R v Willoughby (Keith Calverley)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | THE VICE PRESIDENT |
| Judgment Date | 06 December 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWCA Crim 3365 |
| Docket Number | No: 200400065/C4 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) |
| Date | 06 December 2004 |
[2004] EWCA Crim 3365
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2
The Vice President
Mr Justice Douglas Brown
Mr Justice Mackay
No: 200400065/C4
MR S CLARKE appeared on behalf of the APPELLANT
MR R BARRACLOUGH QC & MR J HILLEN appeared on behalf of the CROWN
On 27th November 2003, at Maidstone Crown Court, following a trial before His Honour Judge McKinnon, this appellant was convicted by the jury of reckless arson, contrary to sections 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, and manslaughter. On 7th April 2004 he was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for arson and 12 years concurrently for manslaughter, that is to say the total sentence was one of 12 years' imprisonment. He appeals against conviction by leave of the Single Judge limited to the judge's direction in relation to manslaughter.
For present purposes the facts can be quite shortly stated. The appellant was the owner of The Old Locomotive, a disused Victorian public house in Canterbury. On 18th August 2002, a little before 9.30 in the evening, the premises were destroyed by fire and an explosion. It was the Crown case that the appellant had recruited a man called Derek Drury (known as 'Bindy') who was a local taxi driver, to help him set fire to the building. Derek Drury was the man of whose manslaughter the appellant was convicted.
The two, according to the Crown, went to the premises to set fire to it, using petrol as an accelerant. In the explosion which followed the ignition the premises collapsed, killing Mr Drury and injuring the appellant, who was found outside the premises in a state of shock.
The expert evidence before the jury was to this effect:
"Although I cannot entirely exclude the possibility that petrol vapours were actually ignited by a spark from an electrical appliance, it is my view a deliberate ignition by a flame was more likely."
The motive attributed to the appellant was financial. He had a mortgage which, with arrears, amounted to a total indebtedness in excess of £200,000 by August 2002. There was also a second charge on the property, to the brewery, amounting to a sum in excess of £47,000. Both the mortgagees were pressing for payment. The appellant had sought to sell the property for residential development but five successive planning applications which he had submitted had been unsuccessful. It seemed unlikely that planning permission would be forthcoming because of the wish to preserve the facade of the building. Unsurprisingly, in those circumstances, prospective developers lost interest in buying the property. It was in fact sold the following year.
The appellant, who was of good character, denied the offence. He claimed, in the evidence which he gave before the jury, to have gone there with Mr Drury because they thought there were or might be squatters in the building, though none were actually found on the evening of the conflagration. Mr Drury, according to the appellant, had stayed on the premises while the appellant went to get a torch in order to explore the cellar. The fatal explosion took place while he was in the process of returning to the building.
The issue for the jury was whether or not the appellant was party to this conflagration and, in consequence, criminally responsible for Mr Drury's death. There was evidence that, on the afternoon before the fire Mr Drury had had a £50 note in his possession, was the sort of notes someone which to whom he owed money at the time had never previously seen in Mr Drury's possession.
In the early hours, following the fire, police recovered from the boot of the deceased's car a red petrol can and a torch. They also found another torch leaving the appellant's fingerprints at the entrance to the nearby car park.
In the course of giving evidence, the appellant said he had never poured petrol and had no reason to do so; any petrol was attributable to squatters. He also referred to having smelt gas on occasions at the premises, though he had not detected such a smell on 18th August.
The learned judge summed up the matter in relation to gross negligence in a manner which Mr Barraclough QC, appearing now, as at trial, for the appellant, described as classically appropriate, that is to say, as appears from page 10 line 19 of the summing-up:
"…responsibility for the death arises, firstly, where there is a duty of care owed by the defendant to the victim; secondly, where that duty of care had been breached, causing the death of the victim; and, thirdly, that it was such that it would be characterised as gross negligence, and accordingly criminal."
The learned judge then went on to direct the jury that whether or not there was a duty of care was a matter for them to decide. At page 11, line 8 of transcript, he went on:
"…it is for you to decide which facts you find proved and whether you are sure that a duty of care existed.
Now here, of course, we are concerned with the owner of a public house, who the Crown say engaged Derek Drury to assist him in destroying that public house by fire, and to be with him at the pub while the preparations for the arson were taking place. Even though both were engaged on such an enterprise, there was still a duty of care on the defendant, you may think, when Drury was on or near the defendant's premises, the Crown say to safeguard his health and welfare, to ensure that he would be safe from the risk of injury.
If you are sure that those facts have been proved, then there is an evidential and a legal basis for you to say that a duty of care existed. As I say, the decision on that is yours.
If you are sure that such a duty existed, the breach of that duty of care occurred, the Crown say, when instead of doing that, he with Drury, in pursuance of the joint enterprise to destroy the pub by fire, set about to do just that, with one or other or both scattering petrol around the premises, itself an extremely dangerous action, it is said, putting them both in a high risk environment, when it would only take one spark for ignition to occur, and which could occur at any time, even if accidentally or unintentionally. And, as it turned out, ignition did take place, with the result that Drury was killed.
Thus, the Crown say that there is the duty of care to look after the health and welfare of the victim, to ensure that he was safe at the defendant's premises; that duty plainly breached by what the defendant with Drury were doing and which, as it turned out, caused the death of one of them. By 'caused the death of one of them', the law means that it contributed significantly to the death, even if it was not the sole or principal cause. You may think that, without the petrol, there would be nothing to ignite.
Thus it is said by the Crown that the spreading of the petrol, to the degree that must have happened, given the scale of the fire that resulted, contributed significantly to the death, the more so of course if by his own, as is the prosecution case, Drury himself was the cause of the ignition."
Thereafter the judge went on to direct the jury as to gross negligence and what that meant, in terms which are not and could not be the subject of criticism.
Mr Barraclough's submission is that the judge's direction was inadequate because it amounted to no more than that two men had set fire to the public house owned by one of them. They had spread petrol, which was a risky business, and the owner was negligent by failing to avoid risk of injury, such as is inherent in such a risky enterprise. Mr Barraclough submitted that no doubt an owner can be guilty of gross negligence manslaughter, wherever the relationship sensibly permits a duty of care to be established. The question, however, is whether an owner owes a duty, without more, to ensure the safety of a co-actor as together they lay petrol. If a duty is owed, Mr Barraclough posed the question: is it by virtue of his position as owner/occupier or commissioning agent, or is it because co-actors owed a duty to each other to ensure each other's safety when, in particular, spreading petrol? Mr Barraclough sought to distinguish R v Wacker [2003] 1 Cr App R 329 on the basis that, in that case, there was a relationship between vulnerable passengers and the driver, if the driver closed the vent ultimately causing the suffocation of those in the vehicle. Here, however, submitted Mr Barraclough, the two who undertook the operation were of equal degree. He posed the question: could it be convincingly argued that the deceased was guilty of manslaughter in the absence of a specific act by him which took them beyond the normal potential consequences of such a high risk enterprise? The difference between the present case and Wacker, submitted Mr Barraclough, is that it is possible to smuggle people safely, which was the activity concerned in Wacker, whereas, although it is possible to burn a place down safely, it is not not possible to do so by the use of petrol without there being a substantial and inevitable risk. He conceded that there can be circumstances in which one criminal owes another engaged on the same enterprise a duty of care. He gave as an example where two agree to burn down a shed which one of them, but not the other, knows contains explosives. In the present case, however, submitted Mr Barraclough, there were no special features, at any rate identified by the trial judge, to render the appellant criminally liable over and above the arson reckless as to endangering life.
Mr Barraclough took us to a number of passages in the judgment of Chief Justice Mason and the judgment of Justice...
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