S v Special Educational Needs Tribunal and the City of Westminster
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE LEGGATT,LORD JUSTICE MILLETT,SIR RALPH GIBSON |
| Judgment Date | 13 December 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWCA Civ J1213-2 |
| Date | 13 December 1995 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | QBCOF 95/1294/D |
[1995] EWCA Civ J1213-2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(Mr Justice Latham)
Before: Lord Justice Leggatt Lord Justice Millett Sir Ralph Gibson
QBCOF 95/1294/D
MR P ENGELMAN (Instructed by Messrs Teacher Stern Selby, London WC1R 4JH) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MR R McMANUS (Instructed by the Treasury Solicitor, SW1H 9JS) appeared on behalf of the First Respondent
MR T CALLMAN (Instructed by the Solicitor to the City of Westminster, London SW1E 6QP) appeared on behalf of the Second Respondent
Wednesday, 13 December 1995
This is an appeal by leave of the Judge against the judgment of Latham J given on 25 July 1995 whereby he dismissed the appeal to the High Court of a boy who is now nearly 13 1/2 years old and has been referred to as "S". That appeal was against the decision of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 2 February 1995. The Tribunal had dismissed the appellant's appeal against the provisions of an amended statement of special educational needs dated 6 September 1995 in error for 1994. The particular part of the statement objected to was the decision not to amend the school specified in the statement.
The appeal to the Judge was, as it happened, the first such appeal on a point of law against the decision of a tribunal pursuant to the provisions of section 11(1) of the Tribunal and Enquiries Act 1992.
The first point that was raised before the Judge concerned his jurisdiction to entertain the appeal observing that S himself, by his mother and next friend, was the sole appellant. The Judge held, in a careful and comprehensive passage from his judgment, that the only right of appeal to the Tribunal was that given by sections 169, 170 and 172 of the Education Act 1993 ("the 1993 Act").
Mr Engelman, who appears in this court for S as he did before the Judge, has taken us through those provisions and has shown us in addition the provisions of section 173, which also make provision for a parent to appeal. It is not necessary to consider in detail those statutory provisions. Suffice to refer by way of example to section 169(2) which provides that the child's parent may appeal to the Tribunal against the decision, that is (for purposes of that section) a decision not to make a statement.
To the like effect are regulations made under section 180 of the 1993 Act which provide for the conduct of appeals as parties, only by parents and the Local Education Authority. Once more Mr Engelman has shown us most of the salient provisions of the Special Educational Needs Tribunal Regulations 1994 Statutory Instrument No. 1910. Each of those provisions refers to a parent as making the relevant appeal or signing the appeal or delivering Notice of Appeal and like provisions. Perhaps most telling of all in the present context is the definition in regulation 2 of the term "child" in respect of which it is provided:
"In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires-
…
'child' means the child in respect of whom the appeal is brought."
Mr Engelman, in face of those provisions both of the statute and of the regulations made under it, very properly acknowledges that the parent is consistently identified as the person bringing the appeal. Nonetheless, he is emboldened to argue that that does not necessarily preclude a child from falling within the definition of "party to proceedings" for purposes of section 11 of the Tribunal and Enquiries Act 1992 when appeal is made to the High Court.
In aid of that submission, Mr Engelman contended both in writing in his skeleton argument and orally before this Court, first that the child plainly is a party to the proceedings in question. That appears to me to beg the question to which the submission relates. The term "party" as normally understood is a party to litigation, playing a prescribed part. The child, as...
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