R v Liverpool City Council ex parte Joseph Connolly
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE JUDGE |
| Judgment Date | 20 November 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWHC J1120-1 |
| Date | 20 November 1995 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | No. CO-1767-95 |
[1995] EWHC J1120-1
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION)
(CROWN OFFICE LIST)
Before: Mr Justice Judge
No. CO-1767-95
MR N. WADSWORTH (instructed by DP Hardy & Co., Liverpool) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
MR T. DAVEY (instructed by Messrs Sharpe Pritchard (agents for PF Taylor, Liverpool) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
Monday, 20th November, 1995
With the leave of Laws J, Joseph Connolly seeks relief by way of judicial review in respect of his claim for housing benefit and the liability to pay rent. The claim for relief arises from a decision made on
5 December 1994, contained in a letter —page 6 of the bundle attached to Mr Walmsley's affidavit —itself dated 30 November 1994.
The claim for relief in the Form 86/A refers to the request made in that letter for a statement of reasons to be provided under regulation 77 of The Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987. The relief sought is for an order that a statement of reasons should be so provided, a declaration that the applicant had a right to such a statement of reasons and, further, a declaration that the respondent was under a duty to provide it and, by failing to do so, was in breach of its statutory duty.
The affidavit in support of the application was sworn by the applicant himself. It is brief and, in principle, none the worse for that. It refers to advice given by the solicitors acting for the applicant and sets out, in paragraph 4, this bare assertion:
"No reasons as requested have been provided
to date …"
Then, in paragraph 5:
"There is now produced and shown to me and exhibited hereto in date order correspondence marked JC/1 …"
Then the exhibit itself is a single letter of
30 November 1994, marked "5th December 1994".
In addition to that evidence, there was an affidavit of service. No other correspondence was disclosed or drawn to the attention of the court when the application for leave was made.
The reason as put forward by Mr Wadsworth this morning is very simple: the only relevant letter was the one referred to in the affidavit and in F86/A. Accordingly, any other correspondence which has now been put before the court did not need to be disclosed at the outset under the ordinary principles of full disclosure which apply in these proceedings.
The respondents have contended that the disclosure was wholly inadequate. There is, even now, no explanation in the form of an affidavit from Mr Walmsley, the solicitor's Managing Clerk acting for the applicant, to explain the failure to give full and frank disclosure; but that inadequacy has been remedied, at least for my purposes, by Mr Wadsworth's explanation to me.
The simple fact of this case, in my judgment, is that the 5 December letter is not the only relevant material. There were two lines of communication between the City Council and the applicant and his legal advisers, one of which was not disclosed at all and one of which was only disclosed in part. It may very well be —and for present purposes I assume it —that the confusion which may have arisen in this case arose from the fact that the City Council was conducting, apparently, two distinct lines of correspondence. I should be careful, therefore, not to over-criticise the applicant or his legal advisers for a confusion which appears to have stemmed from the City Council itself.
The two lines of communication can be fully summarised by looking at two documents, dated
15 November 1994.
On that day two documents were sent. The first, at page 2 of the bundle, is described as a "PAYMENT ON ACCOUNT". It says in terms that the "correct entitlement to rent allowance" cannot be determined because the writer is "unable to determine" it and proposes a weekly payment on account and undertakes that the correct rent allowance entitlement "will be determined as soon as possible."
The letter goes on to point out that if the determination then were to reveal an overpayment, that overpayment would be recovered, but the question would be approached as "sympathetically as possible". If, on the other hand, the determination showed an under-payment, then the balance would be paid.
That document is plainly not a determination.
It was responded to on 22 November, at page 3. It referred to a request for "A statement of reasons for a determination to make a payment on account."
The other line of correspondence on 15 November is at page 4.
That refers, in terms, to "YOUR HOUSING BENEFIT". It says that the claim has "been assessed", and that on the basis of the information available for the next 12 months until 31 December 1995 there would be a grant of £70 weekly towards the rent payable by the applicant. It explains how payment will be made, in that it will be made directly to the landlord. It then sets out a deduction for excessive rent from £110 that was claimed, thus making a sum of £40. That document also contained material to suggest that if there was any dissatisfaction with the conclusion an appeal could be made in writing.
It was in relation to that line of correspondence that the document of 30 November was written.
In fact, both lines of correspondence continued.
The line of correspondence relating to payment on account was responded to by the City Council on 7 December in these terms:
"A statement of reasons may...
To continue reading
Request your trial