Mr & MRS M v SW SCHOOL and The SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS and DISABILITY TRIBUNAL
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | JAMES GOUDIE QC,MR JAMES GOUDIE |
| Judgment Date | 22 October 2004 |
| Neutral Citation | [2004] EWHC 2586 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 22 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | CO/4003/04 |
[2004] EWHC 2586 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand London WC2
Mr James Goudie QC
(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
CO/4003/04
MR DAVID WOLFE (instructed by Beth Coxon, Disability Rights Commission, 2nd Floor, Arndale House, The Arndale Centre, Manchester M4 3AQ) appeared on behalf of the APPELLANTS
(MR DANIEL STURDY was in attendance)
This is an appeal pursuant to section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 by Mr and Mrs M against the decision of the Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal ("the Tribunal") issued on 21st July 2004. The decision concerns their daughter A, born on 17th May 1996. The Tribunal rejected their claim that SW School ("the School") had unlawfully discriminated against A. Neither the School nor the Tribunal have been represented before me, in circumstances set out in a witness statement by a legal officer of the Disability Rights Commission who acts for Mr and Mrs M.
The alleged act of discrimination related to the fact that A had not been allowed by the school to transfer automatically into Year 3. The evidence before the Tribunal included an optometrist report and reports from two educational psychologists. The Tribunal's conclusions were as follows:
"A. We concluded that, although A has some specific difficulties, she could not be described as disabled within the meaning of the words as contained in section 1 of the Disability Discrimination Act. Having concluded this, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to hear evidence relating to the other issues in the claim.
B. We were not persuaded that A's vision difficulties were such that they have substantial and long-term effects on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The report from Caroline Hurst had contained details regarding these. However, we also heard that A now wears glasses and that these have helped to overcome these problems. The wearing of glasses is specifically exempt from the definition. The fact and the difficulties being overcome would appear to suggest that they are not substantial and long term.
C. We were not persuaded that A's motor difficulties are such that they could be described as a disability. The reports from the DDAT centre have contained results of tests. However, the report had contained no comparison to other children or details of the tests carried out. A appears able to function independently at school and with self-help skills although is slightly clumsy. We were not persuaded that the effects of these are such that they have a substantial and long-term effect of the management of day-to-day activities.
D. A had been assessed as having an IQ of 80. This would place her within the average range. The level of functioning in academic skills is not so delayed that she would not be able to access a mainstream school curriculum.
E. There was no Speech or Language therapist report in the papers to show how delayed A's language skills are. Although she has been receiving Speech and Language Therapy, there was no assessment produced to show why this is required. We did not therefore conclude that these difficulties would have a substantial or long-term effect on her ability to manage day-to-day activities.
F. Overall, there has been no medical diagnosis or statements contained in the reports to say that A should be considered as disabled within the meaning of Disability Discrimination Act 1995. We did not feel that either individually or collectively the difficulties were such that they have a long-term or substantial effect on her ability to manage normal day-to-day activities. We therefore concluded that the claim should be dismissed."
The grounds of challenge can be summarised as follows. First, SENDIST misdirected itself in law by treating the question of whether A's difficulties were substantial as meaning that they were of significant proportions rather than that they were more than trivial; alternatively, unlawfully came to a perverse conclusion on the point; alternatively, unlawfully failed to explain the approach it was taking.
Secondly, SENDIST unlawfully failed to reach a clear and consistent finding on whether A's vision difficulties were overcome by her glasses, or whether the glasses merely helped to overcome her problems.
Thirdly, in so far as SENDIST concluded that glasses overcame A's vision difficulties, it acted unlawfully by acting in ignorance of the material and established fact, namely that her glasses did not overcome the vision difficulties; and/or reaching a decision without any basis in the evidence; and/or rejected expert evidence without any evidence on which to do so and without giving the appellant an opportunity to deal with it; and/or without giving any proper reasons for doing so.
Fourth, SENDIST impermissibly took into account what it found to be A's ability "to function...
To continue reading
Request your trial