Re GLATT and Another

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMR JUSTICE MITTING
Judgment Date14 December 2010
Neutral Citation[2010] EWHC 3619 (Admin)
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Docket NumberCJA/32/1997
Date14 December 2010

[2010] EWHC 3619 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Before: Mr Justice Mitting

CJA/32/1997

Re: Glatt

Mr Andrew Mitchell QC appeared on behalf of the Claimant

Mr Richard Jones QC and Mr Gordon Wignall appeared on behalf of the Defendant

MR JUSTICE MITTING
1

: There are four applications in this long running application by Mr Louis Glatt under which he seeks a detailed assessment under CPR 69.7 (5) of the receiver's costs, expenses and disbursements, including the amount that should be paid to the receiver as remuneration; in the alternative, and his preferred choice, for an order that the receiver provide a raft of detailed information about the breakdown of such costs.

2

There are two applications by the receiver: the first, substantially unopposed, is for a charge over the receivership assets and for an order for their sale to realise a sum sufficient to pay his costs and expenses etc. and, secondly, for an order for an interim payment out of the estate together with interest on such sums as I determine should be paid. There is no opposition in principle to the making of an interim payment. There is opposition both in principle and as to amount of any interest.

3

Mr Glatt's application can be dealt with shortly because it has —following submissions made by Mr Mitchell QC for the receiver and Mr Jones QC for Mr Glatt —been possible to discern a substantial measure of agreement. I am satisfied that the time has come at which all parties interested in this estate must either reach agreement as to the amount of the receiver's costs or, alternatively, participate in a process which will definitively determine those costs. The only method of definitively determining them against the complex background of this case that is likely to produce finality and justice is an order for the determination of the receiver's costs and remuneration by a costs judge. Accordingly, like Mr Justice Munby many years ago, I am satisfied that notwithstanding the cost of the exercise the time has come at which it must be undertaken unless agreement is reached beforehand.

4

Accordingly, I propose to make a deferred order for the assessment of the receiver's remuneration under CPR 69.7 (5) on terms which Mr Mitchell has outlined to me which gives the parties a short period in which to reach agreement if they can. I will leave the detail of that order until later. That disposes of the second of Mr Glatt's applications. There is no point in ordering further disclosure of material to him which will, in any event, be disclosed on assessment under CPR 69.7 (5).

5

The receiver's first application for a charge over property and an order for sale should not, in principle, create any problem. I accept that once I have determined the question of the principle raised by the receiver's second application that an appropriate order should be worked out by agreement between the parties, and I will give a short amount of time for that to occur.

6

The receiver's second application raises questions particular to the case and of wider interest. As this receivership has proceeded until it was discharged on 26 April 2006, four tranches of costs and expenses have been incurred and work has been done by the receiver which reasonably attracted remuneration.

7

The first tranche was the subject of an order by Mr Justice Munby of 25 July 2003. He assessed the sum which should be paid as an interim payment at eighty-five per cent of that claimed by the receiver. The second tranche which the receiver seeks is for budgetted costs totalling £92,605 odd which there is no reason to discount. Those were the costs authorised to be incurred. They have been incurred, and no reason has been advanced by Mr Jones as to why the full sum should not be payable. The third tranche is costs incurred over and above those budgetted. On the basis that only eighty-five per cent of those costs are to be recovered, the amount sought is £75,865. The fourth tranche is for yet further costs. Again, those costs are costs connected with litigation brought by or on behalf of the receiver in an attempt to realise the assets, the subject of the order. Eighty-five per cent of those costs amount, I am told, to £277,945. The total amount claimed in all four tranches is £530,201. All but the second tranche is claimed at the rate fixed by Mr Justice Munby when he ordered payment of the first tranche of remuneration and costs.

8

Mr Jones accepts that the receiver is entitled to be paid a substantial sum on account of costs and remuneration. He puts the sum which should be allowed on the third and fourth tranches at seventy-five per cent. If his figure is right, the difference is approximately £40,000. Accordingly, on his figures there is £480,000 odd due; on the receiver's figures £520,000 odd.

9

Tempting though it is to split the difference and come out with a tidy round sum of £500,000, I do not think it would be right to do that. The arguments advanced on behalf of Mr Glatt for differing from the assessment of Mr Justice Munby seem to me to be as lacking in substance as those which he substantially dismissed when setting the high proportion of costs incurred to date to be paid by way of his interim order. I see nothing in the material which I have considered which would cause me to differ from his broad-brush assessment.

10

I therefore determine that the amount which should be paid to the receiver by way of interim orders in the first and fourth tranches is £528,221.

11

The question of principle that arises concerns interest on that sum and indeed on sums that have already been realised by partly disposing of the assets. There is no doubt that the receiver has been from the moment of his appointment entitled to an equitable lien on the whole of the receivership assets (see Miller v Miller [1992] 1 WLR 517).

12

It has long been settled that a receiver entitled to a lien over the assets in respect of which he has been...

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