Deeble v Robinson
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE SOMERVELL,LORD JUSTICE DENNING,LORD JUSTICE ROMER |
| Judgment Date | 10 November 1953 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1953] EWCA Civ J1110-2 |
| Date | 10 November 1953 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
[1953] EWCA Civ J1110-2
In The Supreme Court of Judicature
Court of Appeal
Lord Justice Somervell
Lord Justice Denning and
Lord Justice Romer
Mr. J. F. Drabble and Mr. H. S. Pears (instructed by Messrs. Corbin, Greener & Cork agents for Mesers. Dawson & Burgess, Doncaster) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Appellant (Applicant).
Mr. A. S. Orr and Mr. W. Greenwood (instructed by Messrs. Sharpe, Pritchard & Co., agents for Messrs. Briggs & Co., Doncaster) appeared as Counsel on behalf of the Respondent (Respondent).
In these proceedings the Applicant applied for the grant of a new tenancy of certain premises on the ground that a "separate part" was occupied for the purposes of retailing milk. The application was made under Section 10 2 (c) of the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act,1951. I will road the relevant parts of Section 10. "(1) The provisions of this part of this Act shall have effect for enabling the occupier of a shop under a tenancy to which this section applies (hereinafter referred to as 'the expiring tenancy') to apply to the court for, and subject to the provisions of this Act to Obtain, the grant of a new tenancy where apart from the next following section the expiring tenancy would come to an end immediately before the date of the commencement of this Act or within the period of two years beginning with that date, and would so come to an end by effluxion of time or by the expiration of a notice to quit given by the landlord, whether before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) This section applies to a tenancy the subject of which (a) consists of a shop, or (b) consists of a shop and of living accommodation occupied wholly or mainly by the tenant or by a person who is employed by the tenant for the purposes of the retail trade or business carried on in the shop, or (c) includes a separate part which consists of a shop or which consists of a shop and of such living accommodation as is mentioned in the last foregoing paragraph". I can miss out sub-section (3). Sub-section (4) says: "In the case of an expiring tenancy the subject of which falls within paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of this section and not within paragraph (b) thereof, any new tenancy granted under this part of this Act shall if the landlord so requires be a tenancy of the whole of the subject of the expiring tenancy, and otherwise a tenancy of the separate part consisting of the shop or consisting of the shop and of living accommodation, as the case may be". Then there are provisos which I do not think I need trouble to read.
The Applicant has a milk round, delivering to customers at their houses some 75 gallons a day. The premises consist of two dwelling houses and a yard. In that yard is a shed used for the Applicant's spare bottles, frig., and other articles". This is the "separate part" primarily relied on.If the applicant is right with regard to the shed, the stable where he keeps the horse that takes round the milk might also be covered. Some six to eight pints are sold on the promises, not at the shed, but these can, in my view, be disregarded, and no reliance was placed upon them. The learned judge come to the conclusion that the shed was not a shop within the meaning of the Act.
The Applicant was, I think, carrying on a retail trade. This trade was not carried on in the shed. The shed was used for the trade. The shed, I think, quite plainly, was not a shop in the ordinary sense of the word. It is submitted, however, that it is within the definition to be found in Section 20. The definition of a shop in that section is as follow: "'Shop' means promises occupied wholly for business purposes, and so occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of a retail trade or business". Also, "'Retail trade or business' has the same meaning as in the Shops Act, 1950, except that it does not include the sale of intoxicating liquor", and so on. Then in the Shops Act of 1950, Section 74 says: "'Retail trade or business' includes the business of a barber or hairdresser, the sale of refreshments or intoxicating liquors, the business of lending books or periodicals when carried on for purposes of gain, and retail sales by auction, but does not include the sale of programmes and catalogues and other similar sales at theatres and places of amusement? The argument is as follows. The definition of "shop", it is said, covers premises used for the purpose of retail trade although not a shop or shops in the ordinary meaning of the word. An example would be the head office of a company running a number of retail shops. This would not be a shop, but it is said it would be "used for the purposes of a retail trade or business", and therefore included by the definition.
Many observations can be found in reported cases on Interpretation clauses. In ( Regina v. Pearce 5 Queen's Bench Division page 386 at page 389), Mr Justice Lush said, "But I think an interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain". Mr. Justice Lush was dealing with a clause in the form "X includes". I agree with what is stated in Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 197, that "where the word is declared to mean so and so the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive". He goes on to say that "when the word is declared to "include" so and so, the definition is extensive". I agree, but applying the principle laid down by Mr. Justice Lush one would not, unless forced, even when the definition is in the form "includes", carry the extension beyond border line or doubtful cases. Applying these observations the form of words here is inapt to include promises which, like the shed, are plainly not shops.
Reliance was placed on the fact that in Section 74 of the Shops Act, 1950, "shop includes any promises where any retail trade or business is carried on". These latter words do not occur in the present definition. The two Acts were dealing with different subject matters. The shops Act was dealing with hours and conditions of work, Sunday trading and so on. One would have expected the definition to make clear that it applied to any premises where any retail trade was carried on. The present Act is dealing with leases. The restrictive words at the beginning of the definition limit the definition to promises wholly occupied for business purposes. I agree that the definition might have ended with some such words as "carried on therein". On the other hand, if the legislature had intended the wider meaning I would have expected the words "whether carried on in the promises or not". The definition has to be read in the context of the Act. Section 10(2) and 10(4) both contain the words "retail trade or business carried on in the shop". This phrase is difficult to reconcile with a definition which makes "shop" includepremises in which the retail trade or business is not carried or, There is a further consideration. It has often been laid down that plain words are necessary to establish an intention to interfere with common law or contractual rights. I do not think the shed in question here is plainly covered by the relevant sections for reasons which I have given.
For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Deeble has a milk round. He sells milk to people at the doors of their houses. He runs his business from a dairy building where he keeps his equipment, refrigerator, spare milk, bottles, and so forth, and a stable where he keeps his horse and float. His round is seven streets adjoining the premises. He does not actually have a shop as ordinarily understood. His lease of these premises is coming to an end, and he wants to stay on there. This depends on whether the premises come within the definition of a "shop" in the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act 1951.
In Section 20 Parliament has expressly ordained that in that Act the expression "shop" has this meaning: It means "Premises occupied for business purposes and so occupied wholly or mainly for the purposes of a retail trade or business". I think that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Bart v British West Indian Airways Ltd
- R v Pora
- St Patrick County Council v Kubairshingh
-
R v Industrial Dispute Tribunal and Hotel Four Seasons Ltd.ex parte The National Workers' Union
...that plain words are necessary to establish an intention to interfere with common law or contractual rights” (per Somervell, L.J. in Deeble v. Robinson, [1954] 1 Q.B. 77, 81). 27 The Tribunal found “that the work stoppage and the failure to take up duties…. which occurred because the Manag......