Tariq Alsaifi v Benjamin Amunwa

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Warby
Judgment Date27 June 2017
Neutral Citation[2017] EWHC 1443 (QB)
Docket NumberCase No: HQ16D04156
CourtQueen's Bench Division
Date27 June 2017

[2017] EWHC 1443 (QB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Mr Justice Warby

Case No: HQ16D04156

Between:
Tariq Alsaifi
Claimant
and
Benjamin Amunwa
Defendant

The Claimant in Person

Simon Harding (instructed by Ronald Fletcher Baker LLP) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 8 June 2017

Judgment Approved

Mr Justice Warby

Introduction

1

This is the hearing of an application by the defendant to this claim for libel, by which he seeks to bring it summarily to an end. Also before the court is an application notice filed by the claimant in response to the defendant's application, seeking rulings on meaning.

2

The claimant, Mr Alsaifi, describes himself as "a highly educated professional with qualified statuses in teaching, lecturing accountancy and engineering" who has worked as a teacher and lecturer in the North East of England since 2002. The defendant, Mr Amunwa, is a barrister and legal commentator. At the material times he operated a website called "law mostly", at the address https://lawmostly. com, a Facebook account also called lawmostly, and a Twitter account in the name benamunwa.

3

The claim relates to an article or blog post published by Mr Amunwa on the website and via these social media accounts from about 5 August 2016 under the heading " Teacher's regulator acted outside its power in unlawful prosecutions" ("the Article"). The Article related in large part to a judgment given by Andrews J DBE sitting in the Administrative Court on a statutory appeal brought by Mr Alsaifi against a decision of the Secretary of State for Education to prohibit him indefinitely from teaching: Alsaifi v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 1519 (Admin) ("the Appeal Judgment"). The Secretary of State's decision was made on the recommendation of a panel of the National College for Teaching and Leadership ("NCTL"), an executive agency appointed by the Secretary of State as the regulator for the teaching profession.

4

The claimant, who has represented himself throughout, issued these proceedings on 1 December 2016. He did so by filing a Part 8 claim form. Initially, his case was set out in the claim form and a statement of case dated 20 November 2016. However, by Order of Master Cook dated 1 February 2017 the action was ordered to proceed as a Part 7 claim. Mr Alsaifi was directed to file and serve by a specified date Amended Particulars of Claim, "which is to comply with the requirements of CPR 16, CPR 53 and the relevant Practice Directions", and certain other specified requirements, failing which the claim would be struck out. On 27 February 2017 he filed and served the Amended Particulars of Claim which now stand as the formal statement of his case.

5

Master Cook's order set a deadline by which the defendant should either file and serve a Defence or "make an application to strike out the Claimant's claim, apply for summary disposal, or apply for such other remedy as so advised." The defendant chose the latter course. Accordingly, there is at present no Defence. But the nature of the defences that would be relied on is sufficiently clear from the application the defendant has made.

The applications

6

By his application notice dated 10 March and sealed on 15 March 2017 the defendant seeks rulings from the court (1) that the words complained of are not capable of bearing the meanings attributed to them in the Particulars of Claim, and (2) that they are not capable of bearing any other meaning which is defamatory of the claimant. In the event that those determinations are made, the defendant seeks the dismissal of the claim. In the alternative, he seeks an order for summary disposal of the entire claim pursuant to s 8 of the Defamation Act 1996 on the grounds that "the claimant has no reasonable prospect of succeeding in his claim". That alternative application is based on the propositions that the majority of the Article was a fair and accurate report of the Appeal Judgment so that the defendant has an unassailable defence of absolute or alternatively qualified privilege; and if the Article was otherwise defamatory a defence of honest opinion would be bound to succeed.

7

The claimant filed notice of a cross-application, sealed on 31 March 2017, for a ruling on meaning in his favour, to the effect that the words complained of are capable of bearing "the meaning attributed to them in paragraphs 5, 6 & 7 [of the Amended Particulars of Claim] and/or any other meaning defamatory of the claimant".

Issues

8

The main issues for determination are, accordingly,

(1) Whether the words complained of are capable of bearing any of the meanings of which the claimant complains, or any other meaning defamatory of Mr Alsaifi; and if and to the extent they are

(2) Whether Mr Alsaifi has any real prospect of success at trial, given the defendant's intention to rely on the statutory defences of privilege for court reporting and, if necessary, honest opinion.

9

The burden of proof or persuasion lies on the defendant in relation to his applications, and on the claimant in relation to his application. But these are not issues in respect of which the burden of proof is of any great consequence. The court must form a view on the basis of all the evidence and argument before it. In doing so I need to bear in mind that this is a filtering process and that there are high thresholds to be met before one can justify cutting short the legal process and disposing of a claim at the interim stage, in summary fashion. The thresholds are identified at [45], [47] and [56] below.

Evidence and argument

10

I should pay tribute to the economy of the written and oral argument advanced by Mr Harding on behalf of Mr Amunwa, and I commend Mr Alsaifi for the courteous and generally clear presentation of his case at the hearing. It is however a matter of concern that both sides placed excessive documentary material before the court.

11

The issues I have identified are relatively narrow in scope, and do not require or admit of any substantial volume of evidence. The question of meaning is in this, as in most cases, a matter for resolution by applying settled principles to the particular statement(s) complained of. In this case the statement is quite short. Evidence as to meaning is in general inadmissible. As will be clear from the statements of principle which I set out below, the court is required to avoid over-elaborate analysis and must treat the issue of meaning as one of impression. It is therefore wrong to allow the parties to press the court in argument with minute textual analysis, which will generally tend to distract rather than assist. The other main task which the applications require is a comparison of the Article with the Appeal Judgment, to determine whether the one could be found at a trial to be an unfair or inaccurate report of the other. That is a matter capable in principle of sustained and serious argument, but not one that depends, or could turn, on evidence of any facts extraneous to the two documents in question.

12

Both parties nonetheless submitted a substantial volume of evidence. Mr Amunwa's case was set out in a witness statement and exhibits of Mr Ramdarshan. Appropriately, the exhibits consist only of the Appeal Judgment and the Article. The statement itself runs, however, to 67 paragraphs over 18 pages. A large proportion of this consists of argument as to meaning, the availability of a privilege defence, and the issue of serious harm which has not in the event been pursued. Mr Alsaifi filed a witness statement consisting of 107 paragraphs, covering 25 pages of single-spaced text, together with a 339 page "Bundle of Evidence" and other documents. Some, but relatively little of Mr Alsaifi's witness statement and evidence was relevant to his own application. In fairness to him, the nature of the defence application meant that he was entitled to address evidentially the issues of malice and serious harm, and he did so. But his materials did show a lack of focus. The statement also contained a good deal of argument. It was supplemented by a 4,000 word skeleton argument.

13

I make these points to emphasise the importance of parties to litigation of this kind ensuring that they conduct their cases proportionately. Parties have a duty to help the court to ensure that the case is conducted in accordance with the overriding objective. It is unreasonable, and tends to obstruct that objective, if the parties deluge the court with so much written material on an application of this kind. As I told the parties at the hearing, I deliberately paid scant attention to the many pages of argument about meaning that were contained in the evidence, focusing my attention instead on reading the words complained of for myself. I took this approach for three main reasons. First, evidence as to meaning is strictly speaking inadmissible. Secondly, this approach accords with the principles governing the determination of meaning, set out below. Thirdly, and perhaps consequentially, this approach accords with the overriding objective, not least the principle of proportionality and the need to allocate to any given case a share of the court's resources that is appropriate, and not excessive.

Summary of conclusions

14

Even bearing in mind the high thresholds to which I have referred, I have concluded that many of the meanings complained of by Mr Alsaifi are strained, forced, unreasonable and extravagant, and meanings that a reasonable reader could not possibly draw from the words complained of. I have however concluded that the words are clearly capable of defaming Mr Alsaifi. Applying the principles of law that I set out below, I find that the part of the Article which consists of a report of the Appeal Judgment could convey to a reasonable reader a meaning or meanings...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Dr Ashti Hawrami v Journalism Development Network Inc.
    • United Kingdom
    • King's Bench Division
    • 22 February 2024
    ...the Penthouse action which was a document required by law to be available to public inspection.” 46 I was then taken to Asifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 which related to a publication derived at least in part from a reported judgment. At paragraphs 39 onwards Warby J (as he then was) held th......
  • Tariq Alsaifi v Trinity Mirror Plc & Board of Directors and Another
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 17 November 2017
    ...Mr Alsaifi ( [2016] EWHC 1519 (Admin) ("the Appeal Judgment")). ii) The Blog proceedings were dismissed by Warby J on 27 June 2017 ( [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB) ("the Blog Judgment")) following a successful summary disposal application by Mr Amunwa. The Judge found that Mr Alsaifi had no real p......
  • Tariq Alsaifi v Trinity Mirror Plc and Board of Directors and Another
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 27 June 2017
    ...to the Defamation Act 1996, paragraphs 9 and 11. 2 The hearing in this case followed shortly after the hearing of applications in Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB) which raised issues bearing some similarity to those that arise now. It will be convenient to make some reference to my re......
  • Arnold Mballe Sube v News Group Newspapers Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Queen's Bench Division
    • 24 May 2018
    ...of meanings which words are capable of bearing – an increasingly rare exercise, these days, for reasons explained in Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB) [39]–[40]. At this trial, I am concerned with what the words did mean. 22 Mr Engelman also relies on the principle that the ordinary re......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT