R Syed Gillani v Secretary of State for the Home Department
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Ms Naomi Ellenbogen |
| Judgment Date | 07 June 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWHC 2649 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/124/2018 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 07 June 2018 |
[2018] EWHC 2649 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Ms Naomi Ellenbogen QC
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
CO/124/2018
and
APPEARANCES
THE CLAIMANT appeared in Person.
THE FIRST DEFENDANT was not present and was not represented.
Mr A Moss (instructed by MPS Legal Services) appeared on behalf of the Second Defendant.
Ms J Element (instructed by the IOPC) appeared on behalf of the Interested Party.
THE DEPUTY JUDGE:
This is the claimant's renewed application for permission for judicial review. He filed his claim form on 21 December 2017 stating that the decision challenged was dated 4 October 2017, described as being the Metropolitan Police Service's decision to arrest him and the review of that decision by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, as that body was then known, now known as the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The defendants to his claim are, respectively, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, who did not appear today, and the Metropolitan Police Service, represented by Mr Moss. The interested party is the Independent Office for Police Conduct, represented today by Ms Element.
The arrest of which the claimant complains took place on 31 May 2016, some 19 months before the claim form was filed. The matter was reviewed on the papers and permission was refused by order of Mr Roger ter Haar QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, dated 9 April 2018. He noted, as remains the case before me today, that no case was put forward at all against the first defendant. It is unclear why she has been joined to these proceedings. In the circumstances, there being no ground which relates to her actions, there can be no permission for judicial review in relation to any decision by that defendant.
As was noted in the order made by Mr ter Haar QC, the case against the second defendant principally concerns the lawfulness or otherwise of the claimant's arrest on 31 May 2016. Mr ter Haar QC concluded that any application for judicial review in respect of the lawfulness of that arrest, and the circumstances of that arrest generally, is now well out of time.
The claimant asserts that the reason for the delay is that he had been exhausting all other remedies in relation to his challenge to the lawfulness of that arrest. That is an unparticularised, general statement, but, in any event, as is pointed out on behalf of the second defendant, the matters which were being pursued, both in challenging the decision made by the second defendant and its subsequent review by the interested party, would not change the nature of the arrest and its lawfulness. To my mind, it, therefore, does not explain or justify the delay between the arrest itself and the date on which the claim for judicial review was brought, and I agree with Mr ter Haar QC that any challenge to the arrest and any application for judicial review in respect of the lawfulness of that arrest and its circumstances are now well out of time and cannot proceed for that reason.
In any event, there are other reasons why the application discloses no realistic prospect of success (that being the test which, I remind myself, I must apply at this stage). Helpfully...
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