Jones v Gates

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeTHE MASTER OF THE ROLLS,LORD JUSTICE JENKINS,LORD JUSTICE MORRIS
Judgment Date10 December 1953
Judgment citation (vLex)[1953] EWCA Civ J1210-1
CourtCourt of Appeal
Date10 December 1953

[1953] EWCA Civ J1210-1

In The Supreme Court of Judicature

Court of Appeal

On Appeal from the Bournemouth County Court

Before:

The Master of the Rolls

(Sir Raymond Evershed).

Lord Justice Jenkins and

Lord Justice Morris

John Clement Jones
and
John Gates

Counsel for the Appellant: MR R.R.D. PHILLIPS. Instructed by Messrs Sharpe, Pritchard & co., London, agents for Messrs Rendall, Litchfield & co.,(Bournemouth).

Counsel for the Respondent: MR ROBERT HUGHES, instructed by Messrs Peacock & Goddard, London, agents for Messrs Luff Raymond & Williams (Wimbourne Minster).

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS
1

This was an action to recover possession of a field of 6.162 acres at Northbourne, in the Country Borough of Bournemouth. I gather from Mr Phillips that there was at one time a question whether this field, or the tenancy of it, constituted an agricultural holdings or a tenancy within the meaning of the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1948; but it is now conceded that it was an agricultural holding, and therefore that the subject matter was within the scope of the Agricultral Holdings Act, 1948.

2

That being so, the Plaintiff, who is the Appellant in this Court, by his solicitors served upon the Defendant, the Tenant, on the 25th June 1951, a notice which, so far as it is relevant, was in these terms: "We hereby give notice to quit and deliver up" the field which I have mentioned, and then there was added this: "The land is required for a use other than agriculture for which permission has been granted under the enactments relating to town and country planning".

3

On the 28th June 1951 the Tenant, or his agent on his behalf, served a counter-notice to the effect that Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, should apply, and that the Notice to Quit should not have effect unless the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries consented to its operation. The form of notice and counter-notice is a reference to the terms of section 24 of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1948, Sub-section (1) of which provides as follows: "Where notice to quit an agricultural holding or part of an agricultural holding is given to the tenant thereof, and not later than one month from the giving of the notice to quit the tenant serves on the landlord a counter-notice in writing requiring that this subsection shall apply to the notice to quit, then, subject to the provisions of the nextfollowing subsection, the notice to quit shall not have effect unless the Minister consents to the operation thereof".

4

I pause to emphasise that Parliament has there enacted in the plainest terms that where a cross notice is given within a month, then, subject only to what follows in the next subsection, the Notice to Quit is not to have effect unless the Minister consents.

5

Sub-section (2) of Section 24 provides as follows: "The foregoing subsection shall not apply where. … (b) the notice to quit is given on the ground that the land is required for a use, other than for agriculture, for which permission has been granted on an application made under the enactments relating to town and country planning, or" — and then an alternative is stated which I can pass over. The paragraph concludes: "and that fact is stated in the notice."

6

From what I have read it is apparent that the landlord, By stating at the end of his notice that the fact is as I have read it, purported to invoke Paragraph (b) of Subsection (2), so as to exclude the Operation of Subsection (1). The tenant, on his part, challenged the landlord's right to invoke Section 24, Subsection (2), and called upon the operation of Subsection (1), claiming therefore that without the Minister's consent the Notice was invalid.

7

In those circumstances the first question which fell to be decided by the Country Court Judge was whether it was the fact that the land was required for a need other than for agriculture for which permission had been granted, etc. Nobody has suggested that merely stating that fact (that the Notice to Quit is given on the ground that the land is required, etc.) is sufficient and that the terms of the subsection are satisfied by the mere ipse dixit of the landlord. The conclusion of the Country Court Judge was as follows: "As to its being so required the Plaintiff says that he intends to sell the field as a sports groundand would have no difficulty in doing so. He has he says had enquiries from a business firm and a football club but has so far had no offer and is not I gather now in negotiation with anybody. He does not propose either to let it for that purpose or so to use it himself. On that evidence Mr Phillips says that a reasonable prospect of use is shown and that satisfies the word 'required'. I do not think that in the absence of a definite person or persons willing to negotiate there could be said to be such a reasonable prospect and I am not therefore satisfied that the holding is 'required' for the purpose."

8

I agree entirely with that language of the learned country Court Judge; I may say that the finding followed evidence given by the plaintiff, and certain correspondence which has been read to us, from which it is quite plain that although the landlord has it in mind, if he finds a purchaser, to sell the field as a sports ground, there is at the moment no such purchaser. As the country Court Judge said, there is no-one in negotiation with the landlord nor, as it seems to me on the evidence, was there anybody at any relevant time.

9

The matter may, I think, therefore, be put quite briefly thus: If the question be: is this land required for a use, etc., then who now so requires it? Not the landlord, because as the Country Court Judge says, he does not propose to use it or to let it; and there is nobody else except what Mr Phillips calls "the prospective purchaser." who is an unidentified and possibly non-existent person — nobody else can answer that description. It follows therefore, in my judgement, that the learned Country Court Judge rightly decided adversely to the Plaintiff.

10

Certain other points which were put are dealt with by the Country Country Judge and they do not arise here, save one...

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