London Library v Cane (Valuation Officer)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE HODSON |
| Judgment Date | 04 November 1959 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1959] EWCA Civ J1104-1 |
| Date | 04 November 1959 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
[1959] EWCA Civ J1104-1
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
Lord Justice Hodson,
Lord Justice Ormerod and
Mr. Justice Wynn-Parry
In the Matter of the Local Government Act, 1948 and
In the Matter of the Rating and Valuation Acts, 1925 to 1957 and
In the Matter of an Appeal from the Central London Local Valuation Court
Mr. GEOFFREY LAWRENCE, Q.C. and Mr. FRANK STOCKDALE (instructed by Messrs. Godge, Fiske & Co.) appeared on behalf of the Appellants, The London Library.
Mr. J.P. WIDGERY, Q.C. and Mr. PATRICK BROWNE (instructed by the Solicitor of Inland Revenue) appeared of behalf of the Respondent Valuation Officer.
Mr. REGINALD W. BELL (instructed by Messrs. Allen & Son) appeared on behalf of the Respondents the Westminster City Council.
: The Judgment that I am about to read is the Judgment of the Court.
The question in this appeal is whether The London Library is liable to be assessed for the purpose of rating or whether it is exempt from rates under the provisions of the Scientific Societies Act, 1843. Section 1 of the Act so far as material to this appeal is as follows: "No person or persons shall be assessed or rated, or liable to be assessed or rated.… In respect of any land houses or buildings.…belonging to any society instituted for the purposes of science literature or the fine arts exclusively.…provided such society shall be supported wholly or in part by annual voluntary contributions.…"
The proposal for rating of The London Library was made on the 24th January, 1957, and the assessment was confirmed on the 21st August, 1957, by the Local Valuation Court for Central London. The appeal by The London Library to the Lands Tribunal was dismissed on the 29th July, 1958, by the learned President, from whose decision this appeal is brought.
The history of the Library is fully set out in the Decision of the Lands Tribunal and need not be repeated. It has in fact for many years been exempt from rates on the ground that it is instituted for the purposes of literature exclusively and fulfils the other requirements of the Act of 1843.
The Appellants contend that while it is clear that the object of the Library must be exclusively for the enhancement, promotion and dissemination of literature, the fact that the members pay an annual subscription does not destroy the exclusiveness of the objects. They submit that the means employed by the Library for attaining these objects do not disqualify provided the means, as they say is the case of these employed by the Library, do not amount to a distinct collateral object.
A number of cases decided in the middle of the last century were cited in support of the contention that The London Library was not disqualified by reason of its having a collateral object in addition to the object of the promotion of literature. These authorities begin with The Birmingham Churchwardens v. Shaw (1849) 10 Ellis & Blackburn, page 869, where the question at issue was never challenged, followed expressly in 1851 in ( The Queen v. The Overseers of Manchester 16 Queen's Bench, page 449). In the same volume of the Queen's Bench reports there are also The Queen v. Brandt, at page 463, and The Queen v. Gaskell, at page 472, and The Queen v. Cockburn, at page 480. In the same year there was the case of Earl of Clareadon v. Churchwardens of the Parish of St. James (1851) 10 Common Bench, at page 806, which related to The London Library itself.
In all these cases (except that of Brandt) the Court found itself bound by the Birmingham case, which is scarcely distinguishable from the present, to come to a conclusion which would be favourable to the Appellants here.
On the other hand, there are passages in the earlier cases which lead one to the conclusion that the attention of the Court was not always focussed on the word "exclusively" in the statute. Compare Lord Campbell's observations in the Manchester case to the effect that the members seemed not to have for their "chief" object their own recreation and amusement. In the Brandt case he referred to the "principal" object which the members had in view, although in Cockburn's case, the last of the series, he referred to the fact that the statute had anxiously introduced the word "exclusively" both into the preamble and the enactment.
If there was any misconception about the effect of the statute it was laid at rest by the House of Lords in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest (1890) 15 Appeal Cases, page 34. Lord Watson at page 348, referring to section 1 of the Act of 1843, said: "Then it is not sufficient compliance with the plain language of the Act that a society be established chiefly for the purpose of promoting science, literature or the fine arts. One or other of these must be its exclusive object; so that an institution which also contemplated some other, though altogether subsidiary object, could not claim the benefit of the exemption.
The principle there stated has been enunciated clearly in this Court in the case of ( British Launderers' Research Association 1949 1 King's Bench, page 434), where Lord Justice Denning used the following words (at page 467): "There is one thing which is clear both on the wording of the statute and on the cases. The word 'exclusively' must be given its full effect. It is not sufficient that the society should be instituted 'mainly' or 'primarily' or 'chiefly' for the purpose of science, literature or the fine arts. It must be instituted 'exclusively' for these purposes. The only qualification - which, indeed, is not really a qualification at all - is that other purposes which are merely incidental to the purposes of science and literature or the fine arts, that is, merely a means to the fulfilment of these purposes, do not deprive a society of the exemption. Once, however, the other purposes cease to be merely incidental but become collateral; that is, cease to be a means to an end, but become an end in themselves; that is, become additional purposes of the society; then, whether they be main or subsidiary, whether they exist jointly with or separately from the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts, the society cannot claim the exemption. That is, I think, made quite clear by the Opinions of Lord Watson and Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest".
There is no real dispute between the parties as to the approach to the problem, and it is recognised that in so far as the Society serves individual members it must do so incidentally and not as an end in itself in order to claim exemption.
The only question is whether on the true construction of the charter the Appellants can contend that the object of the Library is literature exclusively, for no question here arises of activities of the Society outside the scope of the charter. The charter recites: "That the Association or Society now existing and known as the 'London Library' was established in the year 1841 by Thomas Carlyle and other eminent persons under the patronage of H.R.H. the late Prince Consort to supply the great want in London of a library embracing every department of literature and philosophy and from which books might be taken for use by members to their own homes".
Reference to the byelaws, which again are set out in full in the Decision of the learned President, shows that the advantages of the Society are restricted to members. No doubt since many of the members are corporate bodies, through these bodies a large number of persons other than individual members may have access to the volumes of literature contained in the library, but the tangible benefits of the library are restricted to the members themselves. The relevant findings of fact contained in the learned President's Decision are as follows: "What then is the true purpose of this Library? I think the answer is to be found in the first paragraph of the Charter: '…a library embracing every department of literature and philosophy and from which books might be taken for use by members to their own homes'. And the provision imposed by the library 'A member's rights are personal and cannot be assigned or shared'. All the evidence confirms that in their use of the hereditament the Society has rigorously adhered to the terms of their charter and has ensured the practical application of these terms by their byelaws and circulars to members and prospective members. In no place in either the byelaws or circulars is...
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