Peter Maxfield-Martin v Solicitors Regulation Authority
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Soole |
| Judgment Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] EWHC 307 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/3241/2021 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2022] EWHC 307 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Soole
Case No: CO/3241/2021
Francis FitzGibbon QC (instructed by Richard Nelson LLP) for the Appellant
Louise Culleton (instructed by Capsticks Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 15 and 16 December 2021
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Soole
The Appellant (‘PMM’) appeals against an Order dated 28 July 2021 and associated Judgment dated 31 August 2021 whereby the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal 1 found proved three Allegations of misconduct by him whilst in practice as a solicitor at Gomer Williams & Co Ltd (‘the firm’) and imposed the sanction of suspension from practice for 12 months. The allegations arose from his completion of an application dated 25 June 2018 to the Law Society for mental health re-accreditation which contained declarations to be signed respectively by the applicant and a ‘partner/senior manager’ in the firm, in this case a partner/director, Gareth Gwyndaf Jones (‘GGJ’); and from his subsequent conduct when the firm reported him to the Law Society in terms which alleged that he had completed the form on behalf of GGJ without his authority.
Principles 2 and 6 of the SRA Principles 2011 provide that a solicitor must ‘2. act with integrity’ and ‘6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal services’.
The first two Allegations against PMM were that in breach of Principles 2 and 6 he:
1.1 submitted his application for mental health re-accreditation with a declaration he completed and signed off in the name of GGJ, which certified that its contents were correct and confirmed GGJ had read and understood the declaration, when he knew that GGJ had not seen or reviewed the application;
1.2 suggested in an email to the firm that they withdraw the allegation they had made about him to the Law Society, whilst referring to reporting alleged breaches by the firm of the Civil and Criminal Contracts. There is no appeal against the Tribunal's finding on this Allegation.
In addition, by Allegation 1.3 the SRA advanced Allegation 1.1 on the basis that his conduct was dishonest: ‘Dishonesty is alleged as an aggravating feature of [PMM]'s misconduct but is not an essential ingredient in proving the allegations.’ The identified particulars of dishonesty relied upon the two-stage test for dishonesty reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC. As to the first stage it alleged that when acting as he did PMM knew or believed: that GGJ had neither seen nor read the application; that GGJ had not signed the application nor given the declaration; that GGJ had not authorised the submission of the application with his signature; that the recipient would be misled as to the above matters when it received the application; and that the declaration was untrue: para.69. As to the second stage, that in those circumstances PMM was dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
By this appeal, PMM does not dispute the factual basis alleged in Allegation 1.1; but challenges the findings that this his conduct was dishonest (Allegation 1.3) and that it constituted breaches of Principles 2 and 6.
The appeal is pursuant to s.49(1) Solicitors Act 1974 and CPR 52.20/21. There is no dispute as to the essential principles of such an appeal, in particular that (a) it is by way of review, not rehearing ( CPR 52.21(1); (b) the Court will only allow the appeal of the decision of the Tribunal was ‘wrong’ or ‘unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court’ (52.21(3)(a)); (c) this can connote an error of law or fact or the exercise of discretion; (d) the Court should exercise particular caution and restraint before interfering with either the findings of fact or evaluative judgment of a first instance and specialist tribunal, particularly where the findings have been reached after seeing and evaluating witnesses; (e) the Court will only interfere with findings of fact and their evaluation, including a finding of dishonesty, if it is satisfied that the Tribunal committed an error of principle in carrying out the evaluation or for any other reason its evaluation was wrong in the sense of falling outside the bounds of what the Tribunal could properly and reasonably decide; (f) the SDT is a specialist tribunal particularly equipped to appraise what is required of a solicitor in terms of professional judgment and an appellate court will be cautious in interfering with such an appraisal; (g) decisions of specialist tribunals are not expected to be the product of elaborate legal drafting. Their judgments should be read as a whole; and in assessing the reasons given, unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it is appropriate to take it that the tribunal has fully taken into account all the evidence and submissions: see e.g. SRA v. Martin [2020] EWHC 3525 (Admin); SRA v. Good [2019] EWHC 817 (Admin); SRA v. Siaw [2019] EWHC 2737 (Admin); SRA v. Day [2018] EWHC 2726 (Admin).
Narrative
The background narrative can largely be taken from the Tribunal's succinct summary. PMM was admitted to the Roll in July 1989. At the material time he worked as a solicitor at the firm from their offices in Llanelli, on a consultancy basis. He had become an accredited member of the Mental Health Panel of Solicitors in June 2015. The firm had a mental health Legal Aid contract and PMM was the Legal Aid supervisor for the work. In order for the Legal Aid contract to be renewed in this area of work, PMM needed to be re-accredited. He submitted this application on 25 June 2018, a few days before the final date for its submission.
In addition to his own signature and declaration, the form had to be signed by a ‘partner/senior manager’ under the declaration ‘I hereby certify and acknowledge that the information provided in this application is correct to the best of my knowledge’. Against the ‘Signature’ box, the form stated ‘For electronic applications: I have read and understood the declaration above. Please check box to confirm your acceptance’. There followed a box in which PMM inserted an ‘X’. Against the main box he typed in the name of GGJ.
In the course of subsequent correspondence between the Law Society and the firm concerning issues relating to Continuing Professional Development (CPD), the firm obtained a copy of the application form. By emails in August 2018 from another director, Juliet Phillips-James (‘JPJ’), it was stated that GGJ's name had been put on the form without his consent and that he had never had sight of the application.
By reply dated 6 September 2018 to questions from the Law Society, PMM stated that he had been given express authority by GGJ to submit the application. By email dated 13 September the Law Society advised him that his application was unsuccessful and that he could appeal against the refusal. His appeal was successful and the re-accreditation granted from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2021. In doing so the Law Society stated ‘After careful consideration of the documents you have provided, your appeal has been granted. We are of the view that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that you had implied authority to submit the application with the consent of the firm’: letter 10 December 2018.
The matter was reported to the SRA. In his response to its ‘Explanation with Warning’ letter, PMM did not accept that the form was submitted without the knowledge or consent of GGJ, but did accept that he completed the declaration in his name and that he did not provide him with a copy of the form before doing so. He referred to a meeting on 1 May 2018 at which he stated he was given express authority to act in the way he did; and that the matter had been further discussed on 29 June 2018.
PMM was dismissed by the firm on 14 September 2018. In an email to GGJ and JPJ dated 1 October 2018 he made reference to alleged breaches by the firm of Civil and Criminal Contract and suggested that ‘in all the circumstances [the firm] would be better served by immediately withdrawing the allegation made to the Law Society’ in respect of his application of GGJ's signature to the re-accreditation form. This conduct was the subject of Allegation 1.2, from which there is no appeal.
The Judgment
Allegation 1.1
The Tribunal recorded PMM's admission that he had completed the declaration in the name of GGJ; and that when doing so he knew that GGJ had not seen or reviewed the application. Accordingly it found the factual basis of that allegation to be proved; and for that purpose the issue of GGJ's consent and authority did not arise. Thus ‘The issue of consent was relevant to the Respondent's reason for acting as he had, however it was not relevant to the simple factual issue of whether he had submitted the form and completed the declaration knowing that Mr Jones had not seen or reviewed it, which the Respondent had not disputed. The factual basis of Allegation 1.1 was therefore proved on the balance of probabilities’: para.37.20.
I will deal later with its findings that this conduct breached Principles 2 and 6.
Allegation 1.3: dishonesty
The Tribunal began with consideration of why PMM had acted as he did. On the issue of authority and consent, it found that PMM had the implied authority of GGJ to act as he did. This conclusion appears in a number of passages in the...
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