Bigg v Boyd Gibbins Ltd
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE RUSSELL,LORD JUSTICE FENTON ATKINSON,LORD JUSTICE CROSS |
| Judgment Date | 29 January 1971 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1971] EWCA Civ J0129-2 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 29 January 1971 |
[1971] EWCA Civ J0129-2
Lord Justice Russell,
Lord Justice Fenton Atkinson and
Lord Justice Cross.
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
(Civil Division)
On appeal from Order of Vice-Chancellor
Mr GERALD GODFREY (instructed by Messrs Berwin & Leighton) appeared on behalf of the Appellants (Defendants).
Mr DENNIS LEVY (instructed by Messrs Alec Woolf & Turk) appeared on behalf of the Respondents (Plaintiffs).
We need not trouble you, Mr Levy.
This is an appeal from an order made for specific performance by the Vice-Chancellor under the provisions of Order 86, rule 4 - it was the old Order 14A - which provide that in actions for specific performance "Unless on the hearing of an application either the court dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the court that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of the action, the court may give judgment for the plaintiff in the action".
This came before the Vice-Chancellor as a matter which involves solely the question whether upon the true construction of a few letters passing between the Plaintiff and the Defendant (the Plaintiff being the vendor and the Defendant company being the proposed purchaser) there was a concluded contract.
With the matter being dealt with under Order 86, it is I think right to say that an order should be made only if the Judge thinks it is a plain case and ought not therefore to be tried. Speaking for myself, I should have thought that it would be sensible that if you have got simply a short matter of construction, with a few documents, the learned Judge on this summary application should simply decide what is in his judgment the true construction. There could be no reason to go formally to trial (except that you might possibly get another Judge) where no further facts could emerge which would throw any light at all upon the letters that have to be construed.
The matter comes before this Court on appeal, the argument being that anyway the learned Judge was wrong insaying that this matter of construction was plain and that therefore he should not, in the exercise of the summary jurisdiction, have made the final order for specific performance which he did under Order 86.
As a consequence of a suggestion that came from the Bench in this Court, so as to avoid duplication of proceedings, when clearly nothing is to be gained by having a trial, even if we were to decide that the Judge was wrong on the "plain case" point, it has been agreed by Counsel, on instructions from their clients, that this appeal should be dealt with as if it was an appeal from the trial of the action; that is to say, the parties consent to our dealing with this appeal as if the hearing before the Vice-Chancellor was the trial of the action.
In the result, subject to a point which I shall refer to at the end of my judgment, we are not concerned with whether this is a plain case; we are only concerned with what, in our judgment, is the true construction of the letters.
The property in question is a property called Shortgrove Hall at Newport. The first letter is a letter from the proposed vendors - that is to say, the Plaintiff - headed "Shortgrove Hall, Newport". This is to the proposed purchaser, of course. "Thank you for your letter received last week. We still have not received the keys or plan as you promised and shall be grateful if you will do something about this as soon as possible. As you are aware that I paid £25,000 for this property, your offer of £20,000 would appear to be at least a little optimistic. For a quick sale I would accept £26,000, so that my expenses may be covered. If you are not interested in this price, would you please let me knowimmediately as then I shall open negotiations with" some other people.
Just looking at that document, I stress the words "for a quick sale I would accept £26,000"; that is to say, "for a quick sale to you" (obviously) "I would accept an offer to bay the property for £26,000".
The next letter does not assist, but on the 8th January, 1970, we find the proposed...
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Tan Yeow Khoon v Tan Yeow Tat and Another (No 1)
...in the court embarking upon a lengthy exercise of cross-examination of Mr Gea or of any others. In Bigg & Anor v Boyd Gibbins Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 183[1971] 1 WLR 913 (CA), it was held that `if there were simply a short matter of construction, with a few documents, it would be more sensible ......
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Kau Nia Enterprise (Pte) Ltd v Teck Wah Corp (Pte) Ltd
...that an order should be made only if the learned Registrar thinks it is a plain case and ought not therefore be tried: see Bigg v Boyd [1971] 1 WLR 913) per Russell LJ at 915 B, C. If it is a matter involving the construction of documents, in which a trial including oral evidence (if any) w......
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Offer and Acceptance
...13 OWN 141 (Ex). 14 Harty v Gooderham (1871), 31 UCR 18 [ Harty ]. 15 Above note 11 at 260. See, for example, Bigg v Boyd Gibbons Ltd , [1971] 1 WLR 913 (CA) (“for a quick sale, I would accept £26,000” — held to be an offer); Calgary Hardwood & Veneer Ltd v Canadian National Railway Co (197......
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INVITATION TO TREAT
...2 All E.R. 497. "Similarly, a statement may be an offer although it is expressed as an acceptance." See: Bigg v. Boyd Gibbins Limited (1971) 1 W.L.R. 913. The point I am making is that the mere fact that a document, such as Exhibit 1 in the instant case, uses the expression offer does not i......