Jude v HM Advocate; Hodgson v HM Advocate; Birnie v HM Advocate
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judge | LORD HOPE,LORD BROWN,LORD DYSON,LORD HAMILTON,LORD KERR |
| Judgment Date | 23 November 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | 2012 SCCR 88,[2011] UKSC 55 |
| Court | Supreme Court (Scotland) |
| Docket Number | No 7 |
| Date | 23 November 2011 |
[2011] UKSC 55
Lord Hope, Deputy President
Lord Brown
Lord Kerr
Lord Dyson
Lord Hamilton
Appellant (HM Advocate)
Joanna Cherry QC
P Jonathan Brodie QC
Kenneth J Campbell QC
Douglas Fairley
(Instructed by The Appeals Unit, Crown Office)
Respondent (Birnie)
Christopher Shead
Moira Mackenzie
Andrew Mason
(Instructed by Drummond Miller LLP)
Appellant (HM Advocate)
Joanna Cherry QC
P Jonathan Brodie QC
Kenneth J Campbell QC
Douglas Fairley
(Instructed by The Appeals Unit, Crown Office)
Respondent (Hodgson)
Christopher Shead
Moira Mackenzie
Andrew Mason
(Instructed by Drummond Miller LLP)
Appellant (HM Advocate)
Joanna Cherry QC
P Jonathan Brodie QC
Kenneth J Campbell QC
Douglas Fairley
(Instructed by The Appeals Unit, Crown Office)
Respondent (Jude)
Christopher Shead
Moira Mackenzie
Andrew Mason
(Instructed by Drummond Miller LLP)
Heard on 11 and 12 October 2011
The respondents to the Lord Advocate's appeal in these three cases are Raymond Jude, Michael Hodgson and Josh Birnie. They were each detained as suspects for questioning at a police station under sections 14 and 15 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Their detentions took place prior to the decision of this court in Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, 2011 SC(UKSC) 13; [2010] 1 WLR 2601. As was the practice at that time, they did not have access to legal advice either before or during their police interviews. In the course of their interviews they said things in reply to questions put to them by the police on which the Crown relied at their trials. They were convicted and sentenced to various periods of imprisonment. They then appealed against these convictions. Their appeals were still current when the judgment in Cadder was delivered on 26 October 2010.
Among other grounds of appeal in the High Court of Justiciary the respondents advanced submissions which raised a devolution issue. This was that the leading of evidence of statements which they made during their police interviews was a breach of their rights under articles 6(3)(c) and 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and that, in terms of section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998, the Lord Advocate had no power to lead that evidence. They referred to the decision in Cadder in support of this ground of appeal. For Birnie it was also submitted that the reliance by the Crown upon his admissions in these circumstances deprived him of a fair trial, to which he was entitled under article 6(1) of the Convention and at common law. The Crown's response to these submissions was that, for various reasons, the principle that was established in Cadder did not apply in these cases. The High Court of Justiciary decided to deal with this response as a preliminary issue, and it was referred to a court of five judges. On 11 May 2011 the Appeal Court (the Lord Justice-Clerk (Gill) and Lords Osborne, Eassie, Clarke and Mackay of Drumadoon) repelled the Crown's objections and continued the appeals for hearing on the remaining grounds of appeal: [2011] HCJAC 46, 2011 SLT 722. The Crown was given leave to appeal against that decision to this court under para 13 of Schedule 6 to the Scotland Act 1998.
The issues raised by the Crown's response to the devolution issue were as follows: (1) that in the case of each respondent section 118(8) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 was an absolute bar to any challenge to the evidence of the police interviews, as objection was not taken at or before the trial to the leading of that evidence; (2) that each of the respondents had waived their right of access to a lawyer when they were interviewed; (3) that by failing to objectto the evidence through their respective legal representatives they had waived the right to take the point as a ground of appeal; and (4) in Jude's case only, that the point had been taken too late as section 100(3B) of the Scotland Act 1998, as amended by section 1 of the Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009, provides that any proceedings brought on the ground that an act of a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible with the Convention rights must be brought before the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place.
The Crown did not seek leave to appeal from the Appeal Court's decision in relation to the application of section 118(8) of the 1995 Act. Leave was sought and granted in relation to the issues of waiver and the application to Jude's case of section 100(3B) of the Scotland Act. In his written case to this court the Lord Advocate made it clear that he did not intend to pursue the point that the respondents had waived their right to object to the admissibility of the evidence of the police interviews because their legal representatives did not object to that evidence at the trial. This was because he accepts that, at the time when the respondents were tried, a person who was detained under section 14 of the 1995 Act did not have an express right in Scots law to legal advice before or during his police interview. As for the issue of individual waiver, his position was that the only point in these appeals which was likely to be of importance for future cases was that raised in the case of Birnie. Unlike the other two respondents Birnie made an unsolicited statement following his police interview, having declined the opportunity to have access to a lawyer prior to and while making it.
The advocate depute, Miss Cherry QC, confined her submissions about waiver in these three cases to the question whether Birnie waived his right to a lawyer when he made his unsolicited statement. She made no submissions in support of the proposition that the respondents had waived their right to a lawyer at their police interviews. That issue was however the subject of detailed submissions in the Lord Advocate's reference in McGowan (Procurator Fiscal, Edinburgh) v B, which was heard at the same time as these appeals. The court has issued a separate judgment in that case: [2011] UKSC 54.
In the result the only matters which remain for consideration in relation to these three appeals are (1) whether the time bar referred to in section 100(3B) of the Scotland Act 1998, as amended, applies to Jude's appeal, (2) whether Birnie waived his right of access to a lawyer when he made his unsolicited statement following his police interview and (3) whether the reliance by the Crown upon his admissions in these circumstances deprived him of his right to fair trial under article 6(1) of the Convention. No issue now arises in regard to the preliminary points that were taken by the Crown in Hodgson's appeal.
Jude went to trial in the High Court of Justiciary at Aberdeen on an indictment which libelled one charge of breach of the peace, one charge of lewd and libidinous conduct, three charges of indecent assault and two charges of assault with intent to rape. On 5 June 2008 he was convicted of one charge of indecent assault and of both charges of assault with intent to rape. On 28 August 2008 he lodged a notice of his intention to appeal against his conviction. On 17 February 2009 his appeal was deemed to have been abandoned because his note of appeal had not been lodged within the period referred to in section 110(1)(a) of the 1995 Act. On 5 October 2010 he lodged an application for extension of time under section 111(2) of that Act along with a note of appeal. His application for extension of time was granted on 6 October 2010 and his note of appeal was received on the same date. It is plain, and not disputed, that the time bar which would have otherwise have applied under section 110 of the 1995 Act was removed when the Appeal Court decided on 6 October 2010 to grant Jude's application for an extension of time under section 111(2).
At the end of his judgment in Cadder Lord Rodger drew attention to the provisions of section 100 of the Scotland Act, as amended by the Convention Rights Proceedings (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2009: 2011 SC(UKSC) 13, paras 104–106. In its amended form, the relevant provisions of that section are as follows:
"(1) This Act does not enable a person –
(a) to bring any proceedings in a court or tribunal on the ground that an act is incompatible with the Convention rights, or
(b) to rely on any of the Convention rights in any such proceedings,
unless he would be a victim for the purposes of article 34 of the Convention (within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998) if proceedings in respect of the act were brought in the European Court of Human Rights.
…
(3) This Act does not enable a court or tribunal to award any damages in respect of an act which is incompatible with any of the
Convention rights which it could not award if section 8(3) and (4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 applied.
(3A) Subsection (3B) applies to any proceedings brought on or after 2 November 2009 by virtue of this Act against the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive in a court or tribunal on the ground that an act of the Scottish Ministers or a member of the Scottish Executive is incompatible with the Convention rights.
(3B) Proceedings to which this subsection applies must be brought before end of –
(a) the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place, or
(b) such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,
but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question.
…
(3E) The reference in subsection (3A) to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Raymond Willian Jude V. Her Majesty's Advocate
...police interview. On 23 November 2011 the United Kingdom Supreme Court refused the appeal at the instance of the Lord Advocate (Jude v HMA 2012 SCCR 88). Grounds of appeal [6] Against that procedural background grounds of appeal 1, 2, 5 and 8 had to be determined by this court. As it had be......
-
George Brodie V. Her Majesty's Advocate
...thereafter appealed against conviction to their Lordships in the High Court of Justiciary. Cases referred to: Advocate (HM) v JudeUNK [2011] UKSC 55; 2012 SC (UKSC) 222; 2012 SLT 75; 2012 SCCR 88; 2012 SCL 130; [2012] HRLR 8 Anderson v HM AdvocateSC 1996 JC 29; 1996 SLT 155 Brown v McPherso......
-
McGowan (Procurator Fiscal)
...understood the propositions in para 2(b) of the Minute to have been based on the observations of the High Court of Justiciary in Jude v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 46, 2011 SLT 722. In para 34 of his opinion, with which all the other members of the Appeal Court agreed, the Lord Justice Clerk (......
-
Joseph Michael Birnie V. Her Majesty's Advocate
...and his voluntary statement, Lord Hope set out the relevant facts in the Supreme Court in paragraphs 22 to 26 of Jude v HM Advocate, 2012 SCCR 88, 2012 SLT 75 as follows: "22 The facts which provide the background to the argument in Birnie's case are as follows. He was interviewed under cau......
-
The role of special advocates
...vMB (FC); Secretary of State forthe Home Department vAF (FC) [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440 at [54], Lord Mance in Home Office vTariq [2011]UKSC 55, [2012] 1 AC 452 at [78].15. [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 AC 531.Jackson 345 instructions from his or her client on the closed material.16He cited......
-
Chalmers to Cadder: Full Circle on Police Interrogation?
...Supreme Court judgements, concerning waiver of the right to legal advice, followed shortly in McGowan v B [2011] UKSC 54 and Jude v HMA [2011] UKSC 55, the latter of which involved three conjoined cases. cases, where the struggle is primarily focussing around two issues; first, the extent t......