R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Alexander
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Diplock,Lord Keith of Kinkel,Lord Roskill,Lord Brandon of Oakbrook,Lord Brightman |
| Judgment Date | 08 July 1982 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1982] UKHL J0708-1 |
| Date | 08 July 1982 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1982] UKHL J0708-1
Lord Diplock
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Roskill
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook
Lord Brightman
House of Lords
My Lords,
For the reasons given in the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Roskill, with which I agree, I too would allow the appeal.
My Lords,
I have had the benefit of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Roskill. I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives I too would allow the appeal.
My Lords,
Nearly four years ago, on 19th September 1978, the appellant arrived at Heathrow Airport. She was, and is, a citizen of Sri Lanka, and thus subject to immigration control under the Immigration Act 1971 ("1971 Act") and the then current Immigration Rules made pursuant to section 3(2) of the 1971 Act (H.C. 79—"the Rules"). At the time of her arrival the appellant had an entry clearance. The immigration officer took the view that this entry clearance had been obtained by a material deception. This conclusion has at no time been challenged in any of the subsequent proceedings. This entry clearance was, therefore, of no avail to her at the time of her arrival, and is of no further relevance to this appeal. The appellant then applied for leave to enter as a student to begin a three-years' course in marketing studies. The immigration officer at Heathrow was satisfied that the appellant had at the material time a genuine and realistic intention of studying in this country, and that fact has never been in issue. But he was not satisfied either that she had sufficient means available to her to meet the whole cost of her intended course or to maintain herself, or, which is presently the important conclusion, that she intended to leave the United Kingdom after completing her studies. The immigration officer, being of that opinion, took the view that in those circumstances he possessed no discretion to admit her, and accordingly he did not purport to exercise any discretion. He, therefore, on the 21st of September 1978, refused the appellant leave to enter the United Kingdom as a student.
My Lords, the question of the appellant's means is no longer relevant. The sole issue for determination by your Lordships' House is whether, notwithstanding the immigration officer's conclusion that he was not satisfied that she intended to leave the United Kingdom after completing her studies, the Rules accorded to him a discretion under Rule 21 to admit her for "a short period".
My Lords, the immigration officer's decision has led to a remarkable succession of legal proceedings during the currency of which the appellant has, your Lordships were told by counsel, remained in this country albeit without pursuing her intended studies. That remarkable succession of legal proceedings has resulted in a remarkable difference of opinion upon what was agreed by counsel during the hearing of this appeal to be a very short, and your Lordships may think, simple point of construction of the last sentence of Rule 21 of the Rules which must, of course, be interpreted in the context of the antecedent Rules, 18, 19 and 20, and in particular, Rules 18 and 19.
The succession of proceedings began with an appeal by the appellant to an adjudicator. On the 9th October 1978 the adjudicator allowed her appeal. It is not necessary to refer to his reasons. They occupy some four closely printed pages. The immigration officer then appealed to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. That tribunal, on the 16th November 1978, reversed the decision of the adjudicator, and allowed the immigration officer's appeal. Their reasons for so doing also occupy some four closely printed pages. The appellant then obtained leave, substantially out of time, to move the Divisional Court for an Order of Judicial Review to quash the determination of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. On the 7th November 1980, some two years after the date of that determination, the Divisional Court (Donaldson L.J. and Forbes J.) quashed that determination and sent the matter back to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for reconsideration in the light of their decision that, on the facts which I have outlined, the immigration officer upon the true construction of Rule 21 possessed the discretion to decide whether or not to admit the appellant "for a short period". They directed that the Immigration Tribunal must consider, as they had not previously done, whether or not that discretion should be exercised in the appellant's favour. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was then brought against that decision. On the 28th October 1981 the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning M.R. and Oliver and Watkins, L.JJ.) by a majority allowed that appeal, holding that there was no such discretion vested in the immigration officer. Oliver L.J. delivered a powerful and closely reasoned dissenting judgment, agreeing with the conclusion of the Divisional Court. On the 21st January 1982 your Lordships' House gave the appellant leave to appeal against that decision of the Court of Appeal.
My Lords, since the date upon which the appellant was originally refused leave to enter, the Rules have been changed with effect from 1st March 1980—H.C. 394. What were Rules 18–21 inclusive of the Rules have become Rules 21–25 inclusive of the new Rules. In Rule 25 of the new Rules, formerly Rule 21 of the Rules, there is a slight...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Brahmbhatt v Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport, Terminal
...to in the judgement: R v Home Secretary ex parte PhansopkarELR [1976] 1 QB 606. R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte AlexanderWLR [1982] 1 WLR 1076, [1982] Imm AR 50, HL. R v Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay ex parte AminELR [1983] 2 AC 818. Practise and procedure — Citizenship — Wife — ......
-
Appeal Under Section 13(4)(b) Of The Tribunals, Courts And Enforcement Act 2007 By Irum Shah Nawaz And Others
...and humanity” would prevail (para 17). [45] Counsel also placed reliance upon the decision in Alexander v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [1982] 1 WLR 1076 (HL), which held that the Immigration Rules were not to be construed with the strictness appropriate for a statute, but sensibly, according......
-
Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department
...the operation of the relevant immigration legislation: per Lord Roskill, for a unanimous House of Lords, in R v IAT ex p Alexander [1982] 1 WLR 1076 at p 1080G. Section 3(2) provides: 'The Secretary of State shall….lay before Parliament statements of the rules, or of any changes in the rule......
-
Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council; R (N) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (M) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
...requirement of a passport should not also apply. The rules are not to be construed with the strictness of a statute: R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Alexander [1982] 1 WLR 1076, 1080G. 81I prefer Mr Kovats's submissions. One of the requirements to be met by a spouse or child of ......