Michael Decker v Geoffrey William Hopcraft
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Warby |
| Judgment Date | 30 April 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWHC 1170 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ14D03245; HQ15D01988 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 30 April 2015 |
[2015] EWHC 1170 (QB)
The Honourable Mr Justice Warby
Case No: HQ14D03245; HQ15D01988
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Claimant in Person
Ms Kate Wilson (instructed by Adams and Remers LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 23 April 2015
These are the reasons for the orders I made at the hearing on 23 April 2015.
Introduction
Before the Court are application notices issued by the Defendant in these two defamation actions on 4 September 2014, 3 October 2014, and 14 April 2015, by which he seeks orders striking out some of the claims, and directions that certain issues in the claims that would remain should be tried as preliminary issues.
The Defendant is represented by Ms Kate Wilson of Counsel. The Claimant represents himself in both actions. He has not appeared at the hearing, for reasons which will become clear. Ms Wilson has advanced her client's case with scrupulous fairness, assisting me by identifying the points which, if he had been represented, the Claimant would be likely to have argued. It is because of his absence from the hearing that I have thought it best to give this written judgment rather than require the Claimant to go to the trouble and expense of obtaining a transcript of a judgment delivered orally.
The first matter I have to deal with is an application by the Claimant for the hearing of the Defendant's applications to be adjourned, on the grounds of the Claimant's ill health.
Background
The background to the actions is a dispute between the parties in their capacities as committee members of the Crawley Boxing Club. The Claimant was the Club secretary. The Defendant was the Club Chairman. There was a falling out between them which, according to the Claimant, began when he announced in 2013 that he would stand against the Defendant for election as chairman at the next annual general meeting.
It is unnecessary for present purposes to go into the details of the dispute that arose and continued over the following months. It is enough to say that it is alleged by the Claimant that the Defendant took steps, the validity of which the Claimant disputes, to amend the club constitution and to remove the Claimant. The Claimant not only disputed the validity of such steps but also referred matters to the sport's governing body, England Boxing.
The first of the Claimant's two actions was started by a claim form issued on 8 August 2014. This made three defamation claims. The first concerns words spoken in March and April 2014 to four individuals; the second concerns an allegation of crime made to the police in April 2014; the third arises from an email sent by the Defendant in April 2014 to a national officer of England Boxing. The Claimant describes these as the First, Second and Third Claims, and I shall do the same.
The Defendant's application notice of 4 September 2014 sought an order for the trial of preliminary issues in relation to the Third Claim. This was followed by a long and detailed letter of 8 September 2014 in which the Defendant's solicitors explained why they maintained that the First and Second Claims made by the Claimant were liable to be struck out. In relation to the First Claim it was objected that the Claimant had failed, deliberately and without justification to identify the publishees of the words the subject of that claim; and that the claim could not succeed in any event because the Claimant could not show that the publication had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to reputation. In relation to the Second Claim it was said that the plea was deficient for failure to set out the actual words complained of, and that in any event the occasion of the publication was absolutely privileged.
The Claimant replied the following day over six pages, stating that he would "deal with your points seriatim", which he then did, rejecting the objections raised. A hearing of the Defendant's application notice was fixed for 30 September, before Deputy Master Eyre. On 26 September 2014 a Skeleton Argument prepared by Ms Wilson was served on the Claimant. He prepared a detailed Skeleton Argument of his own. The battle lines were therefore drawn, in writing. I have been able to review and absorb both Skeleton Arguments in the course of this hearing – though Ms Wilson's latest Skeleton Argument has some updated legal references.
In the event, Deputy Master Eyre released the application for hearing by a Judge dealing with defamation matters.
On 1 October 2014 the Defendant served a Part 18 Request seeking the missing details in respect of the First Claim. On 3 October the Defendant's second application notice was issued, seeking an order striking out the First and Second Claims. On 8 October 2014 the Claimant replied to the Request for Further Information saying, among other things:
"I have obviously spent some time considering the proper response to the RFI. I would draw your attention to the Particulars of Claim (para 17 line 7–8) which expresses my concern that the individuals may suffer prejudicial treatment if their names are revealed …
… I believe the welfare of members (particularly where they are minors) supersedes my need for witnesses therefore I have decided not to comply with your RFI on that ground.
This, of course, means that your Application to strike out the First Claim has a far greater chance of success – indeed it will be difficult to resist. It therefore seems sensible, and will save time and cost, to agree not to proceed with the First Claim."
The Claimant did not however do anything more to withdraw the claim.
The question of when the Defendant's two application notices could be heard then had to be dealt with. On 13 October 2014 the Claimant wrote, referring to a medical procedure that he was due to undergo on 29 October 2014 for a "longstanding issue" and which he said would disable him from attending a hearing for three weeks afterwards, that is until 21 November, "perhaps longer". He said that even if fully fit by then he had childcare commitments during December that meant "any date prior to the end of the year may turn out to be problematic". He proposed any afternoon date on or after 5 January 2015.
The response was to the effect that the hospital stay and convalescence did make it sensible not to ask for a hearing in November, but that more than six weeks notice was sufficient to enable the Claimant to make arrangements to be available "for some dates in December". On 22 October 2014 the Claimant replied saying that "I can only repeat that I am likely to be unavailable prior to 5 January 2015. I am happy to provide a medical certificate in support to the Court in due course if required." The Claimant's correspondence was then placed before the court by the Defendant's solicitors and a date of 10 December 2014 was fixed.
A dispute then arose, accompanied by some ill-tempered correspondence on the Claimant's side, about whether the Defendant's solicitors had acted fairly over the matter of listing. Eventually the Claimant applied for a decision to be made without a hearing, to adjourn the hearing date on medical grounds. The Defendant's solicitors had agreed that if the medical information was private they did not need to see the medical evidence, though they did require to see all correspondence with the Court. An order adjourning the hearing was made on the papers by Turner J, and the hearing was re-listed for 12 February 2015.
On 28 January 2015 the Claimant wrote stating that "I have had the results of further medical tests, and I regret I will be unfit to prepare for and attend the hearing … I have been given a further medical certificate until 23 rd March 2015, by which time I hope to be fully recovered and will continue the case." The Defendant's solicitors again did not oppose the proposal. They asked to be copied in on correspondence but said that "as before, we do not require copies of confidential medical information to be provided to us at this stage." The final three words are to be noted. As a result of the Claimant's communications with the court at this point the February 2015 hearing date was vacated and the applications were listed for this hearing date.
The second of the Claimant's defamation actions was begun by claim form issued on 25 March 2015. The claim is for damages for slanders allegedly spoken by the Defendant on three separate occasions during a boxing dinner show on 28 March 2014. I shall therefore call these the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Claims. Those claims were made by separate action in order to ensure they were brought within the limitation period, without the complexities that could have resulted from amending the claim in the first action. The claim form records that the Claimant paid a Court fee of £10,480.
On 8 April 2015 the Defendant's solicitors wrote stating that they believed a preliminary issue trial in respect of these matters would further the overriding objective and that they would be applying for an order to that effect. They enclosed a copy of the recent decision of Nicola Davies J in Lachaux v AOL (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 915 (QB) in which the Judge set out and applied the relevant principles, in the context of two related defamation claims. On 10 April the Claimant replied, stating that he was "required to have another overnight stay in hospital on May 11 th", and inviting agreement to an adjournment. The Defendant declined to consent, and informed the Claimant by letter of 13 April that he would have to make an application.
On Tuesday 14 April the Defendant's latest application notice was served on the Claimant by post and email. On Wednesday 15 April the Defendant's solicitors sent the...
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