendants
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE LEGGATT,LORD JUSTICE ROCH |
| Judgment Date | 19 October 1993 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1993] EWCA Civ J1019-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | No. FC3 93/5903/B |
| Date | 19 October 1993 |
[1993] EWCA Civ J1019-1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Mr. Justice Forbes)
Before: The Master of the Rolls (Sir Thomas Bingham) Lord Justice Leggatt and Lord Justice Roch
No. FC3 93/5903/B
Mr. Corry appeared in person.
No other party were represented.
)
Tuesday, 19th October, 1993.
THE MASTER OF THE ROLLSThis is an appeal by the defendant in an action against orders made by Forbes J on 11th October 1993. The effect of the judge's order was that a corporate defendant in the two actions, Freeway Classics Limited, should not be permitted to appear without legal representation by Mr. Corry, a 99% shareholder and sole director of that company.
The history of the action is set out by Forbes J in the course of his judgment and it is not necessary to go into much of the detail. The litigation arises, as it appears, out of a contract made in November 1990 by which the plaintiff bought a substantial value of antique or vintage MG motor cars and parts from the defendants. It is said, although I am sure that this is in issue, that there were deficiencies in what was delivered in that some of the parts which should have been delivered were missing. The result of that was that on 16th July 1991 the plaintiffs issued proceedings against the defendants for breach of contract, and Gatehouse J granted a Mareva injunction in relation to an MG motor car with the registration number DOW 33. He also ordered disclosure of assets. It appears that disclosure of assets was not made as ordered, and accordingly the matter came on a motion for contempt before Saville J. It was then undertaken on behalf of the defendants, the company then being represented by leading counsel, that the affidavit that was required would be sworn and delivered the next day. On that basis the contempt application did not proceed.
When, however, the affidavit was sworn it transpired that the MG motor car, which was the subject of the first Mareva injunction, had been transferred to a Miss Samuel shortly before the injunction had been granted. The result of that was that a second writ was issued challenging the transfer of the car to Miss Samuel on the basis that it was transferred at an under-value. In the course of these further proceedings a second Mareva injunction was obtained on 4th October 1991 in respect of an MG Coupe and some office equipment, and a third Mareva was granted in relation to a small bronze model of an MG.
The present position, as we understand, is that the assets of the company which have been frozen by the Mareva injunctions now in force are on the office equipment and the MG Coupe that I have already referred to, and the bronze model of an MG, the value of the goods, according to the judge who derived his evidence from Mr. Corry, being some £6,000.
One of the issues that has caused trouble throughout the history of this action is that since a relatively early stage the company, Freeway Classics Limited, has not been represented by solicitors or counsel, but Mr. Corry, as director and shareholder, has sought to act on its behalf. The plaintiff has resisted that, and on 22nd July Master Murray made an order, the effect of which was to debar
Mr. Corry from acting on behalf of the company. Mr. Corry challenged the Master's order and he made a reference to the judge in chambers for determination of the issue as to whether Mr. Corry should be allowed to represent and act for the company or not. There was an abortive hearing before Popplewell J on 14th September but, for reasons that I need not go into, his order was set aside, and so it came before Forbes J on 11th October, just a week or so ago.
Forbes J drew attention to Ord. 12 r 1(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides:
"The defendant to such an action who is a body corporate may acknowledge service of the writ and give notice of intention to defend the action either by a solicitor or by a person duly authorised to act on the defendant's behalf but, except as aforesaid or as expressly provided by any enactment, such a defendant may not take steps in the action otherwise than by a solicitor."
That deals with the position of a corporation which is a defendant, and there is a corresponding provision dealing with plaintiffs to be found in Ord. 5 r 6(2) of the rules of the Supreme Court, which provide:
"Except as expressly provided by or under any enactment, a body corporate may not begin or carry on any such proceedings otherwise than by a solicitor."
On a straightforward reading of those provisions they appear to be very clear legislative provisions requiring a limited company to pursue its litigation, other than to the limited extent of acknowledging service, through legal advisors. There is, however, a limited gloss which has been put on those provisions in...
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