John Earl Baughman v The Queen
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough |
| Judgment Date | 25 May 2000 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2000] UKPC J0525-1 |
| Date | 25 May 2000 |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 76 of 1998 |
[2000] UKPC J0525-1
Privy Council
Present at the hearing:-
Lord Slynn of Hadley
Lord Hutton
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
Lord Millett
Sir Andrew Leggatt
[Majority Judgment delivered by Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough]
On Saturday 27th May 1995, Valerie Baughman, the wife of the appellant, fell some 99 feet to the ground below from the roof of the Royal Antiguan Hotel, Antigua. She was killed outright. She and the appellant were from Illinois USA. They had been married for only four years; she was not his first wife. They had come for a short holiday in Antigua and Barbuda, re-checking into the hotel only two days earlier, and were due to leave again on the 28th May. The police were not satisfied with the explanation which the appellant gave of how his wife came to fall from the roof and he was charged with her murder. The appellant's explanation was that she stumbled and fell over an unguarded parapet about 16" high. The prosecution case was that he pushed her over.
In March and April 1996, the appellant was tried before Redhead J. and a jury. The jury found him guilty of murder. He appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal contending that evidence had been improperly admitted and that the summing up was biased and defective. In reserved judgments delivered on 15th September 1997, the Court of Appeal, Bryon C.J., Satrohan Singh J.A. and Matthew J.A., dismissed his appeal. Matthew J.A. held that in some detailed respects the summing up was defective and, by implication, that these deficiencies amounted to a material irregularity; he applied the proviso concluding:-
"Despite the deficiencies in the summing-up to which I have referred above, I am of the view that the Prosecution had made a strong and persuasive case that the Appellant had murdered his wife. I am of the view that had the Jury been properly directed they would inevitably have returned the same verdict of guilty of murder."
The only other reasoned judgment was that of the Chief Justice. Despite the fact that he opened his judgment by stating that he agreed with the conclusion of Matthew J.A. and said that he wished to explain why he held the view that it was an appropriate case to apply the proviso, the thrust of his judgment was that he did not accept that the legitimate criticisms of the summing up amounted to material irregularities in the trial. Having referred to certain features of the evidence given at the trial and the arguments of the appellant, he said, using words which also accurately describe the hearing before their Lordships' Board:-
"In short, I have formed the view that the criticisms of the summing up which were very eloquently and forcefully argued by learned counsel for the Appellant demonstrated no more than minor deficiencies which did not affect the justice of the case."
He concluded:-
"I was satisfied that the Jury had ample evidence to support their verdict. The deficiencies in the summing up which Counsel for the Appellant succeeded in demonstrating were minor and it is inconceivable that a Jury properly directed would have come to any other verdict."
Satrohan Singh J.A. unsurprisingly felt it unnecessary to choose between the two approaches and contented himself with concurring in the dismissal of the appeal. The criticisms did not affect the safety of the conviction.
The appellant has with special leave appealed to their Lordships' Board against the dismissal of his appeal by the Court of Appeal.
The prosecution case at the trial gained only limited support from the physical evidence. The injuries on Mrs. Baughman's body were considerable but did not assist to answer any disputed question. The position where the body was found, a lateral distance of 14 feet out from the side of the building did support the prosecution case. If she had simply fallen without being propelled in some way, how did she come to have landed so far out? The prosecution called a Mr. Lewis, a civil engineer to explain to the jury the mathematics of the speed at which a falling body accelerates towards the ground and the need for the initial application of a measurable horizontal force before the start of the fall to achieve the horizontal displacement. She would only take 2.48 seconds to fall the full distance and the horizontal speed imparted would have to be about 3.8 mph. This made an accidental fall improbable.
One of the grounds of appeal before their Lordships and before the Court of Appeal was that Mr. Lewis should not have been allowed to give this evidence. It was argued that he lacked the necessary expertise and, it seems, that the evidence was in any event irrelevant and inadmissible. This ground of appeal was rightly rejected by the Court of Appeal. The limited evidence which Mr. Lewis gave was clearly within his expertise and went to a question which was relevant and upon which the jury required expert assistance. The jury would need to consider what the significance was of the position where the body fell to the acceptance or rejection of the appellant's explanation.
A second expert witness, Mr. Workman, was also called at the insistence of the appellant to give evidence on the same point but his evidence merely strengthened that of Mr. Lewis. He confirmed that, if the body had fallen without any lateral impetus being applied, it would have fallen closer to the building and landed on a 9' wide metal platform about 10' above the ground. This platform formed part of a fire escape on the outside of the building bounded by a metal railing. This railing was to feature in a statement made by the appellant from the dock at the trial. He had not mentioned it earlier. In re-examination Mr. Workman said that the requisite lateral force could have been a push, implicitly accepting that it could also have been something else.
The prosecution case had to rely upon circumstantial evidence. But this included the evidence of a Mr. Philbert Jackson who had happened to be sitting outside his apartment in sight of the hotel and to have a pair of binoculars with him. His attention was drawn to the hotel when he heard Mrs. Baughman scream. He saw the immediate aftermath of whatever it was caused Mrs. Baughman to fall. He was a very important witness. His credit was attacked; the jury had to decide whether to accept his evidence. The other circumstantial evidence was less powerful and directed more to rebutting the appellant's explanation and showing that he had lied. The prosecution, as they were entitled to, sought to establish that the appellant had told lies in attempting to persuade the police that the fall was an accident. The prosecution submitted to the jury that he had lied to cover up his guilt. As to his motive, the prosecution case was that he had grown tired of his wife and wished to collect $200,000 insurance on her life.
A notable feature of the trial was that the appellant elected not to give evidence. He chose instead to make an unsworn statement from the dock. The defence case, apart from its attack on the prosecution witnesses, had to be derived from what the appellant said in this statement and had said in interview. The prosecution did not know in advance whether the appellant was going to give evidence at the trial and consequently a number of the witnesses were called by the prosecution primarily to give evidence which would contradict explanations which the appellant had given in interview and could be expected to repeat on oath if he himself gave evidence. The appellant's submissions before the Court of Appeal and their Lordships' Board were largely directed to criticising the probative force of this evidence as if it stood alone and was not essentially rebutting in character.
In order to understand the course of the trial and the significance of the evidence called by the prosecution it is necessary first to summarise the account given by the appellant in interview. He said that his relationship with his wife was warm and loving. They had discovered the staircase which led from the 8th floor of the hotel where their room was to the roof and had on a number of occasions gone up there together in order to enjoy the view. On the morning of the 27th they went to the pool together. After lunch, his wife went back to the pool. She was rather depressed. She had a number of drinks both before and after lunch but he did not because he had a tummy upset. He went off to a shop to buy a newspaper and on impulse bought a pack of greetings cards. He went back to the hotel room and wrote up two of the cards with love messages for his wife. He put one on her pillow and the other in a small plastic bag which he took with him.
Having rejoined her at the pool, the appellant and his wife went back to their room at about 5.00 p.m. She found the card on her pillow. They then went up to the roof.
"We walked up the stairs either side by side or may be I was one step ahead but we were holding hands. When we reached the tile area on the roof we stepped out on the tiles and I think we glanced at the hill to look for the goats. It was a very short time before I pulled the card out of my pocket and I started to hand it to Valerie and she reached for it and I think it hit the side of her hand and it fell. It didn't fall straight down it kind of fell at an angle may be a foot and a half in front of us and we both started to pick it up and 'am well' in order to pick it up you had to take a short step as it was not right at our feet, so as she went forward her foot and either one was slightly on the edge of the other or may be she did not lift her foot up and it did not slide very well. Valerie was wearing slippers. Well her body was going forward and her foot did not go far enough so she lost her balance and she...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R v Labrador et Al
...for another inference consistent with innocence, an unfavourable inference ought not to be drawn against the accused. (2) Baughan v. R (2000) 56 W.I.R. 198 at PP. 224, 226 and 229 PC, a case based on circumstantial evidence and the approach to be adopted in the treatment of inference to be ......