R (Adele Nipyo) v Croydon London Borough Council
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MRS. JUSTICE DOBBS: |
| Judgment Date | 04 March 2008 |
| Neutral Citation | [2008] EWHC 847 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/288/2008 |
| Date | 04 March 2008 |
[2008] EWHC 847 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mrs Justice Dobbs
CO/288/2008
Mr B McGuire appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr W Beglan appeared on behalf of the Defendant
This is an application for judicial review, permission being granted by Mr. Andrew Nichol QC sitting as a Deputy High Judge on 18th January 2008. Interim relief was granted by Forbes J on 11th January 2008, directing that the defendant provide the claimant with suitable accommodation for herself and her three children until determination of this application.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
The claimant is a single mother with three children who live with her, aged 10, 15 and 23. On 9th November 2007, following the breakdown of her relationship a year earlier, she lost her accommodation. This was due to having accumulated rent arrears. She turned to the Council for assistance and was temporarily placed in hostel accommodation.
The claimant was interviewed by the defendant on 14th and 16th November, and again on 3rd December.
By a decision dated 11th December, she was found by the defendant to be 'intentionally homeless' under section 184 and told to leave the temporary accommodation by 20th December. The basis for this decision was that the claimant failed to comply with condition 1 of the general form of order made by District Judge White at Croydon County Court on 1st May 2007, that the warrant for the possession of the property in which she lived should be suspended, on condition that the claimant pay her rent plus £5 per week, the first payment due on or before 1st May 2007. She failed to do so and was evicted. It was noted that, in fact, over the period of her tenancy since 1998, the account had been in arrears and that there had been numerous applications to the county court to terminate the tenancy —no fewer than 10 times between 1999 and 2007. On eight occasions the claimant failed to comply with the order made by the court, and thus the landlord applied to the court in September 2007 for the warrant for eviction to be reinstated.
On 13th December 2007, the claimant attended the Housing Advice Service. She was interviewed and advice and information given.
The claimant was apparently unable to find alternative accommodation and made a request for review under section 202 of the Act and for continued provision of accommodation. That request was made on 20th December.
On 21st December the claimant was told by the defendant that the period had been extended until 1st January 2008. On 4th January, the claimant asked the defendant to exercise its discretion to continue providing accommodation pursuant to section 188(3) pending the internal review she had requested. On the same day she received a letter from Joanna Murray, the defendant's review officer. It was pointed out that the local authority was not bound to secure accommodation for persons in these circumstances, but had the discretion to do so and would do so only in exceptional circumstances. That was because only a small proportion of reviews were successful. The decision was taken in accordance with the Code of Guidance to the Housing Act and took into account the criteria set out in the case authorities. The officer considered that there was nothing exceptional in the claimant's circumstances, even taking into account medical issues raised, although no medical evidence had been provided to substantiate them. An offer was made to assist the claimant in finding accommodation and she was invited to attend the appointment made with the Housing Options Service. A referral was also made to the Social Services under the Children Act because of the dependent children.
The claimant again asked for accommodation citing high blood pressure and the fact that her 15 year old daughter had exams pending. She sought legal assistance having been required to leave her temporary accommodation and she was referred via Shelter to her present representatives.
On 7th January a letter before action was sent to the defendant by the claimant's solicitors.
On the following day, those representing the claimant contacted the defendant, reminding them of their ongoing obligations under section 190(2)(a) of the Act, namely that the section imposes a duty to secure accommodation for such period as the Council consider will give the particular homeless applicant a reasonable opportunity of securing accommodation for his particular household. The lawyers made a request for temporary accommodation pending review. On the same day, the review officer indicated that the claimant's personal circumstances had been considered in accordance with the “Conville” principles.
Those representing the defendant wrote to the claimant's solicitors on 10th January indicating that the claimant had had in the region of 28 days to secure accommodation, such period of 28 days being given as an indicator of a reasonable period of time to give a family with dependent children in the previous Code of Guidance. It was pointed out that if the client could not secure accommodation for the household and presented to Social Services, then they would secure accommodation for the children under section 20 of the Children Act 1989.
The claim for judicial review was filed on the same day. It is a challenge to the defendant's refusal to continue to provide the claimant with accommodation under section 190.
The grounds stated in the application for judicial review are:
2) The defendant had reached a perverse decision that 24 days over Christmas and New Year was a reasonable period for the claimant to secure accommodation.
3) The defendant had failed to comply with its statutory duty to carry out an assessment of the claimant's housing needs under section 190(4) of the Housing Act 1996.
4) The defendant failed to give any or any lawful or sufficient advice and assistance under section 190(2)(b).
5) The defendant failed to have regard to relevant facts, those facts which had caused it to find her to be in priority need.
Since the lodging of the claim form, there have been further developments. On 6th February, the claimant was interviewed again by the Housing Advice section. It was considered that no further advice and assistance could be given over and above what had already been provided. Lists of agents and bed and breakfast accommodation were provided on that day, plus a list of five additional properties that the officer had located via agents and one from the Internet. The view was taken that the claimant had made little or no attempt to locate her own accommodation. In a letter dated 8th February, an offer was made by the defendant to accommodate the claimant until the 5th March, in return for the proceedings being dropped, in order to save further costs. The offer was repeated on 18th February and declined. The reason that the offer was declined was set out in a letter from the claimant's solicitors dated 25th February and reads as follows:
“With regards to your clients' offer, we wish to refuse it because Adele Nipyo simply has nowhere to go at this stage and she had entirely relied on the help that the court has provided for her and may yet provide her and Adele Nipyo has made her position very clear —with 2,000 or thereabouts she can obtain accommodation, but in the absence of such funds she cannot possibly give up a court case which is the only thing keeping her and the children together and off the streets.”
The defendant replied with a letter dated 26th February, pointing out that the claimant now had a remedy in the County Court in the light of the rejection of her case on review. It noted that the claimant will have been given 85 days by 5th March and that she was already in arrears with the rent, and by not paying the rent, she must have had some money available to her to put towards saving for a deposit.
The core issue identified for the court by the claimant is “In carrying out their Conville assessment, has the defendant had any or any lawful sufficient regard to the particular needs and circumstances of the applicant”, the point being, it is argued, that the reasonable period has to be assessed from the standpoint of the applicant having regard to her circumstances.
THE CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS
The claimant submits the following. By virtue of her children, the claimant is in priority need and thus section 190(2) applies. Even if she had not been in priority need, she was still entitled to a reasonable period to make arrangements to leave: See R. v. London Borough Council of Newham, ex parte Ojuri (No.5) (1998) 31 HLR 631,637. For a woman with dependent children the starting point is the order of 28 days.
The approach of the defendant it is submitted shows:
a) That there was an unreasoned decision on 11th December to provide accommodation until 21st December, a period of 10 days from the date of the letter, before it was known what was going to transpire in discussion to take place with the Housing Advice Service on 13th December.
b) A further unreasoned and unrecorded decision was taken on 21st December to extend the period of accommodation to 1st January.
c) No further extension was formally agreed or offered. On 8th January the claimant again stated that a reasonable period had been provided. The letter referred to “Conville” but contained no suggestion that there had been any lawful application of the principles set out.
d) A further solicitor's letter was written on...
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