Martyn Worthington Associates v Wigan Chamber of Commerce and Another
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE WARD |
| Judgment Date | 28 March 2003 |
| Neutral Citation | [2003] EWCA Civ 1657 |
| Date | 28 March 2003 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | A1/2003/0418(A |
[2003] EWCA Civ 1657
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
(His Honour Judge Mackay)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Lord Justice Ward
A1/2003/0418(A
Mr A Latimer (instructed by Messrs Stephensons, Wigan) addressed the court via telephone link on behalf of the Appellant Defendant
Mr A Singer (instructed by Messrs Platt & Fishwick, Wigan) addressed the court via telephone link on behalf of the Respondent Claimant.
This is an application by the appellant, the Wigan Chamber of Commerce Training and Enterprise Limited, for a stay of execution of the order made by His Honour Judge Mackay on 14th February 2003. That order was made on the trial of a claim by the respondent, Martyn Worthington Associates, for damages for the breach, it is said, of contracts made with the Chamber of Commerce to provide certain training and support services in the Wigan area. The judge was persuaded that there was oral agreement made between Mr Worthington's practice and members of the staff of the Chamber of Commerce. That there were agreements made seems no longer to be challenged, but the appeal is brought by the Chamber of Commerce, with the judge's permission, against his finding that these employees had apparent authority to bind the Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce denying that authority and saying that contracts had to be in writing. That appeal will take probably half a day, and I am told by the parties that it may be heard by December.
The application is for a stay of execution and there are essentially two grounds advanced for that stay.
CPR 52.7 provides that:
"Unless —
(a)the appeal court … orders otherwise …
an appeal shall not operate as a stay of any order … of the lower court."
So the rule now is much as before: that there is no stay of the judgment, that the appellant needs to apply for a stay and that the Court of Appeal has a general discretion to permit the stay.
Mr Latimer persuasively makes his telephone application, and I have no complaint about that. It seems a sensible approach on a small application like this and it saves costs.
Mr Latimer submits that the first reason for allowing the stay is that the parties have already agreed what should happen by the consent order of 27th September 2001. That order was made in these circumstances. The Chamber of Commerce was being wound up, not through insolvency, but perhaps for governmental reasons. The claimant was, not surprisingly, concerned about protecting any judgment he might obtain. There was the threat of a freezing injunction, but arrangements were made, incorporated in the consent order, that:
"1.The Defendant shall deposit by way of security the sum of £150,000 to be paid to the Defendant's solicitors and to be kept in their clients account, or in a separate designated client account [then follow the important words] pending the conclusion of the action."
Paragraph 3 reads:
"This order shall remain in force until judgment or conclusion of this action unless before then it is varied or discharged by an order of the court."
Mr Latimer's submission is that the action has not concluded because this appeal is pending. Therefore the money is in the solicitors' account and the claimant is protected and will get his money in due course.
For my part, I find the agreement not to have been happily drafted. "… pending the conclusion of the action" is ambiguous. Ordinarily one would expect that the action would conclude with a final judgment; and that is Mr Singer's point. He says that in paragraph 3 the order remains in force until judgment. There has been judgment and therefore the order no longer operates. That does not explain the further words "or conclusion",...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Apollo Fuels Ltd and Another
...Mairs (Inspector of Taxes) v Haughey (1992) 66 TC 273 (Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland) and Wilson (Inspector of Taxes) v Clayton [2003] EWCA Civ 1657; [2005] STC 157. She also accepted the submission that "benefit" cannot mean something different in Sections 114 and 120 from its meani......
-
Wilson (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Clayton
...EWCA Civ 1657" class="content__heading content__heading--depth1"> [2003] EWCA Civ 1657 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION Patten J. Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Lord Justice Peter......
-
Marion Miller v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust
...to ask what is a " proper recompense for the services provided" by members of Mrs Miller's family: see Evans v Pontypridd Roofing Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1657. Since care was provided as and when required, regardless of day or night and at week-ends as well as on week-days, Mr Hough contends th......
-
Mr Paul Harrison,Mr Lee Solway & Harrison Solway Logistics Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs, TC 06956
...Mairs (Inspector of Taxes) v Haughey (1992) 66 TC 273 (Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland ) 17 Wilson (Inspector of Taxes) v Clayton [2003] EWCA Civ 1657 16 deliberate for which the time limit is 20 years which the assessments are comfortably within. 104. Mr Outhwaite argued that because f......