John Neville Aidiniantz v Grace Aidiniantz (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Peter Jackson |
| Judgment Date | 13 October 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWCOP 65 |
| Court | Court of Protection |
| Docket Number | Case No: COP 12751571 |
| Date | 13 October 2015 |
[2015] EWCOP 65
IN THE COURT OF PROTECTION
IN THE MATTER OF GRACE AIDINIANTZ
The Honourable Mr Justice Peter Jackson
Case No: COP 12751571
and
Will Tyler QC instructed by Rayden Solicitors for the Applicant
David Rees instructed by the Official Solicitor for the First Respondent
Jonathan Auburn instructed by Pinder Reaux for the Second — Fourth Respondents
Hearing dates: 29 and 30 September 2015
Judgment date: 13 October 2015
Introduction
These proceedings in the Court of Protection are the latest setting for the poisonous feud between the children of Mrs Grace Aidiniantz. On this occasion, they dispute where their mother should live, who should care for her, who should see her, and whether her finances should be investigated.
Mrs Aidiniantz, who is now aged 88 and in poor health, has four children:
John Aidiniantz ('John') lives in London. He is a half-brother to the respondents and is married with a young child.
Linda Riley ('Linda') lives in London and owns a property in Florida.
Stephen Riley ('Stephen') lives at 1 Parkgate Road, a property purchased in 1997 that was until recently also his mother's home.
Jennifer Decoteau, née Riley ('Jennifer') lives in London.
Where I speak of 'the respondents' I am referring to Linda, Stephen and Jennifer.
Others concerned with Mrs Aidiniantz are:
Ruth Mackertich ('Ruth'), her half-sister, who has lived at 1 Parkgate Road since 2001.
Ms AH, a carer employed by the family between April 2013 and June 2015.
Tariq Siddiqi, an associate of the respondents and an antagonist of John.
The proceedings began in November 2014 and conclude with this judgment, which follows a hearing lasting for a day, spread over 29 and 30 September.
Publicity
A preliminary point arises about the extent to which the proceedings can be reported. They were heard in private, in accordance with the Rules, at a hearing at which members of the press were in attendance. Two questions now arise: should the press be allowed to report the hearing, and should there be a public judgment naming the parties? Submissions have been made by the parties and by David Barrett and Mario Ledwith, journalists representing the Telegraph Media Group and Associated Newspapers respectively.
It is relevant that on 25 September a media alert was issued by a PR company, notifying members of the media that this hearing would be taking place. The alert is in highly partisan terms, and includes lengthy quotations attributed to Stephen. It was this that brought the journalists to court.
The respondents, having initially denied that they were responsible for the arrival of the press, were then faced with the press alert. They say that it was issued on the instructions of Mr Siddiqi and that the quotes from Stephen are not genuine but were invented by Mr Siddiqi to convey Stephen's views. They say that they did not know what Mr Siddiqi had done until the hearing was under way.
I have not heard evidence about this aspect of the matter and it is unnecessary to reach a conclusion about it. Mr Siddiqi is described by the respondents as "a long-time friend/associate of the family who has closely followed and advised the family on their affairs." I am, to say the least, sceptical that he was acting without the knowledge and approval of the respondents, but it makes no difference. Even if Mr Siddiqi did not tell them what he was doing, he knows them well enough to know that he was doing what they wanted. Indeed, Linda made all the points that appear in the media alert when giving evidence.
The relevance of this is that it alerts the court to the risk that the proceedings will be used as a platform to publicise unproven allegations.
The first question is whether the press should be allowed to report the hearing itself. It submits that it should, or at least that it should be allowed to report certain identified passages from the evidence. The second question is whether the parties should be named in the published judgment.
The respondents' position on these questions is ostensibly neutral. The applicant opposes the hearing being reported and asks for the judgment to be anonymised and reporting restriction to be imposed. The Official Solicitor does not oppose reporting of the hearing along the lines proposed by the press as a fallback position, or the naming of the parties in the judgment.
The general rule is that the hearing is to be held in private, but the court may make an order for all or part of the hearing to be held in public, or allowing specified information to be published, but only where there is good reason to do so: COP Rules 2007 rr. 90–93.
On the question of a public hearing, this is a question that should normally be asked and answered at the outset of proceedings. Once a hearing has taken place in private, even in the presence of the press, an application of the present type seeks to convert it into a public hearing retrospectively. This is in my view problematic. Parties and witnesses should normally know where they stand at the time that they are participating in a hearing. While the court should maintain full flexibility in the operation of Rules 90 to 93, and there may be special cases in which a decision cannot be taken until after the event, I would be cautious before following that course in any normal circumstances. In this case, I do not find a good reason for departing from the rule that the hearing itself remains private.
I also refuse the request for permission to report extracts from the evidence. I appreciate that journalists are experts in selecting material for public consumption and that judges are not, but having seen the extracts that the press wishes to publish against the background of my decision on publication of this judgment and the contents of the judgment itself, I do not find a good reason to endorse selective reporting from the hearing itself.
As to the issue of publication of this judgment and the naming of the parties, Mr Tyler QC submits that:
(1) Real weight should be given to the general rule that the hearing should be in private: Independent News Media Ltd. v A [2009] EWHC 2858.
(2) There is scant genuine public interest in publication of the current proceedings. The press is avowedly not interested in the issues about Mrs Aidiniantz's care, but in the family dispute.
(3) Mrs Aidiniantz's privacy and dignity should be protected, even though she is incapacitated.
(4) John has brought these proceedings in good faith, and should not thereby be exposed to vilification by the respondents. His wife and children would also be affected by publicity, as might employees of the family business.
(5) Litigants generally should not be deterred from approaching the Court of Protection by the fear of consequent publicity.
(6) Public identification of the parties to this "private family dispute" is unlikely to bring reconciliation closer and is likely to fuel conflict.
The position taken by the journalists is that:
(1) This is the latest in a long line of public disagreements between the parties that have been extensively reported in the press, evidenced by news reports from 2013 onwards.
(2) The disagreement about Mrs Aidiniantz's health is not in itself of public interest but is the current forum for the ongoing family dispute, which is of public interest, particularly given the family's business interests.
(3) Anonymisation of the judgment would make it impossible for the press to report this latest chapter in the very public disagreements between the parties.
(4) Blanket reporting restrictions are not required to protect Mrs Aidiniantz's privacy and dignity. There is no intention to report details of her care arrangements or medical condition, beyond saying that she is aged and infirm.
There is in my view good reason for the court to publish its judgment in this case in a form that names the individuals involved:
(1) Happily, very few families descend to the level of mutual acrimony that exists in this family. It is in the public interest for the public, if it is interested, to see the consequences. It is in the public interest to know how the court process operates in a recognizable case. It is in the public interest to know what it all costs: in the past year this family has spent £270,000 on this branch of its litigation alone. It is not in the public interest to suppress all that information: on the contrary, knowledge of how one family has behaved may deter another family from behaving likewise.
(2) In this case, publication of an anonymised judgment would be futile. So much information is already in the public domain that any anonymised judgment would inevitably be linked to the family. The press would be placed in an impossible situation in knowing what it could and could not report.
(3) It is undesirable that there should be any greater difference of approach than is necessary between two courts dealing with different but related aspects of the same dispute. As recently as 4 June 2015, an extensive public judgment in relation to financial issues was given in the Chancery Division.
(4) This is not just "a private family dispute". These parties have repeatedly chosen to air their differences in the courts. There is little likelihood of reconciliation. A public judgment will not make matters any worse for Mrs Aidiniantz than they already are. The parties might even reflect on their future conduct if they know that it may come to public attention.
(5) Mrs Aidiniantz's right to privacy and dignity is undoubtedly an important consideration. Even though she herself will not be aware of...
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