Carol Linda Hayes v Timothy Hayes

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMr Justice Morgan
Judgment Date18 October 2017
Neutral Citation[2017] EWHC 2806 (Ch)
CourtChancery Division
Docket NumberCase No. CH-2017-000038
Date18 October 2017

[2017] EWHC 2806 (Ch)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CHANCERY DIVISION

Rolls Building

Before:

Mr Justice Morgan

Case No. CH-2017-000038

Between:
Carol Linda Hayes
Appellant
and
Timothy Hayes
Respondent

THE APPELLANT appeared in Person.

Mr Sims appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

Mr Justice Morgan
1

This is an appeal by Carol Linda Hayes against an order made by Deputy District Judge Wright, sitting in the County Court at Luton, on 17 th January 2017. By her order, the Deputy District Judge dismissed an application by Mrs Hayes to set aside a statutory demand which had been served upon her by her former husband, Mr Timothy Hayes.

2

This statutory demand has been served following a very long history of litigation between these parties. The history of that litigation has been recited in a number of other judgments because the litigation has continued for a lengthy period, and has resulted in very many, some would say too many, court appearances. I will refrain from making any comment on the conduct of either party. Their conduct has no bearing whatever on the matters which fall to be decided on this appeal. I will concentrate on the relatively few points that are material for the purpose of my decision.

3

The statutory demand recited the particulars of the debt on which it was based. The debt in question was the aggregate of various debts pursuant to a number of court orders. I will refer in a moment to the individual court orders. The amount which is said to be due pursuant to those court orders total some £15,085.38. The statutory demand also claims interest at 8%, which I assume uses the rate under the Judgments Act 1838. Although I have not had separate argument or explanation in relation to that part of the debt claimed in the statutory demand, I will focus on the principal amount and put the question of interest to one side.

4

The first order which created a liability to pay costs was an order dated 3 rd December 2007, made by District Judge Carr sitting in the Watford County Court. That was made in a case with claim number 6CB00392. I have been shown the pleadings in that case, and in that case Mr Hayes sought damages for alleged harassment on the part of his former wife, Mrs Hayes, and Mr Butters.

5

The order made by the District Judge is a lengthy order dealing with a large number of matters, but the part that is relevant for present purposes is para. 12.2 which reads:

"The defendants [that is, as I understand it, Mrs Hayes and Mr Butters] shall pay the costs of the application for security for costs dated 9 th June 2006, assessed summarily at £605.36. The defendants shall pay the costs of the claimant's application for an unless order dated 11 th August 2006, assessed summarily at £756.84."

6

The second order referred to in the statutory demand was an order made by District Judge Carr on 18 th November 2008. It was made in the same proceedings as I have earlier described. Again, the order dealt with a large number of matters, and in para. 10 the District Judge ordered:

"The defendant [I take it that is the defendants] to pay the costs of an application for relief from sanctions, assessed summarily at £6,422.24.

7

The third court order referred to in the statutory demand is an order made in the same proceedings in the Watford County Court, this time by His Honour Judge Wright on 19 th June 2009. Again, the Judge has already dealt with a number of matters, but at para. 6 of the order the Judge ordered that:

"The defendants [that is Mrs Hayes and Mr Butters] do pay the claimant's costs of the appeal, assessed in a sum which together with VAT amounted to £3,047.50".

8

The fourth order referred to in the statutory demand was in different proceedings. These were proceedings in the County Court at Cambridge, brought by Mr Hayes against various defendants. The principal defendant was Mr Willoughby, but according to the order, Mr Butters and Mrs Hayes were either third parties or were the second defendant. The order was made by His Honour Judge Moloney QC on 20 th September 2015. Paragraph 1 of the order stated that the application by Mr Butters and Mrs Hayes, dated 6 th August 2015, was dismissed as totally without merit. Paragraph 3 of that order was to the effect that Mr Butters and Mrs Hayes should pay the claimant's costs of the application, summarily assessed at £1,000.

9

The fifth and final order referred to in the statutory demand was an order made by Mr Justice Butterfield, sitting in the Queen's Bench Division on appeal from the Cambridge County Court. This order was made in a claim where an application had been made for an extended civil restraint order against Mr Hayes. Mr Hayes appealed against the making of that order and his appeal was successful. The extended civil restraint order was set aside. Mr Justice Butterfield ordered Mrs Hayes and Mr Butters to pay 50% of the costs of the hearing before the Judge in the County Court, and they were summarily assessed in the sum of £3,253.44.

10

Those orders have been made. They have been accurately described in the statutory demand. The total I have stated. For the purposes of the appeal today, and I will describe what are the issues in the appeal in a moment, I proceed on the basis that the sums which were ordered have gone unpaid. The orders have not been set aside so they remain enforceable and have not been complied with.

11

When Mrs Hayes received the statutory demand, she applied to set it aside. She put forward various grounds and put in a witness statement which went in detail into the history of the underlying litigation. That application to set aside the statutory demand came before Deputy District Judge Wright on 17 th January 2017. Mrs Hayes appeared in person, assisted by Mr Butters, and counsel appeared for Mr Hayes.

12

I have a transcript of the judgment given by the Deputy District Judge. Not very much turns today on the detailed reasons given by the Deputy District Judge. She considered a large number of points. There were arguments that the debts were not due because some of them had been paid. There were arguments that Mrs Hayes was herself the beneficiary of a large numbers of orders for costs payable by Mr Hayes, and these were to be set off against the orders for costs to which I have referred. Mrs Hayes also relied upon the existence of a counterclaim which was considered by the Deputy District Judge. All of those points are considered by the Deputy District Judge, and her conclusion is that the application to set aside the statutory demand should be dismissed.

13

Mrs Hayes sought permission to appeal against the dismissal of her application to set aside the statutory demand. Orders were made providing for an oral hearing of her application for permission to appeal. In particular, on 6 th March 2017 Mr Justice Norris directed that the application for permission to appeal, and other applications, would be heard in court.

14

Her application for permission to appeal came before Mr Justice Birss on 24 th May 2017. I have been given a slightly unusual document which is a transcript of the hearing before Mr Justice Birss; it is unusual in that it does not appear to be complete. The transcript, as shown to me, starts with the Judge asking Mr Hayes, in other words not the appellant, what Mr Hayes would like to say. Mr Hayes was in person on that occasion, as was Mrs Hayes.

15

The transcript continues with exchanges between the Judge and Mr Hayes, and the transcript ends with Mr Justice Birss thanking Mr Hayes for his contribution, but it does not record what was said by Mrs Hayes and it does not identify any reasoning why this was a proper case for permission to appeal.

16

What I do have, however, and this is essentially the agenda for today's hearing, is a written order made by Mr Justice Birss on the day of the oral hearing. I need to read out a large part of that order. By para. 1 of the order, the judge ordered that:

"Mrs Hayes should have permission to appeal on the question of the effect, if any, of the settlement between her and the trustee in bankruptcy of Mr Hayes on the costs orders made in case number 6CB00392, which form the bulk of the costs orders, the subject of the statutory demand dated 15 th March 2016."

17

By para. 2 of the order, the judge ordered that:

"The permission...

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