DPP v Newbury ; DPP v Jones
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Diplock,Lord Simon of Glaisdale,Lord Kilbrandon,Lord Salmon,Lord Edmund-Davies |
| Judgment Date | 12 May 1976 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1976] UKHL J0512-3 |
| Date | 12 May 1976 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1976] UKHL J0512-3
House of Lords
LORDS PRESENT:
Lord Diplock
Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Lord Kilbrandon
Lord Salmon
Lord Edmund-Davies
Counsel for the Appellants; Mr.E.Lewis, Q.C. and Mr.V.Pugh
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr.P.Owen, Q.C. and Mr.J.Prosser
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Director of Public Prosecutions against Newbury (on Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)), Director of Public Prosecutions against Jones (on Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)), [Consolidated Appeals], That the Committee had heard Counsel for the Appellants, as well on Monday the 26th, as on Tuesday the 27th, days of January last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Neil Newbury of 98 Miskin Street, Cathays, Cardiff, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the First Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) of the 7th of November 1975, so far as therein stated to be appealed against, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; as also upon the Petition and Appeal of Robert Jones of 66 Wyverne Road, Cathays, Cardiff, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the First Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) of the 7th of November 1975, so far as therein stated to be appealed against, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet (which said Appeals were, by an Order of this House of the 19th day of December last, Ordered to be consolidated); and Counsel appearing for the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Respondent to the said Appeal, but not being called upon; and due consideration being had this day of what was offered for the said Appellants:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Orders of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), of the 7th day of November 1975, in part complained of in the said Appeals, be, and the same are hereby, Affirmed, and that the said Petitions and Appeals be, and the same are hereby, dismissed this House.
My Lords, I beg to move that the Report of the Appellate Committe be now considered.
That the Report of the Appellate Committee be now considered.
.
My Lords, I beg to move that the Report of the Appellate Committee be agreed to.
That the Report of the Appellate Committee be agreed to.
That the Orders appealed from be Affirmed and the Appeals Dismissed.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Salmon, and for the reasons given by him, I would dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Salmon, I agree with it, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
I too have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend Lord Salmon. I agree with it, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
My Lords,
On the 11th October 1974 the train travelling from Pontypridd to Cardiff was approaching a bridge which crossed the railway line. The guard was sitting next to the driver of the train in the front cab. The driver noticed the heads of three boys above the parapet of the bridge. He saw one of the boys push something off the parapet towards the oncoming train. This proved to be part of a paving stone which some workmen had left on the parapet. It came through the glass window of the cab in which the driver and the guard were sitting, struck the guard and killed him. There was ample evidence that just as the train was about to reach the bridge the two appellants, who were each about 15 years of age, were jointly concerned in pushing over the parapet the piece of paving stone which killed the guard. They were jointly charged with manslaughter and after a very fair and lucid summing up, each was found guilty. Both of them appealed against conviction and sentence and their appeals against conviction were dismissed. The appellants now appeal to this House. The point of law certified to be of general public importance is "can a defendant be properly convicted of manslaughter, when his mind is not affected by drink or drugs, if he did not foresee that his act might cause harm to another?"
The learned trial judge did not direct the jury that they should acquit the appellants unless they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants had foreseen that they might cause harm to someone by pushing the piece of paving stone off the parapet into the path of the approaching train. In my view the learned trial judge was quite right not to give such a direction to the jury. The direction which he gave is completely in accordance with established law, which, possibly with one exception to which I shall presently refer, has never been challenged. In R. v. Larkin 29 Cr. App. R. 18, Humphreys J, said at page 23 "Where the act which a person is engaged in performing is unlawful, then if at the same time it is a dangerous act, that is, an act which is likely to injure another person, and quite inadvertently the doer of the act causes the death of that other person by that act, then he is guilty of manslaughter." I agree entirely with Lawton L.J. that that is an admirably clear statement of the law which has been applied many times. It makes it plain ( a) that an accused is guilty of manslaughter if it is proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that that act inadvertently caused death and ( b) that it is unnecessary to prove that the accused knew that the act was unlawful or dangerous. This is one of the reasons why cases of manslaughter vary so infinitely in their gravity. They may amount to little more than pure inadvertence and sometimes to little less than murder.
I am sure that in Reg. v. Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59 Edmund Davies J. (as he then was), in giving the judgment of the court, did not intend to differ from or qualify anything which had been said in R. v. Larkin. Indeed he was restating the principle laid down in that case by illustrating the sense in which the word "dangerous" should be understood. Edmund Davies J. said "For such a verdict" (guilty of manslaughter) "inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm". The test is still the objective test. In judging whether the act was dangerous the test is not did the accused recognise that it was dangerous but would all sober and reasonable people recognise its danger.
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