Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE WILLMER,LORD JUSTICE EDMUND DAVIES,LORD JUSTICE PHILLIMORE |
| Judgment Date | 13 November 1968 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1968] EWCA Civ J1113-1 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 13 November 1968 |
[1968] EWCA Civ J1113-1
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
Lord Justice Willmer
Lord Justice Edmund Davies and
Lord Justice Phillimore
THE APPELLANT appeared in person.
MR. GORDON SLYNN (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) appeared as Counsel for the Respondent.
I will ask Lord Justice Edmund Davies to deliver the first Judgment.
This appeal is brought in respect of a decision of His Honour Judge Barrington of the Lambeth County Court delivered as long ago as the 20th February of this year, wherebyhe adjudged that the Appellant, Mr. George Moore, who asserts (and we readily accept) that he is a man of hitherto unblemished character, "Do forfeit the sum of £20 for an assault committed by him on the 20th day of February, 1968 upon Edward John Toogood, an Officer of this Court whilst in the execution of his duty". It was further ordered that a jemmy or case-opener and a screwdriver found in the possession of Mr. Moore on his arrest be impounded. It is against that adjudication that this appeal is now brought.
Was the Appellant guilty of contempt? That is the essential allegation which Mr. Moore has resisted before us over several hours. In turn, it gives rise to two subsidiary questions. First of all, did Mr. Moore assault the bailiff Toogood, or, as he asserts, was he acting merely in self-defence? The second question involved is: if he did assault him, was Toogood at the time of the assault acting in the execution of his duty? If he was not then (assault or no assault) there was no contempt of Court.
Only the first of those two questions is raised by the Notice of Appeal, which challenges the conclusion to which the learned Judge came on the issue of fact raised thereby. Mr. Moore takes the point that there was no convincing evidence upon which the learned Judge could have decided as he did, that he misdirected himself in holding that an assault had been established and that he ought to have found that it was Toogood who had assaulted the Appellant. It is also submitted that the conduct of the trial was against natural justice, all the witnesses being in Court at all material times. Finally it is urged that the evidence called against the Appellant was fabricated.
I deal first of all with the complaint that natural justice was violated by witnesses being allowed to remain in Court and thus in the sight and hearing of other witnesses as they gave their evidence. Mr. Moore says that that is so gross a departure from natural justice that the finding ought to be quashed. But there is no rule of law about this matter. The Appellant has drawn ourattention to the solitary statutory provision that he has been able to find dealing with the point, namely the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, Section 57, which, however, relates solely to domestic proceedings. No rule of law requires that in a trial the witnesses to be called by one side must all remain out of Court until their turn to give testimony arises. This is purely a matter within the discretion of the Court. Indeed, if the Court rules that witnesses should be out of Court and a witness nevertheless remains in Court, while the trial Judge may well express his grave displeasure over such disobedience, he has no right to refuse to hear the evidence of such a witness who in violation of his order has remained. An authority, not quite on those lines but nearly so, is to be found in the case of Briggs in 1930, 22 Criminal Appeal Reports at page 68. Whether or not witnesses are to remain in Court being solely a matter for the discretion of the trial Judge, Judges vary upon that as upon many other matters. If I may be purely personal for one moment, my own preference (particularly in cases which, if not actually arising under the criminal jurisdiction, yet, like contempt' proceedings, are certainly on the fringe or savour of a criminal prosecution) is for the witnesses to be out of Court. But I know other Judges, and one in particular in regard to whom, if I may say so, my admiration is unbounded, who takes exactly the opposite view; he prefers the witnesses to remain in Court so that he may observe their reaction when they hear the evidence of other witnesses. It cannot rightly be said that, if witnesses are allowed to remain in Court, justice cannot be done. I reject that ground of complaint.
The other matters to which the Appellant refers in his Notice of Appeal amount in essence to a submission that the Judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, arrived at a wrong conclusion. The cases where an Appellant in relation to a pure issue of fact can succeed upon that ground in this Court are very few and far between. Within the last fortnight in the House of Lords, inthe unreported case of Onassis and Callas v. Vergottis, once again stressed that the findings of fact of the trial Judge ought not to have been disturbed, turning as they did essentially upon the credibility of witnesses. Similarly, in the present case the decision turned solely upon the impact made upon the learned County Court Judge by the witnesses called on each side. It is true that, while there were three called who asserted that a contempt had been committed, only the Appellant opposed them. But I have no doubt that the learned County Court Judge did not make the cardinal error of saying: 'Three on one side, and one on the other - the three must be right and the one must be wrong'. Having seen and heard all the witnesses, he came to his conclusion of fact.
The matters ventilated with, great amplitude by Mr, Moore here yesterday and today were all canvassed before the learned trial Judge, and I do not propose to go into them now. In my judgment the only grounds relied upon by the Appellant in his appeal are not established. But, as he appears in person, he has been allowed by the indulgence of the Court to rely upon a further ground not raised by his Notice. He now seeks to contest that the bailiff was acting in the execution of his duty at the time of the incident which is said to have amounted to an assault upon that officer.
That question necessitates consideration of the facts. The Appellant was the tenant of a furnished front room on the first floor at No. 9...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
R v Willesden Justices ex parte Brent London Borough
...interests of justice required that witnesses be excluded from court before giving evidence (see Moore v Lambeth County Court Registrar [1969] 1 WLR 141) and any person (including any witness) mentioned in s 47(2) of the 1933 Act should not be excluded without taking into account all relevan......
-
The City Council of Bristol v Desmond Charles Rawlins and and Another
...Two other cases (to which I do not propose to refer in detail) were: McPhail v. Persons Unknown (1973) 1 Chancery 447; and Moore v. Lambeth County Court Registrar (1969) 1 Weekly Law Reports 141, which is not very helpful. 19 That brings me to the final case which I propose to cite: Bristol......
- Tran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
-
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Patel
...for the applicant S Kovats for the respondent Cases referred to in the judgment: Moore v Registrar of Lambeth County CourtWLRUNK (No 1) [1969] 1 WLR 141: [1969] 1 All ER 782. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Shahim Begum (1995) The Times 15 February. Ntoto (unreported......
-
Cases referred to in 1983
...v. Mbamali (1980) 3 - 4 S C 31 432 Mogridge v. Clapp (1892) 3 L.L. 382 C.A. at p.391 524 Moore v. Registrar of Lambeth County Court (1969) 1 W.L.R. 141. 142. 458 Morgan v. DiscoII 38 T.L.R. 251 524 Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd. & Anor. (1971) 2 All E.R. 1156. 23 Morinatu Oduka v. Kasumu (1968......