HM Attorney General v Associated Newspapers Ltd and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Keith of Kinkel,Lord Bridge of Harwich,Lord Goff of Chieveley,Lord Lowry,Lord Lloyd |
| Judgment Date | 03 February 1994 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1994] UKHL J0203-5 |
| Date | 03 February 1994 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1994] EWHC J0203-5
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Lord Lowry
Lord Lloyd
House of Lords
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend Lord Lowry, which I have read in draft and with which I agree, I would dismiss these appeals.
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Lowry. For the reasons he gives, I would dismiss these appeals.
I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Lowry. For the reasons he gives, I would dismiss these appeals.
My Lords,
This appeal is concerned with the meaning of section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 ("the Act"), which reads:
"(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, it is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal proceedings."
The question is whether the word "disclose", as used in the subsection, refers exclusively to disclosure of information by a juror or signifies disclosure generally, including both disclosure by a juror and (where the facts published were not already well known) publication by a newspaper.
As your Lordships have seen, this subsection is expressed to be subject to section 8(2):
"(2) This section does not apply to any disclosure of any particulars:
(a) in the proceedings in question for the purpose of enabling the jury to arrive at their verdict, or in connection with the delivery of that verdict, or
(b) in evidence in any subsequent proceedings for an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to the jury in the first mentioned proceedings,
or to the publication of any particulars so disclosed."
The only relevance, however, of subsection (2) for present purposes is that the words in the last line are consistent with the argument that the publication (in a newspaper, for example) of particulars already disclosed by a juror would itself be regarded as a disclosure if it had not been expressly excluded by the words referred to.
Of the three appellants, the first is the publisher of a newspaper, "The Mail on Sunday", the second was on 5 July 1992 the Editor and the third, a journalist, is the City Editor.
On 11 February 1991 a serious fraud trial, which became known as "the Blue Arrow trial", commenced at the Central Criminal Court. A year later, to the day, the jury retired. On 14 February 1992 one individual defendant was acquitted and four were convicted of conspiracy to defraud. They received suspended sentences of imprisonment on 17 February. (Two other individuals and the corporate defendant had been found not guilty by direction.) On 16 July 1992 the appeals of the convicted defendants were allowed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on the ground that the trial judge's decision to sum-up to the jury on only one issue was a material irregularity.
On Sunday 5 July 1992 an article about the Blue Arrow trial written by the third appellant and headed "Common People — Common Sense — Common Justice" appeared in "The Mail on Sunday". On 10 July 1992 the Attorney-General instituted proceedings against the appellants under the Act, alleging contempt contrary to section 8(1) in that the article "disclosed particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced and votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations" in the Blue Arrow trial. It was conceded at the hearing in the Divisional Court (Beldam L.J. and Tudor Evans J.) on 5 and 6 November 1992 that the article contained the particulars alleged but the appellants contended that, on the true construction of section 8(1), the publication of the article did not amount to a disclosure of those particulars, saying that such disclosure could be made only by a juror. On 12 November, the Court gave judgment, held against the appellants and fined them £30,000, £20,000 and £10,000 respectively for their contempt. From this decision, with the leave of this House, the appellants have appealed both on the question of the interpretation of section 8(1) and as to the amount of the fines.
Beldam L.J., as reported in [1993] 3 W.L.R. 74 at p. 75G, has described both the article and the way in which the material for it came to hand:
"Early in July 1992 Mr. Clive Wolman a journalist and editor of a city section, wrote a newspaper article in which he attributed to jurors in Reg. v. NatWest Investment Bank, known as the 'Blue Arrow' trial, 'accounts by three jurors about how they actually reached their decision'. The article was shown to the editor of 'The Mail on Sunday' who decided to publish it in the 'Money Analysis' section of the issue on 5 July. The article revealed the statements, opinions and arguments of some members of the jury as they discussed their verdicts. It gave the thoughts of some jurors on the evidence and the opinion of one member of the jury that another showed a complete lack of understanding, only wanted to drag the case out and had agreed with the verdict only because he wanted to get home. It related comments made by another juror about the defendants, and how his reluctance to believe in their guilt had been overcome, and it recounted how certain other jurors had been persuaded to change their minds in the course of the deliberations.
How the newspaper was able to reveal to the readers of the 'Mail on Sunday' these confidential details of the jury's deliberations has not been disclosed to the court. It is, however, known that about two weeks after the conclusion of the Blue Arrow trial an advertisement appeared in the London Evening Standard' offering a reward to jurors who had taken part in the trial if they contacted a box number. A woman posing as an American researcher in Massachusetts was said to be seeking data for a comparative study. Two members of the jury answered the advertisement. Other members were contacted by telephone by a woman who avowed that she was preparing a paper for university studies. After preliminary meetings, the initial scruples of two of the jurors were overcome and they were persuaded to answer questions about the confidential proceedings in the jury room. One was paid £200 and the other £100. The journalist denies any knowledge of the advertisement in the 'Evening Standard'. He asserts that he later learnt from the 'researchers' of the interviews which had taken place and that he received from those researchers 'transcripts of their interviews.'
He then telephoned and spoke directly to one of the jurors of whose interview he had a transcript. Although the journalist does not accept the sworn evidence of the juror that he refused his agreement to publish the information, which he had supplied under the clearest assurance that it was for research only and not for publication, he must have realised that the information had been supplied in confidence. One would have expected in these circumstances, as the juror asserted had happened, that a responsible journalist would have sought the consent of the juror to disclose information he had given to the professed researcher, and without that consent would have respected his confidence. It seems a rather plastic ethic which protects the deceiving source yet asserts a licence to betray the confidence of the deceived.
However that may be, the journalist was aware that he was including in the article statements made, opinions expressed and arguments advanced by members of the jury in the course of their deliberations in the Blue Arrow trial. In the same edition of 'The Mail on Sunday' in a column drawing attention to the main feature in the 'Money Section', Mr. Wolman wrote:
'Three jurors in one of the biggest City fraud trials this century have given the full inside story of how they reached their decision. No one has ever previously investigated, let alone published, in any detail how jurors make their decisions because of the restrictions imposed by the law. The jurors served for a year in the Blue Arrow trial which ended in February. Of the 10 defendants, four were ultimately found guilty of conspiracy to defraud …'
In the main article he said:
'But in Britain the Contempt of Court Act 1981 makes it illegal for jurors to "disclose" what goes on in a jury's deliberations. However, having received transcripts of the Blue Arrow interviews, we believe these edited extracts should be published …'"
To this summary I must add an extract from the agreed statement of facts and issues:
..."Before the Divisional Court, the appellants' evidence stated (and it was no part of the Respondent's case to contend to the contrary) that
(1) Those particulars had been provided to the appellants by American researchers who had earlier (and without the prior knowledge or involvement of the appellants) interviewed members of the Blue Arrow jury.
(2) The American researchers were not acting on behalf of the appellants in obtaining or soliciting the particulars from the members of the jury.
(3) The appellants did not obtain any of the particulars included in the article directly from a member of the jury.
(4) The appellants published the particulars included in the article because they sincerely believed that those particulars made an important contribution to the public debate about whether serious fraud trials ought to be conducted before a jury, and because the appellants believed that any interference with such publication would be a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to freedom of expression)."
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