Re A (A Child) (Child Abuse)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Thorpe,Lord Justice Longmore,Lord Justice Maurice Kay |
| Judgment Date | 19 September 2007 |
| Neutral Citation | [2007] EWCA Civ 1058 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | Case No: B4/2007/1880 |
| Date | 19 September 2007 |
[2007] EWCA Civ 1058
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CAMBRIDGE COUNTY COURT
(HER HONOUR JUDGE PLUMSTEAD)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Thorpe
Lord Justice Longmore and
Lord Justice Maurice Kay
Case No: B4/2007/1880
Ms Margot Elliott (instructed by Messrs Irena Spence & Co) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
Mr Jonathan Bennett (instructed by Cambridge County Council) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
HHJ Plumstead, in the Cambridge County Court, delivered an extempore judgment on 19 July at a preliminary fact finding hearing in a public law case, in which a very young child had suffered some very serious injuries which must have been caused by one or other of his very young unmarried parents.
At the conclusion of the extempore judgment, Miss Elliott, who appeared for the father, sought permission to appeal, which was refused by the judge; and accordingly she issued a notice of appeal on 8 August, which was considered by Wall LJ on 14 August, when he directed an oral hearing on notice, with appeal to follow if permission granted.
There appeared this morning Miss Elliott for the father, and Mr Bennett for the local authority. I, as a matter of ordinary experience in public law proceedings, would expect the local authority to be opposing; but in reality they are supporting Miss Elliott, and no contrary argument is addressed either by the mother or the children's guardian. The guardian has written to say that her position is one of neutrality.
So, what were the judge's tasks? She had to assess the causation of injuries suffered by the child in hospital that very nearly terminated his young life. The mother was effectively the only possible perpetrator, since she was the only one of the two parents present at the hospital. The evidence against her was completely compelling, and it is hardly surprising that, as the trial developed, she made limited concessions as to her possible responsibility for the injuries that inevitably dented her credibility, since in all previous statements she had refused to accept any responsibility.
The judge had a wealth of expert evidence in relation to the hospital injuries, and in relation to evidence of earlier head injuries that emerged as a result of the very thorough tests subsequently carried out at the hospital. Those tests also revealed that the baby had suffered what the judge briefly described as:
“(73) So far as the left tibia is concerned, a skeletal survey has shown that there is a metaphyseal fracture at the end of the left tibia. Again, the consensus of medical opinion is perfectly clear; that that can only have been caused by a forceful twisting movement of the left ankle, and there is no dissent on that.”
When that tibial fracture occurred was impossible to determine, and as the judge said in paragraph 105:
“So far as the fracture is concerned, a very broad window has been given, but it could have occurred any time up to the end of November.”
As the judge approached conclusion, she explained why she had no difficulty in concluding that the mother alone was responsible for the injuries in hospital. The judge said in paragraph 109:
“[The mother], in my judgment, did mishandle him in a violent way in hospital, and so that is within her makeup. She has that propensity.”
In relation to earlier head injuries, the judge said in the next paragraph:
“The balance of probabilities is the test, and I am satisfied that it is probable that [the mother] inflicted the earlier skull injuries.”
In relation to the tibial injury, the judge in the following paragraph said:
“So far as the injury to the foot is concerned, I do not think that I can use what I know of her propensity to harm him by shaking him and dumping him...
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