Moran v Manchester City Council; Richards v Ipswich Borough Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Justice Wilson,Lord Justice Tuckey,The Right Hon. Sir Anthony Clarke, Master of the Rolls |
| Judgment Date | 17 April 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] EWCA Civ 378 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Date | 17 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | Case Nos: (A) B5/2007/1151 (LOWER COURT NO. M7X00036) (LOWER COURT NO. 71P00588) |
[2008] EWCA Civ 378
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM (A) THE MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT
MR RECORDER RIGBY
(B) THE IPSWICH COUNTY COURT
HIS HONOUR JUDGE HOLT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Right Hon. Sir Anthony Clarke, Master Of The Rolls
Lord Justice Tuckey and
Lord Justice Wilson
Case Nos: (A) B5/2007/1151
(B) B5/2007/0804
(LOWER COURT NO. M7X00036)
(LOWER COURT NO. 71P00588)
(A) Mr Clive Freedman QC and Mrs Zoe Thompson (instructed by The City Solicitor, Manchester) appeared for the Appellant (Manchester City Council).
Mr Jan Luba QC and Mr Adam Fullwood (instructed by Shelter, Manchester) appeared for the Respondent (Sharon Moran).
Mr Martin Chamberlain (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared for the Intervener (the Secretary of State).
(B) Mr Martin Hodgson (instructed by Messers Anthony Gold) appeared for the Appellant (Rosemary Richards)
Mr James Findlay and Mr Wayne Beglan (instructed by Prettys) appeared for the Respondent (Ipswich Borough Council).
Mr Martin Chamberlain (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) appeared for the Intervener (the Secretary of State).
Hearing dates: 11 and 12 February 2008.
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION
These two appeals, heard together, raise the question whether two women, the first of whom was claiming, and the second of whom had been accepted, to be homeless and in priority need under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 (“the Act”) and who were occupying women's refuges, there had “accommodation … which it would have been reasonable for [them] to continue to occupy” within the meaning of s.191(1) of the Act. If so, then, when they deliberately acted so as to cause themselves to be evicted from the refuges, they became intentionally homeless and the local housing authorities were entitled to conclude, in the case of the first woman, that they did not owe her the main housing duty under s.193 of the Act (“the main duty”) and, in the case of the second, that they ceased to owe her the main duty by virtue of s.193(6)(b) of the Act.
Since the coming into force of s.14(2) of the Housing and Planning Act 1986 there has been symmetry between the definitions of homelessness and intentional homelessness in what are now ss.175 and 191 of the Act. Section 175 provides:
“(1) A person is homeless if he has no accommodation available for his occupation …
…
(3) A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.”
Section 191 provides:
“(1) A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy.”
So, subject to other provisions to which it is unnecessary to refer, a woman is homeless if she does not have a place which can be described as accommodation or if her accommodation is not such that it would be reasonable for her to continue to occupy it. Symmetrically, she is intentionally homeless if the consequence of her deliberate act (or omission) is that she ceases to occupy a place which can be described as accommodation and which is such that it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy it. It follows that if, while occupying a refuge, a woman is already homeless, whether because a refuge cannot be described as accommodation or because it is not reasonable for her to continue to occupy it, a deliberate act (or omission) on her part of which the consequence is that she ceases to occupy the refuge cannot make her intentionally homeless.
The territory of the present appeals is alleged intentional homelessness. But, in the light of the symmetry to which I have referred, the first two of the three questions which arise in the appeals would also arise in the case of a woman who continues to occupy a refuge and who, while doing so, claims to be owed the main duty. First, can a women's refuge be described as accommodation for the purposes of the Act? If so, second, can it be reasonable, for the purposes of the Act, for a woman to continue to occupy a refuge? If so, third, was it lawful for Manchester and Ipswich (for it is convenient so to refer to the two housing authorities) to conclude that it would have been reasonable for the two women to continue to occupy the refuges? Unless in the case of each woman the answer to all three questions is “yes”, she was not intentionally homeless and the main duty was –or remained – owed to her.
We are told that it may be helpful for housing authorities to have guidance as to the proper treatment of claims of homelessness by women who are in refuges or have been excluded from refuges. In this regard the only reported decision is that of Hodgson J. in R v. London Borough of Ealing Ex p. Sidhu (1982) 2 HLR 48 (“ Sidhu”). In forthright terms Hodgson J. there approved the conclusion of a county court judge in another case that “women living in refuges were still homeless” under the terms of the initial precursor of the Act, namely the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. As I will explain, the conclusion of Hodgson J., although not clearly reasoned, must have been to the effect that a women's refuge, albeit accommodation in the ordinary sense of the word, cannot be described as “accommodation” for the purposes of the homelessness legislation.
Manchester and Ipswich invite us to overrule the decision in Sidhu. The two women, by contrast, invite us to affirm it. We have permitted Ms Moran, the respondent in the Manchester case, to adduce fresh evidence in this court from Ms Holly, the National Policy and Services Officer for the Women's Aid Federation of England. In her statement Ms Holly makes clear that the refuge movement is concerned lest women in refuges should fail to qualify as homeless under Part VII of the Act. Its fear is that, unless housing authorities owe to women in refuges, if eligible for assistance and with a priority need, the main duty to accommodate them immediately, as homeless, under s.193 of the Act, refuges will silt up with women in effect required to remain in occupation of them for lengthy periods until council accommodation is allocated to them under the schemes set up by housing authorities pursuant to Part VI of the Act; and thus that refuges will find themselves unable to fulfil their essential task of providing emergency sanctuary for women in flight from violent partners. Ms Holly summarises the movement's stance as follows:
“If women who had fled violence and sought shelter in refuges were not homeless whilst staying at refuges the local housing authority would not owe them any duty as they would not be deemed to be homeless. They would therefore remain in accommodation without moving-on: contrary to one of the main purposes of refuges which is to assist women to move into their own accommodation. This in turn would bring our work to a grinding halt. We would otherwise be forced into issuing immediate 28 days notices to quit when women came to us for refuge in order that we could ensure that their homelessness status would be preserved. This would clearly be highly unsatisfactory and would mean that the women who we seek to assist would be left feeling very vulnerable.”
So Ms Holly commends the view that, for the purposes of the Act, a refuge cannot be described as “accommodation” and that therefore Sidhu was correctly decided; or that, at any rate, it cannot be reasonable, for the purposes of the Act, for a woman to continue to occupy a refuge.
Section 182(1) of the Act provides that, in the exercise of their functions relating to homelessness, housing authorities shall have regard to such guidance as may be given by the Secretary of State. In July 2006, pursuant to the subsection, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government issued a Code of Guidance (“the Code”), two paragraphs of which relate to claims of homelessness made by women occupying refuges and to the placement by authorities of homeless women in refuges. Furthermore s.177(3) of the Act enables the Secretary of State by order to specify circumstances in which it is to be regarded as reasonable or not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation. Allegedly unhelpful to the contention of the women that it cannot be reasonable, for the purposes of the Act, for a woman to continue to occupy a refuge is the fact that, while the Secretary of State thus has power in effect so to provide, she has chosen not to do so. It was for the above reasons that this court acceded to an application by the Secretary of State for permission to intervene in the appeals.
SECTION B: THE HISTORIES
(i) The Manchester Case
Ms Moran has two children who, on 31 October 2006, when Manchester decided that she was intentionally homeless, were aged three and two. Until 30 September 2006 she and the children lived on and off with her partner in council accommodation in Moss Side, of which she and he were joint tenants. On 30 September 2006, following an act of domestic violence perpetrated by her partner towards her, Ms Moran left the accommodation with the children. She went with them first to a refuge in Trafford but on 18 October 2006, in order to be...
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