Hughes v Griffin

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE HARMAN,LORD JUSTICE RUSSELL,MR JUSTICE CAIRNS
Judgment Date28 October 1968
Judgment citation (vLex)[1968] EWCA Civ J1028-2
Date28 October 1968
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Joseph Hughes
and
Ada Lilian Griffin (Widow) and Barclays Bank Limited

[1968] EWCA Civ J1028-2

Before:

Lord Justice Harman

Lord Justice Russell and

Mr Justice Cairns

In The Supreme Court of Judicature

Court of Appeal

(Civil Division)

(From: His Honour Judge Rawlins - Bletehley and Leighton Buzzard County Court)

Mr. J.P. BROOKES (instructed by Messrs. Moodie, Randall, Carr & Miles, Agents for Messrs. Alan Smith & Jones, Luton) appeared on behalf of the Appellant (First Defendant).

Mr. N.F. STOGDON (instructed by Messrs. Middleton & Gutteridge, Dunstable) appeared on behalf of the Respondent-Plaintiff.

Mr. DEREK WOOD (instructed by Messrs. Waltons, Luton) appeared on behalf of the Respondent the Second Defendant.

LORD JUSTICE HARMAN
1

The late Alfred Griffin (whom I shall call for convenience "the testator"), when he married his wife, the appellant in this case and the first defendant below, in the year 1947, was the owner in fee simple in possession and the occupier of a freehold bungalow and smallholding in Bedfordshire. He was a man of 74 and she a woman of 50 who went to live with him apparently in part at least because he needed somebody to look after him in his declining years. She performed that task so admirably that he did not die till he was 95. He apparently told her at some time that she was to come into the house when he was gone. There is no evidence as to when he said that. But she lived there simply because it was his house, not because of any claim of hers. She never thought of it as a claim. She thought that it was his house. I suppose she thought he would leave her the house by his will. Anyway during his lifetime, in my judgment, she never could possibly have asserted a right of her own.

2

In 1951 the testator executed a conveyance of the property in favour of his nephew, the respondent, expressed to be in consideration of a sum of £1, 500 acknowledged to be received by the testator. The document was not executed by the nephew and he knew nothing about it, but he was told at some time, either then or shortly afterwards, by the testator that he was making over his land to him. The wife knew nothing about it. The testator and his wife continued to live there just as they had done before. Their nephew was on very good terms with them; he visited them on Saturday evenings and came in once or twice a week to play cards.

3

So matters stood at that time, the property thus having been made over to the nephew. At some later time - we do not quite know when - the testator decided to forgive his nephew the debt of £1,500 (perhaps he never intended to take it), so any lien on the land that the testator may have had ceased, because he was not asking for anything morel there was no purpose in a lien: that would not have giver, him any right to possession, because anequitable lien does not give such a right; it gives a right of action of foreclosure but otherwise does not confer any right of possession.

4

At a later time, in 1959, the testator handed over the title deeds to the plaintiff, saying; "The property is yours: you should have the title deeds, and here they are", or words to that effect. The nephew took the title deeds over and took over also, I think, some, evidence that the tithe rent charge had been paid off by the testator on his behalf.

5

In 1960 the wife altered some part of the property for the purpose of a hairdresser's business that she was either carrying on or intended to carry on upon the property. The nephew knew all about it and did not think it right to raise any objection. There was also an incident - I do not quite know when - when the testator said to his nephew "Of course I am only here with your leave: do you mind my staying here? I will go out when you like"; and his nephew said "You can stay as long as you like".

6

Matters went on until the testator died in October, 1965. Before that, in January, he had made his will. It occurred to him (and he told the solicitor so) that he was a little troubled about the position as between himself and his nephew over this bit of land and on his instructions the solicitor inserted this clause in the will: "I declare that I have long since excused Joseph Hughes from all liability for any sum of money owed to me as the consideration for the conveyance of my freehold property in Icknield way in the parish of Satan Bray containing 11 acres" (and so forth) "together with the message….erected thereon… to the said Joseph Hughes in the year 1951 but should any estate duty be payable in respect of any part of that property because of the non-payment of the consideration money and because…. Joseph Hughes has never asked me to vacate the dwelling-house there then such estate duty shall be paid by the Bank out of moneys to arise from the sale calling in and conversion of…. my said real and personal property". That is good evidence as being a statement against the interest of the maker of it.

7

He died, as I say, in October, 1965. His widow continued to live in the property and has raised a claim to be entitled to it and relies on the Limitation Act. It is clear, as I have said, that she has no right in the matter at all: she is a mere life-tenant under the will. If anybody had any rights it is the deceased's personal representative. That personal representative is here, by amendment, and so far as is necessary I will deal with the argument on behalf of the first defendant which has been eloquently put before us by Mr. Brookes.

8

On the facts as I have stated them - and they are not in dispute - it seems to me quite clear that if the testator, in spite of all those facts, had acquired a statutory title before his death then the law is in a very ridiculous condition. It would be to my mind contrary to common sense to suppose that " maugre ses dents" (to use the old phrase) a man can become an owner under the limitation Act when his whole intention was not to become such an owner. I would make a citation from Lord Greene in a case of Booker v. Palmer, in which he said this: "There is one golden rule which is of very general application, nearly, that the law does not impute intention to enter into legal relationships where the circumstances and the conduct of the parties negative any intention of the kind". If ever there was a case where the facts showed an absence of such intention or rather an intention precisely the contrary of that which the personal representative claims, it is this case. There was not once but on several occasions a statement by the testator that he was not the owner, that he would give it up if he was asked to, and a disclaimer by his nephew, who after all had throughout the legal and I think the equitable title to the property. Nevertheless it is contended by the widow that the plaintiff's title became extinguished, and for that the words of the statute are relied upon.

9

In his most persuasive argument Mr. Brookes has had to fly in the face of common sense in order that his client may maintain ner claim to be entitled to possession of the property. I can well understand her claim, because she was always under theimpression that it would be hers one day and now she finds herself out of possession and it must be very galling for her, but it does seem an act of most extraordinary ingratitude, the testator being her husband, and having lived under somebody else's roof for 15 or 20 years.

10

The Act in question, of course, is the Limitation Act, 1939; and one begins with section 4 (3), which provides: "No action shall be brought by any other person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him…." I pass from there to section 5 (3): "Where any person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to him" — that is the nephew: it exactly describes the position here — "by a person who, at the date when the assurance took effect, was in possession of the land" — in 1951 the testator was in possession of the land — "and no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance" — that means that Hughes, in spite of the assurance, was not in possession of the land by virtue of it — "the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the assurance took effect". That would say that the right of action accrued in 1951; and. under section 4 (3), more than twelve years having elapsed, no action shall be brought in respect of it.

11

But as against that one must look at section 10 of the...

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