Ronald Terance Stocker v Nicola Stocker
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Warby |
| Judgment Date | 10 June 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWHC 1634 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ13D06031 |
| Date | 10 June 2015 |
[2015] EWHC 1634 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Warby
Case No: HQ13D06031
Caroline Addy (instructed by SA Law LLP) for the Claimant
David Price QC (of David Price Solicitors and Advocates) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 7 May 2015
In this unfortunate libel action the Claimant, Terry Stocker, sues his ex-wife Nicky for statements made by her about him
i) in the course of a Facebook exchange with the Claimant's then partner, Debbie Bligh, on 23 December 2012 and
ii) in an email sent to Ms Bligh's former partner, Eric Roche, on 2 January 2013.
It is the Claimant's case that the Defendant's statements ("the Posts") in the course of the Facebook exchange ("the Exchange") meant that he had tried to kill the Defendant by strangling her, for which he was arrested by police; that he had threatened her and breached a non-molestation order, for which he was also arrested; and that he had been arrested countless times and was accordingly, it was to be inferred, a dangerous and thoroughly disreputable man.
The Claimant alleges that these imputations were published to 21 named individuals who had authorised access to Debbie Bligh's Facebook page, and that they were in addition visible to all 110 of her Friends, and to many Facebook Friends of her Friends. He contends that the Posts frightened and distressed Ms Bligh and, for a time, caused serious damage to his relationship with her. That relationship has since come to an end. It is not alleged that this was a consequence of the words complained of. It is the Defendant's case, denied by the Claimant, that the relationship broke down as a result of Debbie Bligh's conviction for offences of benefit fraud.
The email sent to Eric Roche ("the Email") is said to have borne six defamatory meanings including (1) that he had tried to kill the Defendant by strangling her, (2) that he had threatened to kill her and harm her friends and their property, (3) that he was a vile, angry misogynist who was psychologically unwell and unfit to look after children, and (4) that he subjected the Defendant to sustained mental, sexual and physical abuse throughout their marriage. It is alleged that the Email was, foreseeably, deployed by Mr Roche against Debbie Bligh in the course of proceedings in France over the custody of their children causing her, and consequently the Claimant, distress.
The Claimant threatened litigation on the evening of 23 December 2012, but it was not until 4 months later that solicitors on his behalf wrote a letter before action. When they did, it complained of the Email and not the Posts. Despite the allegedly significant impacts of the statements complained of, this action was not started until 18 December 2013, nearly a year after the first of the publications complained of, and hence just within the limitation period. The case has not progressed swiftly since then. The Defence was served in September 2014, a Reply in November, and it was not until 7 May 2015 that the case came before me for a Case and Costs Management Conference, having been referred by Master Eastman.
The Defence raises issues as to the extent of publication of the words complained of, meaning, and defamatory impact. It pleads that the claim is an abuse of process because (a) it does not disclose a real and substantial tort and/or (b) the Claimant has the dominant collateral and/or improper purpose of causing the Defendant "distress, anxiety, embarrassment, hassle and/or expense". It is alleged that the Claimant consented to the publication of the Exchange. It is said that the publication of the Email is protected by absolute or alternatively qualified privilege, by reason of its connection with the French custody proceedings. Defences of justification and fair comment are advanced in respect of both the Posts and the Email. The majority of the facts relied on to support these various defences are also relied on in mitigation of any damages that may be recoverable. The Reply pleads that the Defendant published the Posts and the Email maliciously. As I shall explain in more detail later, the costs that will have to be incurred if this action goes to trial are said to amount to hundreds of thousands of pounds.
The features of the case that I have outlined above might appear to suggest that the action would be a suitable candidate for the trial of preliminary issues. However, no such application has been made by either party and, after discussion in the course of the hearing, I concluded that I should not force such a trial on the parties, at least at this stage. There is clearly a risk that such a trial might not conclude the claims. There may be, as Mr Price QC suggested on behalf of the Defendant, a risk that this would merely serve to increase the already very substantial costs of the action. It is clearly important, however, for both parties and the court to keep under review the question of whether a full trial of all the issues is avoidable.
The issues
At the hearing on 7 May I decided most of the issues raised, but time did not permit the delivery of a reasoned judgment. Hence this reserved judgment, which gives reasons for the principal decisions. These relate to applications by the Claimant
i) to strike out the defence of consent;
ii) to strike out part of the plea of justification in respect of the Email; and
iii) for disclosure and inspection of the Defendant's medical records.
This judgment also deals with the Defendant's costs budget, on which argument was concluded at the hearing but my decision was reserved.
The strike-out applications
The Claimant's application notice invokes CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (c), alleging that the plea of consent in paragraph 11 of the Defence and paragraph 15.3 of the plea of justification in respect of the Email disclose no reasonable grounds of defence and/or are in breach of a rule.
Consent
Consent was pleaded in paragraph 11 of the Defence served on 23 September 2014, with detailed supporting particulars. Paragraph 11 adopts and relies on the case of abuse of process pleaded in paragraphs 9 and 10. This is lengthy and complex, but its key features may be summarised as follows. The matters complained of are trivial and do not amount to a real and substantial tort; no real or substantial damage has been caused; the Claimant has only brought the action for vindictive motives, in the aftermath of acrimonious divorce proceedings; in October 2012 he texted the Defendant calling on her to say something that would enable him to sue for slander, as he "need[ed] the money"; on the evening of the Exchange he indicated by text to the Defendant that he would sue over it; but he kept the threat of proceedings hanging over the Defendant for as long as the limitation period would allow.
The further facts pleaded in paragraph 11 in support of the consent defence focus on the sequence of events up to and on 23 December 2012. The pre-Christmas period is alleged to have been particularly acrimonious and difficult. The couple's son Joshua was to spend Christmas with his father, who knew that the Defendant was upset that she would not be with her son for Christmas morning for the first time. In around late November/early December the Defendant sent a Facebook friend request to Debbie Bligh, which was accepted. The inference is invited that Ms Bligh told the Claimant about this, and that this would "inevitably have given rise to discussion between Ms Bligh and the Claimant as to the Defendant's motive and possible communications between the Defendant and Ms Bligh".
At 10.50 and 11.33 on the morning of 23 December the Defendant sent two texts to the Claimant which were highly insulting of Ms Bligh, whom she described as a "slag with 6 children with 5 different fathers" and "hag", who she did not want anywhere near her son that Christmas. The inference is invited that the Claimant made these texts known to Ms Bligh who, at some time before 12.16, posted a status update: "cant wait to wake up Christmas day with my man and his son xxx missing my children xxx". The Defendant's case is that it should be inferred that this was done by her after discussion with the Claimant, both of them knowing that it was likely to be read by the Defendant and would provoke a response, which it did.
The Exchange began at 12.16 with the Defendant posting "Which one of his sons would that be? May be u should be with your own kids." Ms Bligh queried what this meant, invited the Defendant to phone her and, when this was twice refused, carried on the conversation, asking "why ask me as a friend on fb?" When the Defendant replied that it was "very enlightening and confirmed a lot of my worse fears", Ms Bligh asked for details. That was at 12.28. It is over the following 70 minutes that the words complained of were communicated, although the transcript of the entire Exchange which is in the papers before me shows that it continued up to 14.39.
At paragraph 11.10 the Defence pleads that:-
"In all the circumstances it is to be inferred that the Claimant procured or authorised Ms Bligh to initiate or continue communication with the Defendant in order to induce the Defendant to publish the allegations complained of (which were a foreseeable and foreseen consequence of the questions asked by Ms Bligh). He thereby consented to their publication."
Particulars of the facts relied on in support of this inference are given. They include the following: that the Claimant had the motive and desire to obtain material that could be used to threaten or bring a defamation claim; that Ms Bligh continued the conversation even when rebuffed; the close relationship between...
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