Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance S.A. v Competition and Markets Authority and another
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Sumption |
| Judgment Date | 16 December 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] UKSC 75 |
| Date | 16 December 2015 |
| Court | Supreme Court |
[2015] UKSC 75
Lord Neuberger, President
Lord Clarke
Lord Sumption
Lord Reed
Lord Hodge
Appellants
Marie Demetriou QC Ben Rayment Oliver Jones (Instructed by CMA Legal)
Respondent (Advocate to the Court)
Kelyn Bacon QC
Ben Woolgar (Instructed by The Government Legal Department)
Intervener (Groupe Eurotunnel SE)
Richard Gordon QC
Gerard Rothschild (Instructed by Pinsent Masons LLP (London))
(with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agree)
SeaFrance SA was a subsidiary of the French state rail group SNCF. It operated a ferry service between Dover and Calais until 16 November 2011, when it went into liquidation in France and its operations ceased. On 2 July 2012, in circumstances which I will describe more fully below, substantially all of its assets were acquired by Groupe Eurotunnel SE (which I shall call "GET"). GET is the parent company of the group which operates the Channel Tunnel between the United Kingdom and France. It acquired the assets as part of an arrangement with Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA (or "SCOP"), a workers' cooperative formed to secure the continuance of the ferry service and thus the jobs of SeaFrance's employees. The essence of this arrangement was that while the ferry service would be operated by GET or a subsidiary of GET, the ships would be operated and crewed by SCOP. The service was subsequently resumed on this basis on 20 August 2012 using three of the same ships and operated by employees almost all of whom had previously worked for SeaFrance.
In September 2014 the Competition and Markets Authority, after an investigation of the impact of the transaction on competition on the cross-Channel routes, prohibited GET from operating any ferry service from Dover using the passenger ships acquired from SeaFrance for a period of ten years. Its jurisdiction to do this depended on whether GET's acquisition of the SeaFrance assets created a "relevant merger situation" for the purpose of the Enterprise Act 2002. The question at issue on this appeal is whether that condition was satisfied. This in turn depends on whether what GET and SCOP acquired on 2 July 2012 was an "enterprise" or merely the assets of a defunct enterprise. The Authority considered that what GET acquired was an enterprise and that accordingly a merger situation existed. The Competition Appeal Tribunal, sitting as a court of judicial review, held that they were entitled to reach that conclusion. But the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by a majority (Tomlinson LJ and Sir Colin Rimer, Arden LJ dissenting: [2015] EWCA Civ 487). In their view what had been acquired was not the "enterprise" formerly carried on by SeaFrance, but only the means to construct a similar but new enterprise. Accordingly no merger situation had been created and there was no jurisdiction to impose remedies. They held that that it had been irrational for the Authority, on the facts which it had found, to reach any other conclusion.
The statutory control of the competition aspects of mergers has been one of the more stable parts of the United Kingdom's competition law. It was introduced by the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, at a time when the only other country with a comprehensive system of merger control was the United States, and its broad outlines have remained unchanged ever since. The current statutory framework is in Part 3 of the Enterprise Act 2002. Before 1 April 2014, merger control had been the responsibility of the Office of Fair Trading and, successively, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Competition Commission. On that date important organisational changes came into effect as a result of the amendment of the Act by Parts 3, 4 and 5 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. The Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission were abolished and the relevant functions of both were transferred to a new body, the Competition and Markets Authority. These changes occurred while the reference which has given rise to the present appeal was in progress. But they do not affect the issues before us. I shall therefore refer to the Act throughout in its amended form.
The purpose of merger control is to regulate in advance the impact of concentrations on the competitive structure of markets. Some merger regimes, notably that of the United States, apply to any acquisition which is liable to bring about such a concentration. It is, however, a fundamental feature of the United Kingdom's scheme that it distinguishes between the acquisition of assets constituting a business and the acquisition of "bare" assets. Concentrations arising from the acquisition of bare assets are not subject to statutory merger control ex ante, even if they have potentially adverse effects on competition, although they may be subject to heightened regulation ex post under Part 1, Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 (Abuse of Dominant Position). The reason for the distinction is that it is thought to be inappropriate to inhibit the organic growth of businesses simply because it is achieved by means of factors of production previously employed in another business, if control of the other business has not itself been achieved.
Part 3, Chapter 1 of the Enterprise Act, deals separately with completed and anticipated mergers. Under section 22(1), which is concerned with completed mergers, the Competition and Markets Authority must, subject to limited exceptions, refer arrangements or transactions to a specially constituted group of panellists if it believes that it
"is or may be the case that:
(a) a relevant merger situation has been created; and
(b) the creation of that situation has resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competition within any market or markets in the United Kingdom for goods or services."
Once a reference has been made, the Authority is required by section 35(1) to decide (among other things) whether a "relevant merger situation has been created", and if it has whether the stipulated effects on competition have resulted or may be expected to result.
What constitutes a "relevant merger situation" depends on section 23. Under section 23(2)(a),
"a relevant merger situation has been created if … two or more enterprises have ceased to be distinct enterprises at a time or in circumstances falling within section 24,"
provided that the enterprise being taken over had a specified minimum turnover in the accounting period preceding the date when it ceased to be a distinct enterprise: see sections 23(1)(b), 28(3) and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Merger Fees and Determination of Turnover) Order SI 2003/1370, articles 2(c) and 11. Under section 26(1):
"for the purposes of this Part any two enterprises cease to be distinct enterprises if they are brought under common ownership or common control …"
For this purpose, "associated persons" and any bodies corporate which they or any of them control are to be treated as one person: section 127(1). "Associated persons" include persons acting together to secure or exercise control over any enterprise or assets: section 127(4)(d).
Of critical importance to these provisions, and to the issues on this appeal, are the definitions of "enterprise" and "business" in section 129(1). An "enterprise" -
"means the activities, or part of the activities, of a business."
A "business" -
"includes a professional practice and includes any other undertaking which is carried on for gain or reward or which is an undertaking in the course of which goods or services are supplied otherwise than free of charge."
There is no statutory definition of "activities".
It is, finally, necessary to refer to the provisions of sections 24 and 27. These deal with the timing of any reference. The effect of section 24 is that a reference must be made within four months of the relevant enterprises ceasing to be distinct or (if later) within four months of the transaction being made public or notified to the Authority. Section 27 provides that where the relevant "arrangements or transaction" take effect in stages, then two enterprises are deemed to have ceased to be distinct when the parties to the relevant "arrangements or transaction" become bound to such extent as will result in their ceasing to be distinct: sub-section (2). By sub-sections (5) and (6), if the enterprises cease to be distinct by virtue of each of a number of successive events occurring within a period of two years, the Authority
"may, for the purposes of a reference, treat successive events to which this subsection applies as having occurred simultaneously on the date on which the latest of them occurred."
The question whether GET acquired an "enterprise" or the bare assets of a defunct enterprise turns on exactly what happened to the business of SeaFrance during the hiatus of seven and a half months between its cessation of operations and the transaction of 2 July 2012. Since the Authority's conclusion on this point is said to be irrational, it is necessary to examine with some care the facts on which it was based. The following summary is based on the Authority's report and on the earlier report issued by the Competition Commission. I shall come back to the circumstances in which a second report was required.
Before going into liquidation, SeaFrance had operated the ferry service with four vessels. There were three passenger ferries, the Rodin, the Berlioz and the Molière, and a freight ship, the Nord Pas-de-Calais. They were all owned by SeaFrance except for the Molière, which was operated by SeaFrance on a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Medtronic / Animas Corporation merger inquiry
...consent. 7 Société Cooperative De Production Seafrance SA (Respondent) v The Competition and Markets Authority and another (Appellants), [2015] UKSC 75. 6 whether a given set of assets form an enterprise ultimately turns on ‘economic continuity.’ The CMA notes that this question is likely t......
-
MUFG Bank / DVB Bank merger inquiry
...the CMA will consider whether the transfer will enable “economic continuity” (Groupe Eurotunnel S.A. v Competition Commission [2015] UKSC 75 (Eurotunnel I) para 120). The CMA’s guidance (see Mergers: Guidance on the CMA’s jurisdiction and procedure (CMA2), paragraph 4.6 – 4.11) suggests tha......
-
Aer Lingus Limited / Cityjet Designated Activity Company merger inquiry
...of 7 Société Cooperative De Production Seafrance SA (Respondent) v The Competition and Markets Authority and another (Appellants), [2015] UKSC 75. 8 Eurotunnel notes at [39] ‘… if the assets of which the [acquirer] acquires control are to be regarded as constituting an “enterprise”, (i) the......
-
Vanilla Group / Washstation merger inquiry
...ICE/Trayport at [223]. 24 Electro Rent Corporation v CMA [2019] CAT 4, at [120]. 25 Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA v CMA [2015] UKSC 75 at paragraph 4; see paragraph 35. 26 Section 72(8) of the EA02. 27 ICE/Trayport at [220]. 28 ICE/Trayport at [220], emphasis added. 10 55. ......
-
COVID-19 And UK Merger Control: Acquiring Distressed Businesses
...January 2014, paragraph 4.44. 2 See, Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA v The Competition and Markets Authority & Another [2015] UKSC 75. 3 See, ME/6831/19, Anticipated acquisition by Roche Holdings, Inc. of Spark Therapeutics, Inc. 4 See, Enterprise Act 2002, section 23. 5 ......
-
UK Merger Control: Five Points To Consider When Planning Transactions
...1 See, Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC / Roofoods Ltd (Deliveroo). 2 See, Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA v CMA [2015] UKSC 75. 3 See, Sabre Corporation v CMA [2021] CAT 4 See, Roche Holdings, Inc. / Spark Therapeutics, Inc. 5 See, Provisional Findings in Illumina Inc/P......
-
UK Merger Control: Five Points To Consider When Planning Transactions
...1 See, Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC / Roofoods Ltd (Deliveroo). 2 See, Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA v CMA [2015] UKSC 75. 3 See, Sabre Corporation v CMA [2021] CAT 4 See, Roche Holdings, Inc. / Spark Therapeutics, Inc. 5 See, Provisional Findings in Illumina Inc/P......
-
Competition Appeal Tribunal Sets Deferential Standard for CMA Merger Control Review
...for Civil Service, [1985] AC 374, at 410. 2 Société Coopérative de Production SeaFrance SA v. The Competition and Markets Authority, [2015] UKSC 75. 3 Sainsburys/Asda v. Competition Markets Authority, [2019] CAT 4 See, e.g., Ryanair Holdings PLC v. Competition Commission [2014] CAT 3 (Ryana......