London Borough of Redbridge v SNA
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Hayden |
| Judgment Date | 21 July 2015 |
| Neutral Citation | [2015] EWHC 2140 (Fam) |
| Docket Number | Case No: FD15P00058 |
| Court | Family Division |
| Date | 21 July 2015 |
[2015] EWHC 2140 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Hayden
Case No: FD15P00058
Mr. Kyri Lefteri for the Local Authority
Ms. Melanie Johnson (instructed by Harris Waters Solicitors) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 2 nd July 2015
This is an application made on behalf of the London Borough of Redbridge to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in order to protect vulnerable youngsters from a male (SNA) in their borough who they perceive to present a sexual risk.
The orders sought are drafted widely, focused on 'any female under 18 years of age'. They require to be set out:
Not to:
a. contact any female under 18 years of age by any means, in person and or through any third person whether by way of face to face contact, telephone (mobile/landline/facetime/skype etc.), text messages, MSM, blackberry, chatrooms, or other social media whether or not such contact is invited in the first instance by the child;
b. seek the company or be in the company of any female under 18 years of age whether or not invited to do so in the first instance by the child;
c. approach any female under 18 years of age in any manner, whether in public, on the street or other public areas such as parks, in private addresses open to certain members of the public such as any food outlet, retail outlet, café, public house, bar, hotel, club, nightclub etc, on public transport, in or at any premises associated with a sporting or entertainment activity or in any private residence, whether or not invited to do so in the first instance by the child;
d. Reside in the same home as a female child under the age of 18 years of age.
Mr Kyri Lefteri, who appears on behalf of the Local Authority sought to rely on the judgment of Keehan J in Birmingham City Council v Sarfraz Riaz and Others [2014] EWHC 4247. There the Judge, at paragraph 9 of his judgment made orders to the following effect;
a) Contact AB by any means, in person and or through any third person whether by way of face to face contact, telephone (mobile/landline/facetime/skype etc), text messages, MSM blackberry, chatrooms, or other social media whether or not such contact is invited in the first instance by AB
b) Seek the company or be in the company of AB whether or not invited to do so in the first instance by AB.
c) Approach AB in any manner, whether in public, on the street or other public areas such as parks, in private addresses open to certain member of the public such as any food outlet, retail outlet, café, public house, bar, hotel, club, nightclub, etc, on public transport, in or at any premises associated with a sporting or entertainment activity or in any private residence, whether or not invited to do so in the first instance by AB
d) Follow AB in any location public or private.
e) Approach any female, under the age of 18 years, not previously associated with him on a public highway, common land, wasteland, parkland, playing field, public transport stop/station.
f) Pass on details for AB for example name, location, address, telephone numbers at which she can be reached or the names of other persons through whom she can be contacted save as directed by the police or order of the Court.
g) Incite, encourage or facilitate the introduction of AB to any other male.
h) Incite or encourage any other male to seeks any form of contact with AB
i) Cause, permit or allow AB or other female previously unknown to him and who may be under the age of 18 years to enter into or remain in any private motor car or taxi in which he is driving or travelling as a passenger.
And is bound by such order until 18 th August 2015.
Keehan J was clearly conscious that he was being asked to push the parameters of the High Court's inherent jurisdictional power to protect vulnerable children. In his detailed exegesis of the law he began with this arresting quotation:
"42. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court "may be invoked in an apparently inexhaustible variety of circumstances and may be exercised in different ways. This peculiar concept is indeed so amorphous and ubiquitous and so pervasive in its operation that it seems to defy challenge to determine its quality and establish its limits" Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court (1970) Current Legal Problems 23."
Recognising that the use of the inherent jurisdiction has been very significantly curtailed by s100 Children Act 1989 and that a Local Authority may not apply for any order under it without first applying for the leave of the court, Keehan J went on to consider what the modern scope and ambit of the inherent jurisdiction might extend to. He noted the observations of Waite LJ in Re M and N (Minors) [1990]:
"the prerogative jurisdiction has shown striking versatility throughout its long history in adapting its powers to the protective needs of children, encompassing all kinds of different situations. Although the jurisdiction is theoretically boundless, the courts have, nevertheless, found it necessary to set self imposed limits upon its exercise, for the sake of clarity and consistency and of avoiding conflict between child welfare and other public advantages".
Keehan J also looked at the facilitative provisions of the Family Procedure Rules which emphasise the inherent jurisdictional powers as imposing a 'duty' on the court to protect children who are subject to proceedings. The relevant paragraphs are:
"The Family Procedure Rules 2010, PD12D paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2:
1.1 It is the duty of the court under its inherent jurisdiction to ensure that a child who is the subject of proceedings is protected and properly taken care of. The court may in exercising its inherent jurisdiction make any order or determine any issue in respect of a child unless limited by case law or statue. Such proceedings should not be commenced unless it is clear that the issues concerning the child cannot be resolved under the Children Act 1989.
1.2 The court may under its inherent jurisdiction, in addition to all of the orders which can be made in family proceedings, make a wide range of injunctions for the child's protection of which the following are the most common: —
a) orders to restrain publicity;
b) orders to prevent an undesirable association;
c) orders relating to medical treatment;
d) orders to protect abducted children, or children where the case has another substantial foreign element; and
e) orders for the return of children to and from another state"
Having reviewed the jurisdiction in this way Keehan J came to the following conclusion in relation to the injunctive orders he was being asked to make:
"46. I am of the firm view that the use of the inherent jurisdiction to make injunctive orders to prevent CSE strikes at the heart of the parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court. I am satisfied that none of the statutory or the "self imposed limits" on the exercise of the jurisdiction prevent the court from making the orders sought by the local authority in this case."
The Birmingham case concerned a teenager who had repeatedly placed herself in situations of grave risk. Police intelligence before the court reported that she was performing sexual acts in exchange for cigarettes and cannabis and had been seen on videos using cocaine and performing sexual acts on Asian males. This is but the barest outline of the welfare concerns in that case but it suffices to illustrate why Keehan J was so highly motivated to use all the weapons in the court's armoury to protect the child and to restrict the behaviour of those who were so cynically abusing her.
In his concluding paragraphs Keehan J observed:
"All too often in such cases the only action taken by the authorities, where there is insufficient evidence to mount a prosecution, is in respect of the victim. They are invariably taken into care or, in more extreme cases, they are placed in secure accommodation as was the case with AB. Whilst that action is taken in the best interests and to protect the young victim, it strikes me as wrong and unfair that no action is taken against the perpetrators of child sexual exploitation. "
I could not agree more forcefully with the sentiments expressed there. Indeed in London Borough of Barking & Dagenham v SS [2014] EWHC 4436 (Fam) I found myself hearing one of those 'more extreme cases' where a young girl had been placed in secure accommodation in an attempt to sever the link she had forged with a group of exploitative males. The order (which I ultimately declined to renew) was predicated on the identified need that she be protected, in effect, from herself. I made the following observations:
"16. The courts have seen a number of cases in recent years where vulnerable young girls have been exploited in a variety of ways by groups of predatory men. That so many of these men escape prosecution and continue to enjoy their liberty whilst the young girls they exploit are locked up (for their own protection) sends very confusing messages to the girls themselves, to the distorted minds of the men who prey on them and to society more generally."
Later in the judgment I encouraged the Local Authority to pursue injuctive relief against a particular male obliging him to notify the police or Social Services if he were contacted by the child (SS):
"I have also indicated that the Local Authority should employ strenuous efforts to serve the individual male I have referred to in this judgment with a notice of an application for an injunction. I have indicated that I intend to craft an injunction which imposes upon him a positive duty to inform the police or Social Services if SS were to contact him in any way at...
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