Westminster City Council v John Riding
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD,LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH |
| Judgment Date | 17 July 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWHC J0717-4 |
| Date | 17 July 1995 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO 1274-95 |
[1995] EWHC J0717-4
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(DIVISIONAL COURT)
Before: Lord Justice Stuart-Smith and Mr Justice Butterfield
CO 1274-95
MR T SPENCER (Instructed by Legal Department, Westminster City Council, London) appeared on behalf of the Applicants.
MISS K ASTANIOTIS (Instructed by Cripps & Shone, West Street, Marlow, Bucks) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
(As Approved)
This is an appeal by way of case stated from the decision of the Justices for the North Westminster Division of the Inner London Area sitting at Wells Street whereby they dismissed an information laid against John Riding, the Respondent, for an offence contrary to section 87(1) and (5) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.
Section 87(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 reads as follows:
"If any person throws down, drops or otherwise deposits in, into or from any place to which this section applies, and leaves, any thing whatsoever in such circumstances as to cause, or contribute to, or tend to lead to, the defacement by litter of any place to which this section applies, he shall, subject to subsection (2) below, be guilty of an offence."
Subsection (5) provides:
"A person who is guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale."
The Respondent was charged under those provisions that on 4th August 1994 persons unknown deposited, in a place to which section 87(3) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 applies, in Church Street, London W2, in the City of Westminster, ten black plastic refuge sacks, empty beer and crisp cartons and two empty bread bags in such circumstances as to cause or contribute to or lead to litter at the said place.
When the Justices heard the case, on 10th February 1995, they found the following facts:
"a) The respondent is the manager of Clutterbucks Ale House, 329 Edgeware Road, W2.
b) On Thursday, 4th August 1994, at 11.50 a.m.
Mr Edward Burke an Enforcement Officer employed by the appellants visited the premises. On the pavement outside he found ten black plastic sacks of bar refuse and some empty beer and crisp cartons and two empty bread bags.
c) The items were commercial waste in that they were trade waste from Clutterbucks Ale House awaiting removal by BIFA (a private waste collection service). The respondent accepted responsibility for putting the items there, but stated that the contractors had 'let him down again'.
d) There was no evidence adduced as to how long the refuse had been there or when collection was due. Notices by the appellant are displayed in the street stating the times of the City Council's waste collection and that waste should not be left out more than half-an-hour before collection. The enforcement officer considered he had a power to issue a fixed penalty ticket of £10.00 for litter offences and had done so on at least five other occasions in a similar situation to the present one."
There was a submission of no case made at the conclusion of the prosecution evidence. It was contended on behalf of the Respondent that any time limit or other provision about street refuse described by the Appellant had no statutory force and that, in any event, there was no evidence to support a conviction in the absence of evidence as to how long rubbish had been there. He pointed out there was no charge arising out of any alleged breach of the bylaws.
Secondly, the rubbish in question could not amount to litter within the meaning of section 87(1) of the 1990 Act. There was no statutory definition of "litter" in the Act. In section 75 "waste" was defined in (b) and rubbish in this case was properly categorised as "commercial waste" rather than litter.
In response to that it was contended on behalf of the Appellant that rubbish was "litter" in the ordinary sense of the word and it could be said to be a thing deposited so "as to cause, or contribute to, or tend to lead to, the defacement by litter", in other words that the refuse left here fell within section 87(1).
The magistrates considered the submission of the Respondent to be well founded. They were of the view that the word "litter" was not apposite to describe street or commercial refuse bagged up and awaiting collection by removal contractors. Their reasoning was that if section 87 had been intended to include defacement by waste or refuse of this kind words to that effect would have been used (as they were in Section 92(1).
The Justices found there was no case for the Respondent to answer and dismissed the information.
The essential question for this Court is whether the Justices were correct in holding that commercial waste, bagged up and placed in the highway awaiting collection by removal contractors, was litter deposited and left for the purposes of section 87(1) Environmental Protection Act 1990 and thus capable of contributing or tending to lead to the defacement by litter of a public place.
The mischief which section 87 is directed at is defacement by litter of a public place. On one view the piles of black plastic sacks we see on a daily basis, lining the streets of our towns and cities, constitute a plain defacement by litter of a public place. Such an accumulation can frequently be unsightly, unpleasant and often noisesome. They are capable of constituting a serious environmental hazard. But the question for this Court is not to pronounce upon the appearance of our city streets; it is to determine whether section 87 covers the placing of waste and refuse on the pavements for collection. The rubbish outside the defendant's premises was commercial waste, as the Justices found. Commercial waste is defined in section 75(7) of the Act, which provides:
"'commercial waste' means waste from premises used wholly or mainly for the purposes of a trade or business or the purposes of sport, recreation or entertainment"
The Justices so found. Is such commercial waste capable of constituting litter within the meaning of section 87? The word "litter" is not defined by the Act itself. For my part I consider that the word should be given its natural meaning of miscellaneous rubbish left lying about. Rubbish left lying about can consist of all manner of things including domestic household waste, commercial waste, street waste and no doubt other waste not falling within such description. The fact, therefore, in my judgment, that the items deposited by the Respondent outside Clutterbucks Ale House was commercial waste does not preclude them from being litter.
It is argued on behalf of the Respondent that...
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