Maharaj and Another v Motor One Insurance Company Ltd
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Wilson |
| Judgment Date | 30 April 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] UKPC 8 |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Date | 30 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | Privy Council Appeal No 0101 of 2016 |
[2018] UKPC 8
Easter Term
Privy Council
From the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
Lord Mance
Lord Kerr
Lord Wilson
Lord Sumption
Lady Black
Privy Council Appeal No 0101 of 2016
Appellants
Reeyah Chattergoon
Taurean Dassyne
Prakash Maharaj
(Instructed by Reeyah Chattergoon & Associates)
Respondent
Shawn A Roopnarine
Helen Lochan
Shanta Balgobin
(Instructed by Roopnarine & Co)
Heard on 1 March 2018
On 17 September 2013 Mr Rampersad Maharaj and Mr Radesh Maharaj (“the claimants”) brought a claim in the High Court against Motor One Insurance Company Ltd (“the insurer”). On 13 April 2016 the Court of Appeal (Narine JA, who gave the substantive judgment, and Moosai and Jones JJA, who agreed with it), in the course of reversing a judgment given in the High Court by Kangaloo J on 29 July 2015, held that their claim was barred by section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation of Certain Actions Act (“the Limitation Act”). The claimants appeal as of right to the Board under section 109(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic.
On 1 August 1988 the first claimant was driving a motorcycle in the town of Penal. The second claimant was his pillion passenger. Their motorcycle collided with a motor car, registration number PT 6676, driven by Mr Parmashwar. The claimants suffered serious injuries.
On 13 February 1990 the claimants sued Mr Parmashwar for having negligently caused their injuries. Ever since then, the history has been one of astonishing forensic delay, perhaps testament to the past difficulties of progressing litigation in the courts of the Republic. It was only on 28 April 1998 that judgment was given for the claimants against Mr Parmashwar, with damages to be assessed. It was only on 11 August 2005 that the damages were duly assessed — in substantial sums for each claimant. Mr Parmashwar has not paid the damages or any part of them.
The claimants' claim against the insurer is founded on section 10(1) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act (“the Insurance Act”). It provides:
“If, after a certificate of insurance has been delivered under section 4(8) to the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under section 4(1)(b) (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability …”
Were the present claim to proceed to trial, there might be an issue as to whether Mr Parmashwar was a “person insured by the policy”. It is clear that he was not the policy-holder; and the insurer (which has assumed the obligations of a different company which issued the policy) does not appear to have assisted the claimants or the court to learn whether he was a permitted driver under the policy and was thus insured by it. Were the claim to proceed, the terms of the policy in that respect would need to be disclosed. But the issue before the Board is whether the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that the claim was time-barred under section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, which provides:
“The following actions shall not be brought after the expiry of four years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say:
…
(c) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment.”
The insurer contends, at any rate before the Board, that the alleged cause of action against it under section 10(1) of the Insurance Act accrued on 28 April 1998, when judgment on the liability of Mr Parmashwar to the claimants was given. It points to the words of section 10(1) and contends that the cause of action accrues when a “judgment in respect of any … liability covered by the terms of the policy … is obtained against any person insured by the policy” even if the “sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability” is identified only after its accrual; and in that respect it cites the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Ltd [1999] Ch 139, in the words of Potter LJ at para 25, that
“for the purposes of limitation, a cause of action may accrue for ‘any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment’ although that sum has yet to be quantified by some process of agreement or adjudication.”
The claimants dispute that their alleged cause of action under section 10(1) accrued prior to 11 August 2005, when, in the action against Mr Parmashwar, their damages were assessed; and such was the date of its accrual accepted by the Court of Appeal. But, were the Board to agree with the Court of Appeal that the time for bringing the action which the claimants brought against the insurer on 17 September 2013 was only four years from accrual of the cause of action, it would be barred irrespective of whether the cause of it accrued on 28 April 1998 or 11 August 2005.
The main issue therefore is whether, as the Court of Appeal concluded, the action of the claimants under section 10(1) of the Insurance Act is an action “to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment” within the meaning of section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation Act and is therefore on any view time-barred.
In challenging the Court of Appeal's conclusion Ms Chattergoon on behalf of the claimants makes a variety of submissions which the Board will assemble in the paragraphs which follow.
The context of her argument is the legislative background to section 3(1)(c) of the Limitation Act. The Act came into force on 17 November 1997, in other words just prior to the date in 1998 when the claimants obtained judgment against Mr Parmashwar and thus on any view prior to the accrual of any cause of action against the insurer. Prior to the Act's commencement the period of limitation for the bringing of a claim against an insurer under section 10(1) of the Insurance Act was governed by section 3 of the Limitation of Personal...
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