Ciechanowski v Circuit Court in Posnan Poland
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Burnett |
| Judgment Date | 24 July 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWHC 2795 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/6432/2013 |
| Date | 24 July 2013 |
[2013] EWHC 2795 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Burnett
CO/6432/2013
Mr J Atlee (instructed by Atlee Chung and Co Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
Ms S Townshend (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
On the 23 May 2013, District Judge Zani ordered the appellant's extradition to Poland, pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued by the Circuit Court in Poznan on 8 September 2008.
It was certified by the Serious Organised Crime Agency on 17 December 2012. The appellant was remanded in custody on 25 February 2013. This is a conviction case. The appellant's extradition is sought for him to serve a sentence of 14 months' imprisonment.
The offence for which the appellant was convicted was committed on 30 April 2004. His conviction followed on 18 August 2004. He received what would be regarded in this jurisdiction as a suspended sentence, it appears on two conditions: first, that he maintain contact with probation services and, secondly, that he make financial reparation for his crime.
As is apparent from material before me, the appellant in fact left Poland in 2004. It was in those circumstances that the decision was taken on 25 October 2007 to activate the sentence, for what was described as a flagrant denial of its conditions.
The offence was one of arson within the meaning of Poland's laws, and was therefore an extradition offence because it is listed in article 2 of the framework directive, and schedule 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. The conduct complained of is that the appellant lit a cigarette and then dropped the lighted match. He was in a public place next to some woodland. A fire broke out, causing about £600 worth of damage.
There is no suggestion that appellant acted deliberately; indeed the material provided by Polish authorities suggests that his actions were unintentional. An argument was advanced before the District Judge that the offence was not an extradition offence. That, however, is not pursued in the light of information provided by the Polish authorities.
It was also argued that the appellant's extradition would amount to a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private and family life, under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The District Judge rejected that argument. He noted that the threshold in such cases was high. The arguments advanced before the District Judge were essentially these:
(1) that the offence occurred a long time ago.
(2) that the appellant was settled in the United Kingdom, having come here in 2004, and had established himself including in work.
(3) that the appellant is gay. Poland, it was said, remains an intolerant environment for gay people, especially in the prison system.
The District Judge referred to the presumption that operates in favour of EU and Council of Europe's states, that the human rights of those extradited will be respected. He observed that he had heard no evidence to displace that presumption.
He directed himself to the relevant authorities but determined the issue against the appellant. The circumstances in which article 8 may operate to prevent extradition from the United Kingdom have been authoritatively examined in two relatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court. The first is Norris v Government of the United States [2010] 2AC 487; the second HH (Appellant) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2012] UKSC 25.
In paragraph 56 of his judgment in Norris, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, said this:
"The reality is that only if some quite exceptional feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves. That, no doubt, is what the Commission had in mind in Launder 25 EHRR CD 67, 73 when it was only in exceptional circumstances that extradition would be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life of the person resisting extradition."
Although Lord Phillips was referring to family life, which was in issue in Norris, similar considerations would apply to private life, albeit that considerations relating to families may be regarded as more telling.
In paragraph 8 of her judgment in HH, Lady Hale helpfully distilled the principles which might be derived from Norris:
"We can therefore draw the following conclusions from Norris.
(1) There may be a closer analogy between extradition and domestic criminal process than between extradition and deportation or expulsion. But the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life.
(2) There is no test of exceptionality in either context.
(3) The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition.
(4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial, that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences, that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty...
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