Gethin Parry v Derbyshire Dales District Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Stanley Burnton |
| Judgment Date | 05 May 2006 |
| Neutral Citation | [2006] EWHC 988 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/9033/2005 |
| Date | 05 May 2006 |
[2006] EWHC 988 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Mr Justice Stanley Burnton
Case No: CO/9033/2005
The Appellant in person
Ranjit Bhose (instructed by Derbyshire DDC Litigation Department) for the Respondent
Introduction
This is an appeal by Mr Gethin Parry against the decision of the Derbyshire Valuation Tribunal ("the Tribunal") dated 4 October 2005, by which the Tribunal dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Respondent that Ivanhoe Cottage ("the Cottage"), Dragon Hill, Brassington in Derbyshire was his sole or main residence between 1 December 2003 and 20 June 2004, and that accordingly, although he did not live in it during that period, he was liable for 75 per cent of the council tax for the Cottage. If he were liable only as owner, his liability would have been entitled to a discount of 50 per cent.
The facts
In its decision, the Tribunal stated that the facts relating to Mr Parry's place of residence for the period concerned were not disputed. They are not set out in any one place in the decision, and are summarised in the following paragraph of my judgment.
Mr Parry was the owner of the Cottage, which he had purchased in 1999, and where he lived until September 2002. In September 2002 he went to live and work in Spain for Rolls Royce, with whom he had an employment contract with a duration of 2 years. He rented accommodation in Spain, he had the legal status of Spanish residency, and he paid Spanish taxes while working there. He let the Cottage under a written tenancy agreement for a period of 2 years commencing 1 September 2002. He moved furniture and other possessions out of the Cottage. At the end of November 2003, his tenant decided to leave the Cottage and Mr Parry accepted the premature termination of the tenancy. Mr Parry did not then return to live in the Cottage, but continued to work in Spain under his contract with Rolls Royce. At the end of that contract, he sought to secure alternative employment in Spain. He was unsuccessful, and therefore returned to live at the Cottage in June 2004. No one lived in the Cottage between the termination of the tenancy and June 2004.
Some of the factual contentions of both the Appellant and the Respondent referred to in the Tribunal's decision were not referred to in its summary of the facts on which it based its decision. According to the Billing Officer, Mr Parry had stated in 2002 that he intended to return to live at the Cottage, and in a letter dated 17 August 2002 he stated that he was moving out temporarily. Mr Parry had stated in a letter dated 21 September 2004 that the Cottage was his sole or main residence from 1 December 2003 to 21 June 2004 (although he did so in a letter disputing the Council's contention that it was his second home). Mr Parry stated that he had intended to extend his contract in Spain, or find an alternative occupation there, and had applied for a post in France. At the end of his 2-year contract, he intended to continue to work abroad. In a letter to the Clerk to the Tribunal dated 6 March 2005, Mr Parry asserted that following the termination of the tenancy referred to above he had instructed his solicitor to draw up another tenancy agreement for another tenant who wanted to move into the Cottage. I have to state, however, that given the excessive prolixity of Mr Parry's correspondence on the question of his council tax, it would not be surprising if this single mention of this point was overlooked by the Tribunal, and I would not criticise them if they did so.
However, the Tribunal made no express finding of fact as to Mr Parry's intentions as regards living in the Cottage on the termination of his tenant's tenancy at the end of November 2003.
The statutory framework
Liability to pay council tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling in England is determined by the Local Government Finance Act 1992 and regulations made under it. Section 6 is as follows:
(1) The person who is liable to pay council tax in respect of any chargeable dwelling and any day is the person who falls within the first paragraph of subsection (2) below to apply, taking paragraph (a) of that subsection first, paragraph (b) next, and so on.
(2) A person falls within this subsection in relation to any chargeable dwelling and any day if, on that day—
(a) he is a resident of the dwelling and has a freehold interest in the whole or any part of it;
(b) he is such a resident and has a leasehold interest in the whole or any part of the dwelling which is not inferior to another such interest held by another such resident;
(c) he is both such a resident and a statutory or secure tenant of the whole or any part of the dwelling;
(d) he is such a resident and has a contractual licence to occupy the whole or any part of the dwelling;
(e) he is such a resident; or
(f) he is the owner of the dwelling.
(3) Where, in relation to any chargeable dwelling and any day, two or more persons fall within the first paragraph of subsection (2) above to apply, they shall each be jointly and severally liable to pay the council tax in respect of the dwelling and that day.
(4) …
(5) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires—
"owner", in relation to any dwelling, means the person as regards whom the following conditions are fulfilled—
(a) he has a material interest in the whole or any part of the dwelling; and
(b) at least part of the dwelling or, as the case may be, of the part concerned is not subject to a material interest inferior to his interest;
"resident", in relation to any dwelling, means an individual who has attained the age of 18 years and has his sole or main residence in the dwelling.
(6) In this section—
"material interest" means a freehold interest or a leasehold interest which was granted for a term of six months or more;
…
As in the case of Williams v Horsham District Council [2004] EWCA Civ 39, [2004] 1 WLR 1137, to which I refer below, the issue before the tribunal was whether Mr Parry was liable to pay council tax in respect of the Cottage as a resident with a freehold interest in it under section 6(2)(a), or as the owner under section 6(2)(f).
The decision of the Tribunal
The Tribunal referred to the decisions of the High Court in City of Bradford Metropolitan Council v Anderton [1991] RA 45, Ward v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council [1993] RA 71, and Doncaster MBC v Stark [1998] RVR 80. It stated:
Of the case law cited by the Billing Officer, the tribunal is mindful that none of the cases is on all fours with the case being considered, but the general principles in the Anderton, Ward and Stark cases is the fact that all three of these taxpayers were away from their "homes" because of the requirements of their employment. In common with these cases, Mr Parry was away from Ivanhoe Cottage because of his employment, the main differences between his situation and the Anderton, Ward and Stark cases being that of regular return visits to that matrimonial home. In Mr Parry's case there were no matrimonial ties or even family ties in Derbyshire and he states in his evidence that he did not stay at Ivanhoe Cottage while employed in Spain. However, as in the Stark case, he did enjoy security of tenure, and this was at the property he owned in Brassington, although this was not available to him during the term of his tenancy.
In the case of Navabi v Chester-letter-Street Disciplinary Committee, it is interesting to note the view that a property does not have to be furnished for it to be identified as someone's sole or main residence.
When considering the above higher court cases, the tribunal is mindful of the directions given in the case of Williams v Horsham DC. In this case, the Judge stressed the need for the tribunal to consider all factors rather than attach too much weight to the issues of "security of tenure" and the "intention to return" and to view the situation in the way any reasonable onlooker would.
The tribunal accepts that Mr Parry's situation differs in many key areas to the situations of the taxpayers cited in the precedent case law referred to by the Billing Officer. However, Ivanhoe Cottage was his home before he took up his employment in Spain and is the address to which he returned once that employment had ceased. It is also the property where he enjoyed greater security of tenure as owner, than the property in Spain, which was rented. The tribunal accepts that Mr Parry moved all his main possessions out of Ivanhoe Cottage, but believes this would, in part, have been done to make way for his tenant.
The tribunal gave full and careful consideration both to the relevant facts and the case law pertinent to this appeal and, when doing this, is persuaded that Ivanhoe Cottage should be correctly described as Mr Parry's main residence for the period concerned.
The Tribunal therefore finds that, after the termination of the tenancy agreement on the 30 November 2003, Ivanhoe Cottage reverted to being Mr Parry's sole or main residence. He should therefore be liable for 75% of the charge, from that date onwards, even though he was not actually living at the property again until the 21st of June 2004.
The contentions of the parties
In many respects, Mr Parry has been his own worst enemy. As I stated above, his correspondence...
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