Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE LEGGATT,LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS,SIR PATRICK RUSSELL
Judgment Date26 March 1997
Judgment citation (vLex)[1997] EWCA Civ J0326-22
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Docket NumberQBENF 95/1767/C
Date26 March 1997
Mansfield & Anr
Plaintiffs/Respondents
and
Weetabix Limited & Anr
Defendants/Appellants

[1997] EWCA Civ J0326-22

Before:

Lord Justice Leggatt

Lord Justice Aldous

Sir Patrick Russell

QBENF 95/1767/C

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

(MR JUSTICE COLLINS)

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London WC2

MR P ASHWORTH QC with MR P GREEN (Instructed by Messrs C M McMahon, London, London Agents for Messrs Moore & Emery, Carlisle CA1 1TE) appeared on behalf of the Appellant

MR P ANDREWS QC with MR M ANDERSON (Instructed by Messrs Oswald Hickson & Collier, London EC4A 3EX, London Agents for Anthony Collins, Pearl Assurance House, Birmingham, B2 5HG) appeared on behalf of the Respondents

1

Wednesday, 26 March 1997

LORD JUSTICE LEGGATT
2

It is over twelve years since on 1st November 1984 a 38-ton lorry belonging to the first defendants Weetabix Ltd failed to take a sharp bend in the village of Upper Tean near Stoke-on-Trent in Staffordshire and crashed into the shop belonging to the plaintiffs Mr and Mrs Mansfield, causing extensive damage. At the wheel of the lorry was Mr Terence Tarleton, who has since died, as has Mrs Mansfield. Although he had no reason to suspect it, Mr Tarleton had malignant insulinoma. That resulted in a hypoglycaemic state in which the brain was starved of glucose and so was unable to function properly. That was what caused the accident. The second defendant is Mr Tarleton's personal representative. On 23rd November 1995 Mr Justice Collins gave judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the defendants liable to them in negligence. Against that judgment the defendants now appeal.

3

The judge found that Mr Tarleton had not had much to eat on the day of the accident. That may have helped to induce his state by lowering his blood sugar level. In course of a journey of 40 miles before the accident Mr Tarleton was involved in three distinct incidents. The first happened at about 2.45 p.m. when he drove erratically, albeit at a moderate speed, along a dual carriageway. The second incident occurred five or ten minutes later when he collided with the rear of a trailer pulled by the vehicle in front of him. The police officer who went to the scene thought that he was behaving strangely. The third incident happened at about 3.30 p.m. when for no good reason the nearside wheels of the lorry were seen to mount the kerb before returning to the roadway. Immediately before the lorry hit the shop it had been travelling unexceptionably through the village, but as it approached the bend it was going too fast. Mr Tarleton was seen to be wrestling with the steering wheel in an attempt to negotiate the bend, and a short skid mark left in the roadway showed that he had braked at the last moment.

4

The judge concluded that it was highly unlikely that Mr Tarleton had completely lost consciousness at any stage before the accident occurred but that his ability to drive properly was impaired because of hypoglycaemia. The judge added at page 7D of the transcript of his judgment:

"I should say that there was also evidence that Mr Tarleton was usually a very careful and sensible driver and was a man who was conscientious and would not have continued to drive if he had appreciated and was conscious that his ability was impaired because of some illness or because of some condition which was affecting him."

5

Mr Tarleton remembered nothing between about 1 p.m. when his journey started and 3.40 p.m. when the accident happened.

6

The judge explained at page 9E of the transcript that -

"… one of the peculiarities about the condition is that notwithstanding that an individual is impaired in the sense that he is unable to rationalise, to form judgments, as well as he ought, he does not appreciate it."

7

Physical symptoms, which the judge referred to as "signposts" to the falling blood sugar level, do not, or may not, exist. At page 10G of the transcript the judge evidently accepted the evidence of an expert witness that -

"… he should not be blamed in any way for continuing to drive, because due, perhaps, to amnesia, a lack of appreciation of the significance of what had occurred, he would not have realised that he was in a less than fit state to continue to drive, and, accordingly, he did continue."

8

The judge added at page 11A of the transcript -

"He clearly was in a state whereby his brain was able to function to a sufficient extent that he could steer the lorry, he could avoid any other traffic, he could manoeuvre round bends, he could drive it in the correct direction towards the depot where he was intending to go, and he could slow down and speed up as appropriate.

Accordingly his cognitive functions were in working order and the messages were going to his hands, to his arms, to his feet, so as to enable him to co-ordinate properly in order to drive the lorry."

9

In short, Mr Tarleton had an impaired degree of consciousness because of the malfunction in his brain caused by the deficiency in glucose.

10

The judge followed Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 W.L.R. 823. In it a motorist was involved in an accident when unknowingly he was suffering from a stroke and was unaware of his unfitness to drive. Neill J. considered several criminal cases about automatism before saying at page 832F -

"I am satisfied that in a civil case a similar approach should be adopted. The driver will be able to escape liability if his actions at the relevant time were wholly beyond his control. The most obvious case is sudden unconsciousness. But if he retained some control, albeit imperfect control, and if his driving, judged objectively, was below the required standard, he remains liable."

11

He gave no reason for being so satisfied. In my judgment consideration of criminal cases can only introduce confusion. In them the question is whether the defendant was driving. Hence the need, if the defendant is to escape conviction, to show that he was in a state of automatism. In civil cases that is not the test. So Neill...

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7 cases
  • Michael Counihan v Dublin Bus and Arthur Ebbs (Bus Átha Cliath)
    • Ireland
    • High Court
    • 2 March 2005
    ...û DUBLIN BUS AND ARTHUR EBBS DEFENDANTS O'BRIEN v PARKER 1997 2 ILRM 170 ROBERTS v RAMSBOTTOM 1980 1 WLR 823 MANSFIELD v WEETABIX LTD 1998 1 WLR 1263 SNELLING v WHITEHEAD THE TIMES 31.7.1975 NEGLIGENCE duty of care Personal injuries - Foreseeability of risk - Causation - Driver unaware of m......
  • Dunnage v Randall
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 2 July 2015
    ...that its dicta neither dilute the objective test for the standard of care nor import a subjective element. 19 He considered that Corr, Mansfield v Weetabix [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (" Mansfield"), Roberts (" Roberts") and Waugh v James K Allan Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyds Rep 1 (" Waugh") recognise that wh......
  • Rasheed Wilks v Donovan Williams
    • Jamaica
    • Supreme Court (Jamaica)
    • 3 December 2020
    ...that impairs his ability to drive. 21 56 The defence of automatism in civil proceedings was examined by Leggatt L.J. in Mansfield and Another v. Weetabix Ltd. And Another. 22 There, a lorry-driver employed by the first defendants was unaware that he suffered from malignant insulinoma, a con......
  • Lin Chun Yuen And Another v Kwong Kam Chuen And Another
    • Hong Kong
    • High Court (Hong Kong)
    • 29 November 2002
    ...within the bounds of ordinary human behaviour to seek an explanation that eliminates fault on his part. 41. Mansfield v. Weetabix & Anor 1998 1 WLR 1263 was concerned with a lorry-driver's unawareness that he suffered from a hypoglycaemic state. The fact that the disabling event was not sud......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 books & journal articles
  • Must the Surgeon Take the Pill? Negligence Duty in the Context of Cognitive Enhancement
    • United Kingdom
    • The Modern Law Review No. 77-1, January 2014
    • 1 January 2014
    ...decisions on the issue of voluntarycontrol and automatism, and these are discussed at length in cases such as Mansfield vWeetabix Ltd[1998] 1 WLR 1263, but these do not concern us here.Imogen Goold and Hannah Maslen© 2014 The Authors. The Modern Law Review © 2014 The Modern Law Review Limite......
  • The Assessment of Gain‐Based Damages for Breach of Contract
    • United Kingdom
    • The Modern Law Review No. 71-4, July 2008
    • 1 July 2008
    ...[12](AnthonyMann QC).79 In tort,se e:Mullin vRichards [1998] 1 WLR 13 04; Bolam vFriernHospital[1957] 1 WLR 582;Mans-¢eld vWeetabix Ltd [1998] 1WLR 1263. In the criminal law, see: RvCamplin [1978] AC 705;RvSmith(Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 24 6; Attorney General forJerseyvHolley [2005] 2 AC 580.80 ......
  • THE 'REASONABLE TORT VICTIM': CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, STANDARD OF CARE AND THE 'EQUIVALENCE THEORY'.
    • Australia
    • Melbourne University Law Review Vol. 41 No. 2, December 2017
    • 1 December 2017
    ...various authorities cited at 651-9 [33]-[67] (Rafferty LJ). (80) Scholz (n 33). (81) Waugh (n 36). See also Mansfield v Weetabix Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1263 (CAdriver with low blood (82) Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474, 486 [32] (McPherson JA), citing Morris v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925, 927-......

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