R v Antoine
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD,LORD MACKAY OF CLASHFERN,LORD NOLAN,LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD,LORD HUTTON |
| Judgment Date | 30 March 2000 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [2000] UKHL J0330-2 |
| Date | 30 March 2000 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[2000] UKHL J0330-2
HOUSE OF LORDS
Lord Nicholls Of Birkenhead
Lord Mackay Of Clashfern
Lord Nolan
Lord Hope Of Craighead
Lord Hutton
(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading a draft of the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Hutton. For the reasons he gives I would dismiss this appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Hutton. For the reasons he gives I would dismiss this appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading a draft of the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Hutton. For the reasons he gives I would dismiss this appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Hutton. I agree with it, and for the reasons which he has given I too would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
The issue which arises on this appeal is whether an accused person charged with murder is entitled to rely on the defence of diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, when he has been found by a jury to be unfit to plead by reason of mental disability, and a jury proceeds under section 4A(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (as substituted by section 2 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991) to determine whether he did the act charged against him as the offence.
On 2 December 1995, Michael Earridge, aged 15, was brutally murdered by two other youths, David McCallum, aged 17, and the appellant, Pierre Antoine, aged 16, in a room in a flat in South London, apparently as a sacrifice to the devil. McCallum plunged a knife into Michael Earridge's chest a number of times in the presence of the appellant after the appellant had prevented the victim from leaving and had struck him. The appellant and McCallum were indicted on a count of murder and (by an unopposed amendment) on a second count of manslaughter. McCallum pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility and his plea was accepted by the Crown. He was committed to hospital under a hospital order subject to a restriction order without limit of time, pursuant to sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
The proceedings against the appellant took a different course. On 13 March 1997 the appellant appeared before Judge van der Werff in the Inner London Crown Court and it was contended on his behalf that he was unfit to plead by reason of mental disability. On 18 March 1997 the jury heard evidence from two psychiatrists called on behalf of the appellant and one psychiatrist called on behalf of the Crown and the jury found that the appellant was under a disability so that he was not fit to stand trial. Their Lordships were informed by counsel that the evidence of the psychiatrists was that the appellant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
Upon the jury finding that the appellant was unfit to plead the procedure to be followed was that provided by section 4A of the Act of 1964 as substituted. Section 4A states:
"(1) This section applies where in accordance with section 4(5) above it is determined by a jury that the accused is under a disability.
(2) The trial shall not proceed or further proceed but it shall be determined by a jury—
(a) on the evidence (if any) already given in the trial;
and
(b) on such evidence as may be adduced or further adduced by the prosecution, or adduced by a person appointed by the court under this section to put the case for the defence,
whether they are satisfied, as respects the count or each of the counts on which the accused was to be or was being tried, that he did the act or made the omission charged against him as the offence.
(3) If as respects that count or any of those counts the jury are satisfied as mentioned in subsection
(2) above, they shall make a finding that the accused did the act or made the omission charged against him.
(4) If as respects that count or any of those counts the jury are not so satisfied, they shall return a verdict of acquittal as if on the count in question the trial had proceeded to a conclusion.
(5) A determination under subsection (2) above shall be made—
(a) where the question of disability was determined on the arraignment of the accused, by a jury other than that which determined that question;
and
(b) where that question was determined at any later time, by the jury by whom the accused was being tried."
Before the hearing under section 4A(2) was commenced by a different jury counsel for the appellant requested the judge to give a ruling on the question whether the defendant was entitled to raise the issue of, and seek to prove, diminished responsibility in respect of the count of murder. Counsel sought this ruling because if the jury found that the killing had been carried out when the appellant was suffering from diminished responsibility the judge would not be obliged (as he would be on a finding that the appellant had done the act of murder) to make a hospital order directing that the appellant's discharge be restricted without limit of time. The judge, in a careful and clear ruling, stated that the question gave rise to two issues. The first issue was what did the prosecution have to prove to cause the jury to make a finding under section 4A(3) that the accused did the act charged against him. The judge ruled, following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Egan (Michael) [1998] 1 Cr.App.R. 121, that the Crown had to prove both the actus reus of murder and the appropriate mens rea, and he observed: "If they cannot do that, then of course the defendant is to be acquitted." The second issue was that raised by counsel, namely, was the defendant entitled to raise the issue of, and seek to prove, diminished responsibility in respect of the count charging murder. On that issue the judge ruled against the appellant and held that on the wording of section 2 of the Act of 1957 diminished responsibility could not be raised on the hearing under section 4A(2). The jury then heard evidence on behalf of the Crown and the defence, the judge summed up, and on 2 June 1997, after a short retirement, the jury returned a verdict that they were satisfied that the appellant had done the act of murder charged against him. The judge then made an order that the appellant be admitted to hospital and that his discharge be restricted without limit of time.
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the appellant challenged the judge's ruling that he could not raise the issue of diminished responsibility on the hearing under section 4A(2), and this was the principal issue addressed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered by Lord Bingham of Cornhill C.J. [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1204. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that the ruling of the judge was correct, and the Lord Chief Justice stated, at p. 1214:
"[Section 2 of the Act of 1957] provided a tightly-drawn solution to a narrowly-defined problem, but it was a solution which applied only where the case against the defendant established all the ingredients of murder, both as to actus reus and mens rea. Thus, as the only question arising under section 4A(2) is whether the jury is satisfied that the defendant has done the act charged against him as murder, no question of diminished responsibility could arise. On a determination under section 4A(2) the defendant would not, in any event, be liable to be convicted of murder within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act of 1957, since section 4A(1) and (2) provide that on a finding of unfitness the trial shall not proceed, and it is not open to the jury to find the defendant guilty of murder but only that he did the act charged against him as murder: see also section 5(1)(b) of the Act of 1964 and sections 15 and 16 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The whole purpose of sections 4 and 4A is to protect a person who is unfit to stand trial against the return of a verdict of guilty. The procedure under section 4A(2) for determining whether the defendant did the act or made the omission charged against him as the offence is to protect the defendant against the making of an order under section 5(2) of the Act of 1964 in circumstances where he is not shown to have done the act charged against him. Section 2 of the Act of 1957 only comes into play where all the ingredients of murder are established against the defendant."
In the course of the judgment the Lord Chief Justice stated, at p. 1213, that the authority of Reg. v. Egan was not in issue before the Court of Appeal, but he expressed doubts about the correctness of the judgment in that case.
The point of law of general public importance certified for the opinion of this House is:
"Where pursuant to section 4A(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 a jury has to determine whether an accused person has done the act of murder, is it open to the accused to rely on section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957?"
On the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant and for the Crown invited your Lordships to consider not only the certified question, but a wider question which was formulated by counsel:
"Where, pursuant to section 4A(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, a jury has to determine whether an accused did the act or made the omission charged against him as the offence, must the jury be satisfied of more than the actus reus of the offence? Must the jury be satisfied of mens rea?"
This question raises the issue whether the judgment in Reg. v. Egan is correct. Because the two questions are interrelated and...
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Appendices A. Canadian, British, and American Case Summaries
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