Martin Woolls v North Somerset Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Jeremy Baker,Lord Justice Hamblen |
| Judgment Date | 25 February 2016 |
| Neutral Citation | [2016] EWHC 1410 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/4639/2015 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 25 February 2016 |
[2016] EWHC 1410 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Lord Justice Hamblen
Mr Justice Jeremy Baker
CO/4639/2015
The Appellant appeared in person
Mr A Fuller (instructed by North Somerset Council) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
APPROVED JUDGMENT
On 21 January 2014, the appellant was convicted at the North Somerset Magistrates' Court of a number of offences of failing to pay the excess charges which he incurred when, on various occasions between 12 March 2012 and 27 July 2013, he parked his Nissan motor vehicle at Knightstone Causeway Car Park without having displayed a valid parking ticket, contrary to the North Somerset District Council (Various Sites) (Off-Street Parking Places) Order 2005, as amended by the North Somerset District Council (Various Sites) (Off-Street Parking Places) (Variation No 5) Order 2010, section 35A(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
At the hearing on 21 January 2014, the appellant had sought a stay of the prosecution in respect of these offences on the basis that it amounted to an abuse of the process of the court. There were essentially three grounds which he relied upon; firstly, that the respondent council had made representations, upon which he had relied, that he would not be prosecuted in relation to offences arising out of the non-payment of the parking charges at Knightstone Causeway Car Park; secondly, that the prosecution was malicious, in that it was motivated by a desire to terminate the passenger boat business which he had operated out of Knightstone Island; and thirdly, that the parking regulations were unlawful.
The matter was considered by District Judge (Magistrates' Court) Lynne Matthews, who determined that where, as here, the application for a stay is made under the second limb of R v Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94, on the basis that it would be unfair for the applicant to be tried, the Magistrates' Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the application, and instead she heard evidence and reached findings of fact concerning the issues which had been raised by the appellant so as to enable him to apply to the Magistrates' Court to state a case for the opinion of the High Court.
On 12 February 2014, the appellant applied to the North Somerset Magistrates' Court to state a case, and on 14 February 2014 the Magistrates' Court provided the parties with a draft case and, following a request for their observations upon it, these were duly received. Thereafter the appellant sought instead to appeal to the Bristol Crown Court, where it was ultimately determined that pursuant to section 111(4) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, he was precluded from doing so, and therefore the application for the case stated was revived and now comes before this court for determination.
It may be that a preliminary issue arises in this case, namely the jurisdiction of this court to consider the appeal in view of the fact that the original application to state a case may have been made on a date beyond that provided by section 111(2) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980, namely within 21 days of the day on which the decision of the Magistrates' Court was given.
In this regard, although rule 35.5(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 provides that its own time limits may be extended, as the note to rule 35.5(2) makes clear, this does not permit a similar extension of time to the making of the original application to state a case under section 111(2) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. However, CPR 52.6(1) provides that application may be made to this court to vary the time limit for filing an appeal notice. In regard to the question as to whether the time limit should be extended, I remind myself of what Brooke LJ had to say in Foenander v Bond Lewis & Co [2001] EWCA Civ 759 concerning the practical consequences which may flow from refusing such an application. In the event, if an extension is required in this case, then I consider that it is appropriate that an extension be granted so as to allow its merits to be determined.
Turning then to the written case stated, the questions posed by the district judge are:
"(i) Was I correct in declining to hear the appellant's abuse of process argument based upon his submissions of (a) legitimate expectation of being granted a free parking permit, or promises that he would not be prosecuted for parking infringements; and (b) the illegitimacy of the Council's parking scheme?
(ii) If so, the High Court is respectfully asked to determine the matters.
(iii) Was I correct in my finding of fact that the parking scheme was valid in that the statutory scheme had been followed before the charges were introduced?"
The first question posed by the district judge can be answered shortly, in that where, as here, an accused makes an application for a stay of the prosecution on the basis of the second limb of R v Beckford, there is clear authority that the Magistrates' Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the matter (see R v Aldershot Youth Courtex parte Anderson [1997] (CO/1911/96); R v Belmarsh Magistrates' Court ex parte Watts [1999] EWCA Admin 112). Instead, as Maurice Kay LJ observed in Nembhard v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] EWCA Admin 194, the summary trial can proceed to a conclusion without a ruling on the application, and, in the event of a conviction, an appeal by way of case stated can be made to the High Court after necessary findings of fact have been made by the Magistrates' Court on the evidence presented to it.
In the present case, the facts as found by the district judge at the hearing include the following:
"11. A schedule to a lease dated 29/ 5/1992 concerning the causeway provided for 'the full and free right for the Council, its successors in title, boat trip operators and passengers, and private boat owners and passengers to make use of and to pass over and long Knightstone Causeway and slip way Y for all purposes connected with the operation boats as shall have been authorised by the Council PROVIDED THAT the use of vehicles shall only be permitted for emergency purposes and for up to a maximum of 30 minutes to enable the delivery of goods and supplies and the launching and landing of tenders used in connection with pleasure craft and other private craft.'
On all occasions when an excess charge notice was issued to Mr Woolls, his vehicle was parked, not for any emergency, but for his convenience whilst he was at sea.
Knightstone was developed between (approximately) 2005 and 2007. I accept that during that time Mr Woolls had discussions with David turner, the director of development and environment. I accept that at these meetings Mr Turner explained that after the development was complete, the boat men would have their parking provision. There is no evidential detail as to what this might mean. I do not find that this was a guarantee of free parking for all time.
Prior to the March 2010 variation to the order, Mr Woolls, in common with other boat men, had, without charge, parked their vehicles on the causeway. This is a road built on the top of the harbour wall.
Prior to the March 2010 variation there was consultation regarding the proposed introduction of parking charges. No written objections were received by the Council. As part of that process of consultation, Mr Taylor, the parking services manager for the Council, had a meeting on a date unknown in early 2009, with Mr Woolls. Mr Woolls told Mr Taylor that he needed provision for vehicle parking and where it ought to be located. I find that Mr Woolls, by his own admission, told Mr Taylor that he had no objection to the introduction of charges provided it did not affect him. Mr Taylor passed on the comments of Mr Woolls to his service head.
When the 2010 variation introduced parking charges, a scheme was set up so that local businesses could purchase a permit.
Mr Woolls bought a permit to cover his use of a parking space for the period May to October 2010. I am satisfied that Mr Woolls was told that if he failed to purchase a permit, his vehicle would be towed away. Although Mr Woolls describes this threat as 'duress', I find that such a threat does not amount to duress.
Mr Woolls argues that on occasions he has not received an excess charge notice despite parking without a permit. I find that this is explained by (i) the lack of any council official checking for permits on a particular day, (ii) a period of grade afforded to Mr Woolls after the introduction of charging and (iii) a delay by the DVLA in the provision of the details of the registered keeper of Mr Woolls' vehicle.
I find that a promise not to charge for parking was not given.
I find that there is no inference that parking tickets would be neither issued nor enforced.
I do not find any credible evidence of a promise that Mr Woolls would be able to park without charge on Knightstone Island beyond the introduction of the May 2010 variation or for all time.
I find that (a) as part of the 2005 to 2007 development of the harbour, the water and electricity supplies were disconnected. They were never reconnected. Mr Woolls had never been billed for water or electricity use when it had been available (b) there is rubble in the harbour which has resulted in a reduction in the time available for Mr Woolls to operate his business. He now needs to wait for the higher tides...
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