Keith Neale v Director of Public Prosecutions
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Steyn,Lord Justice Dingemans |
| Judgment Date | 23 February 2021 |
| Neutral Citation | [2021] EWHC 658 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/4226/2020 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 23 February 2021 |
[2021] EWHC 658 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE DIVISIONAL COURT
Cardiff Civil Justice Centre
2 Park Street
Cardiff CF10 1ET
Lord Justice Dingemans
Mrs Justice Steyn DBE
Case No: CO/4226/2020
Mr T Wainwright (instructed by Bindmans LLP) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Mr L Mably QC & Mr J Boyd appeared on behalf of the Respondent
Introduction
On 25 August 2020, at Newport Magistrates' Court, the appellant was convicted by the justices of wilfully obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996. He appeals to this court by way of the case stated.
The wilful obstruction alleged in the charge against the appellant was his refusal to give his name and address to a police officer when the officer requested that information in order to issue a fixed penalty notice to the appellant, pursuant to the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations ( SI 2020/353) as amended and in force on 23 April 2020 (“the Coronavirus Regulations”).
The essential issue in the appeal is whether the appellant's refusal to give his name and address to the police officer is capable of amounting to “wilful obstruction” for the purposes of section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996.
The justices acquitted the appellant on a separate charge that, on 23 April 2020, he left the place where he was living, and was in a public place, without a reasonable excuse for being outside of his home address, contrary to Regulations 8(1) and 12(1)(b) and (4) of the Coronavirus Regulations. They accepted his evidence that he was homeless, therefore Regulation 8(1) did not apply to him: see Regulation 8(4). In any event, they also found that he had a reasonable excuse for being in a public place because he had a taken a vehicle belonging to a friend who was a key worker for an MOT that day.
The case stated by the justices
The justices have recorded the facts they found as follows:
“(a) On 23 April 2020, at the height of the coronavirus pandemic, the applicant was approached in Newport City Centre by police community support officers, PSCOs Norville and Llewellyn. At that date the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Regulations (2020/353) were in force, as amended by the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (Wales) Amendment Regulations (2020/339).
(b) The applicant was asked numerous times to provide a reason as to why he was out in public and told that he was obliged to give the officers such a reason. The applicant declined to do so.
I The applicant was asked on a number of occasions to provide his name and address and declined to do so on each occasion.
(d) PCSO Norville requested assistance and PCs Lines and Wilkins attended the scene. PC Wilkins spoke with the applicant and asked for his name and address. The applicant refused to provide this information.
I The purpose of the police officers requesting the applicant's details was to enable a fixed penalty notice to be issued, as the applicant had failed to provide any reason for being outside his home and was therefore prima facie in breach of the Coronavirus Regulations.
(f) The applicant was arrested and taken to the police station.”
Before the justices, the appellant contended that he was under no legal duty to provide his name and address to the officers when requested to do so and so his refusal to answer did not amount to wilful obstruction of a police officer. In support of this contention, the appellant relied on Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414.
The justices rejected the appellant's submission of no case to answer and convicted him of wilfully obstructing a police officer in the lawful execution of his duty. They were of the opinion that:
(a) The police officer was carrying out his duties during lockdown enforcing the Coronavirus Regulations.
(b) The appellants made the job of the police officer who was trying to engage with him regarding a potential breach of the Coronavirus Regulations more difficult.
I Rice v Connolly should be distinguished. The justices were of the view that “the two cases were entirely different,” because in Rice v Connolly the appellant was going about his lawful business whereas: “In the present case, having refused to provide a reason for not being at his home address, the applicant was prima facie in breach of the coronavirus regulations.”
(d) They considered that the purpose of the Coronavirus Regulations would be defeated and they would be inoperable if a person could avoid being issued a fixed penalty notice by refusing to provide his name or address. Therefore the justices considered it implicit in the Coronavirus Regulations that the appellant was obliged to provide these details to the officer when asked of him.
I The appellant chose not to comply with the instruction to provide his name and address intending to obstruct the officer in carrying out his duty under the Coronavirus Regulations.
The questions stated by the justices for the opinion of this court are:
“a) Did we err in distinguishing this case from Rice v Connolly?
b) In the absence of an explicit legislative provision requiring the applicant to provide his details to the police officer, did we err in finding the applicant guilty of wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty?”
The legislation
Section 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 provides:
“Any person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.”
At the time of the incident giving rise to these proceedings, regulation 8(1) of the Coronavirus Regulations provided, “during the emergency period, no person may leave the place where they are living without a reasonable excuse.” The emergency period was defined in regulation 3. Regulation 8(2) specified that “a reasonable excuse includes the need” to do the various acts identified in subparagraphs (a) to (m). Regulation 8(4) provided “paragraph (1) does not apply to any person who is homeless.”
Regulation 10(2) provided:
“Where a relevant person considers that a person (“P”) is contravening the requirement in Regulation 8(1), the relevant person may
(a) Direct P to return to the place where P is living;
(b) Remove P to that place.”
A “relevant person” includes a constable or a police community support officer: see Regulation 10(11).
Regulation 12 provided:
“(1) a person who
…
(b) contravenes the requirement in regulation 8(1), commits an offence.
(2) a person who obstructs without reasonable excuse, any person carrying out a function under these Regulations commits an offence.”
Regulation 13 provided:
“(1) A relevant person may issue a fixed penalty notice to anyone that the relevant person reasonably believes, (a) has committed an offence under these Regulations, and (b) is aged 18 or over;
(2) A fixed penalty notice is a notice offering the person to whom it is issued the opportunity of discharging any liability to conviction for the offence by payment of a fixed penalty to (a) a local authority, or (b) a person designated by the Welsh ministers for the purposes of receiving payment under this Regulation as the notice may specify.”
Regulation 13(5) provided that a fixed penalty notice must state or specify various matters. The name and address of the person issued with the notice is not expressly required, whereas the “name and address of the person to whom a fixed penalty may be paid” must be stated: Regulation 13(5)(d). But the fixed penalty notice must “give reasonably detailed particulars of the circumstances alleged to constitute the offence.”
Section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 provides:
“(1) A constable may arrest without a warrant—
(a) anyone who is about to commit an offence;
(b) anyone who is in the act of committing an offence;
I anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an offence;
(d) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an offence.
(2) If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of it.
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