The Reverend Canon Jeremy Pemberton v The Right Reverend Richard Inwood, Former Acting Bishop of Soutwell and Nottingham
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lady Justice Asplin,Lady Justice Gloster,And |
| Judgment Date | 22 March 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWCA Civ 564 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | Case No: A2/2017/0211 |
| Date | 22 March 2018 |
[2018] EWCA Civ 564
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(HH Judge Eady QC)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Lady Justice Gloster
(Vice-President of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division))
Lord Justice Underhill
and
Lady Justice Asplin
Case No: A2/2017/0211
Sean Jones QC, Justin GauandHelen Trotter (instructed by Thomson Snell & Passmore LLP) for the Appellant
Thomas Linden QC and Matthew Sheridan (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 31 January and 1 February 2018
Judgment Approved
This is an appeal from the decision of Her Honour Judge Eady QC in the Employment Appeal Tribunal (the “EAT”) in Appeal No: UKEAT/0072/16. It raises questions in relation to the construction of sections 26, 53 and 54 and Schedule 9 paragraph 2 Equality Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”).
The Appellant, the Reverend Canon Pemberton, (the “Canon”) is an ordained priest of the Church of England who in April 2014, following the enactment of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, married his same sex partner. As a result, on 2 June 2014, the Respondent, the Right Reverend Richard Inwood, former Acting Bishop of Southwell and Nottingham (the “Bishop”) revoked the Canon's “Permission to Officiate” (“PTO”) at services in the Diocese of Southwell and Nottingham (“the Diocese”). Further, by a letter of 7 July 2014 to the Divisional General Manager at the Kingsmill Hospital, Sutton in Ashfield, (the “7 July Letter”) the Bishop explained that he declined to grant the Canon an Extra Parochial Ministry Licence (“EPML”) which was a necessary requirement for the post of Chaplaincy and Bereavement Manager in the Faith Centre at the Kingsmill Hospital run by the Sherwood Hospitals NHS Trust within the Diocese. As a result, the Canon was not appointed to the post.
The Canon's claim for direct discrimination pursuant to sections 13 and 53 of the Equality Act 2010 (the “2010 Act”) and his claim for harassment pursuant to sections 26 and 53 of that Act in relation to the revocation of the PTO and the refusal to grant an EPML were dismissed by the Nottingham Employment Tribunal (the “ET”) in a determination promulgated on 28 October 2015. The ET held that: the PTO was not a “relevant qualification” for the purposes of section 53 of the 2010 Act; that the EPML was a “relevant qualification” and that accordingly, the Bishop was a “qualifications body” for the purposes of section 53 of the 2010 Act: [40] – [48] and [120] – [125]; that the Bishop was able to rely upon the defence in Schedule 9 paragraph 2 of the 2010 Act and therefore, the claim failed: [188], [234] – [237]; and that there was no harassment pursuant to section 26 of the 2010 Act because the refusal to grant the EPML was lawful and there were no aggravating factors: [244], [245], [251], [259] and [270]. In the EAT, Her Honour Judge Eady QC dismissed the appeal and the cross appeal in relation to whether the PTO and the EPML respectively were “relevant qualifications” and dismissed the appeal both in relation to the availability of the Schedule 9 defence and the ET's decision on harassment.
The Grounds of Appeal to this court are lengthy and complex. In summary, they are: (1) the good standing argument, namely that the EAT was wrong to rely upon the ET's finding that in getting married despite the guidance of the House of Bishops, the Canon was in consequence no longer in good standing; (2) the PTO argument, namely that the EAT was wrong to conclude that the PTO was not a relevant qualification because it facilitated the grant of an EPML; (3) the Schedule 9 paragraph 2 argument, that the EAT at [110] and following erred in not asking for whose purposes was the employment or finding that it was for the purposes of the NHS Trust and not the purposes of an organised religion and in determining that the requirement not to be married to a same sex partner was so as to comply with the doctrines of the Church of England; and (4) the Harassment argument that the EAT was wrong at [124] to conclude that the Canon's awareness that his marriage would mean that he was not in good standing and the existence of the Schedule 9 defence were contextual factors which had the effect that it was not reasonable for the refusal to grant the EPML to have the effects required for the purposes of section 26 of the 2010 Act.
The good standing argument is expressed in more detail in the Grounds of Appeal as follows: the EAT at [34] relied on a finding of the ET that by getting married in spite of guidance issued by the House of Bishops, the Canon was in consequence no longer in “good standing”. However, the parties were agreed that: the question of “good standing” was a matter of discretion for the individual bishop; the permissions and licences in issue were conferred or maintained on the basis of “good standing”; the Canon continued to hold a licence in the Diocese of Lincoln and thus, was in good standing in that Diocese; such an inconsistency was a key element in the Canon's case that the defence in Schedule 9 of the 2010 Act could not be made out; and the Canon did not concede that by marrying he would cease to be in good standing.
The PTO argument is set out in more detail in the following manner: the EAT at [103] concluded that the PTO was not a relevant qualification because the Bishop determined that the Canon was not in “good standing” and that the revocation of the PTO and the refusal to grant the EPML were consistent. However, since the test for the grant of both are identical, holding a PTO would have facilitated the grant of the EPML and since the latter was an essential requirement for the appointment as the Chaplaincy and Bereavement Manager, a PTO would have facilitated engagement in that profession.
The Schedule 9 argument is set out in more detail as follows: even if one purpose of the employment was that the Canon would hold religious services, that was still the purpose of the NHS Trust and not that of the Church of England; and there is no doctrine on civil same sex marriage in the Church of England. Therefore, the EAT erred implicitly in concluding to the contrary at [112] and it erred further at [114] by treating the “compliance” principle as being a matter for the assessment of individual bishops.
The Harassment argument in more detail is as follows: in fact, the Canon was not aware that his marriage would mean that he was not in good standing; he remained in good standing in the Diocese of Lincoln; even if he had been aware, it does not mean that objectively, it is unreasonable for his dignity to have been violated nor does it preclude the creation of an unlawful environment; and in requiring some additional “aggravating factor” where the Schedule 9 defence is available to a direct discrimination claim, the EAT glossed the statute in an impermissible manner despite accepting that the defence was to be interpreted strictly.
The Bishop cross appeals on the basis that the ET should have dismissed the Canon's claim on the grounds that the EPML was not a relevant qualification and/or the Bishop was not a qualifications body for the purposes of sections 53 and 54 of the 2010 Act and that the EAT erred in upholding its decision on those issues.
The appeal and the cross-appeal raise, therefore, the following issues: the proper construction of “qualifying body” and “relevant qualifications” for the purposes of section 53 of the 2010 Act; the breadth of the defences to a claim for discrimination in Schedule 9 paragraph 2(3) of the 2010 Act on the facts of this case; and if the defences apply, whether the revocation of the PTO and the refusal to grant the EPML and the communication of those decisions to the Canon can in themselves amount to harassment for the purposes of section 26 of the 2010 Act or whether something more is necessary.
Relevant background and materials
There is no dispute that a person discriminates against another, if because of a protected characteristic, he treats that person less favourably than he would treat others, that marriage is a protected characteristic and that in the case of marriage, section 13 of the 2010 Act applies to a contravention in relation to work only if the treatment is because the person is married: section 13(1) and ( 4) 2010 Act.
Although there was some debate before us, there is also no dispute about the nature of either a PTO or an EPML. A PTO is often granted to retired clergy and is held at the discretion of the bishop of the particular diocese. It is granted pursuant to Canon C8 of the Canons of the Church of England (the “Canons”) (which where relevant is set out below). As its title suggests it permits the clergyman in question to officiate (in the sense of holding services) within a diocese, without the need also to be the incumbent of a benefice. (However, the consent of the incumbent is also necessary before the holder of a PTO can officiate within the benefice.) It is not disputed that in order to be granted a PTO it is necessary for a clergyman to be in “good standing” with the Church of England.
An EPML may be granted by the bishop of a particular diocese pursuant to section 2(1) and (2) of the Extra Parochial Ministry Measure 1967 (No.2). Section 2 of that Measure provides that the bishop of the diocese in which a particular institution such as a college, school or hospital is situated may “license a clergyman of the Church of England to perform such offices and services” as are specified in the licence at the particular place or institution. Sub-section (4) provides that the bishop of the diocese may also revoke the EPML at any time....
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