RB (Linguistic evidence – Sprakab)
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | C M G OCKELTON |
| Judgment Date | 26 February 2010 |
| Neutral Citation | [2010] UKUT 329 (IAC) |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) |
| Date | 26 February 2010 |
[2010] UKUT 329 (IAC)
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Mr C M G Ockelton, Vice President
Senior Immigration Judge Perkins
Senior Immigration Judge Mckee
For the Appellant: Mr G Davison instructed by Corbin & Hassan Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms P Whipple QC instructed by the Treasury Solicitors
RB (Linguistic evidence — Sprakab) Somalia
-
1. Linguistic analysis reports from Sprakab are entitled to considerable weight. That conclusion derives from the data available to Sprakab and the process it uses. They should not be treated as infallible but evidence opposing them will need to deal with the particular factors identified in the report.
-
2. Recordings of all material derived from the appellant and used as material for linguistic analysis should be made available to all parties if the analysis is to be relied on in the Tribunal.
-
3. Sprakab linguists and analysts are not to be required to give their names (as distinct from their identifiers, experience and qualifications) unless there is a good reason particular to the individual case.
| Para | |
| 1 - 2 | Introduction |
| 3 - 8 | Procedural history |
| 9 - 22 | Linguistic reports in the present case |
| 23 - 27 | Anonymity of Sprakab personnel |
| 28 - 82 | The claimant's claim in its factual aspects |
| 83 - 98 | Sprakab |
| 99 - 116 | The individual linguistic evidence in the present appeal |
| 117 - 119 | Submissions |
| 120 - 123 | Other evidence |
| 124 - 142 | Post hearing evidence |
| 143 - 153 | Findings and Conclusion: the appellant |
| 154 -169 | Findings and conclusion: Sprakab |
| 170 - 174 | General guidance on linguistic analysis evidence |
| 175 | Conclusion |
It is a matter of common experience that it is sometimes possible to tell where people come from by the way they speak. In asylum cases, the question of where the claimant comes from is often of crucial importance. First, a claim falls to be assessed against the claimant's nationality, so it is important to be able to establish what that nationality is. Secondly, even within one country the risks may be different for those from different parts, or with different tribal, clan or cultural backgrounds. The question is the extent to which analysis of the way in which the claimant speaks can be used in the executive and judicial determination of those issues, when they are relevant.
In what is now a considerable number of cases, the Home Office has commissioned analysis from Skandinavisk SprÅkanalys AB (Sprakab), a privately owned company in Stockholm, Sweden. It has relied on Sprakab's analysis to a greater or lesser extent in reaching its conclusions on the claim, and has invited immigration judges to take account of the analysis if the claimant appeals to the Tribunal against the rejection of his claim. Such a case is that of the appellant. In this determination, to the writing of which we have all contributed, we give our assessment of the processes adopted by Sprakab, and the manner in which Sprakab analyses ought to be taken into account in asylum appeals.
The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 20 June 2007, and applied for asylum, stating that she was from Somalia. She was briefly interviewed on that date. During the course of that interview the interviewer referred her case to Sprakab, who conducted a telephone interview with her, and concluded that she was not Somali. The result of that analysis was communicated to the appellant. She was asked to return for a fuller interview on 5 July.
She did so, accompanied by a member of the firm of solicitors then representing her, and brought with her a written witness statement, dated the previous day. A full interview was conducted.
The respondent's reasons for refusal letter, dated 20 July, adopts the findings of the Sprakab analysis, but offers a number of other reasons for the respondent's disbelief of the appellant's claim. Asylum having been refused, the respondent made a decision to remove the appellant as an illegal entrant. That decision carried a right of appeal, which the appellant exercised. Her appeal was heard by Immigration Judge Pugh on 31 August 2007. The appellant appeared in person: she was not represented. The Presenting Officer was prepared to cross-examine only on a limited range of topics. The Immigration Judge thought that the appellant needed a better opportunity to present her case, and so took her through the reasons given in the refusal letter. The Immigration Judge concluded that the appellant's claim was not credible: in particular, the appellant was not telling the truth about her origins. The Immigration Judge accordingly dismissed the appeal.
The appellant sought an order for reconsideration. The Tribunal made no order, but on renewal of the application to the High Court, Black J ordered reconsideration. She said this:
“It is plain that the Immigration Judge took great care over this case and dealt with it with considerable sensitivity. I am quite satisfied that there is no arguable error of law in the majority of her decision for the reasons that the Senior Immigration Judge gives.
The one issue that has given me concern is the question of language for the following reasons.
1 There was a linguistic analysis to be found in the Home Office bundle which indicates that the Appellant is Kenyan. The Immigration Judge accepts the analysis as very careful and detailed and relies on it, together with what she was entitled to conclude was the Appellant's lack of consistency and credibility in her evidence, to reach the conclusion that the Appellant is an educated Kenyan woman tried to pass herself off as a Somali (see paragraph 22 and paragraph 29 particularly). The Appellant complains in the grounds of application for reconsideration that the identity and expertise of the expert was not established and the identity of the expert was not revealed to her or to the court. It seems to me that the Appellant was entitled to know these matters and to consider whether to challenge the credentials and/or to call her own linguistic expert.
2 It appears to have been accepted that the Appellant gave evidence in Kibajuni. (Paragraph 7) which contradicts part of the Respondent's case (paragraph 15) which was (as the Immigration Judge recorded) that she “does not speak the variety of Swahili known as Kibajuni and found in the area from which she claims to come”. I cannot be clear from the decision whether the suggestion of the Respondent was (1) that the Appellant's form of Kibajuni was that found in Kenya rather than that found in Somalia (which would not pose a difficulty for the Immigration Judge's findings on language) or (2) that the Appellant did not speak Kibajuni at all (which would be inconsistent with paragraph 7).
It seems to me that a material error of law may have been made in this area and given that the Immigration Judge took into account the question of language in reaching her overall conclusions, there must be a real possibility that the AIT would decide the matter differently on reconsideration.”
There were two interlocutory hearings. At the latter, SIJ Batiste declined to accept the argument put on behalf of the respondent that the Immigration Judge's conclusions were sound even without regard to the linguistic evidence. He observed that the linguistic evidence appeared to have caused the Immigration Judge to take no account of the appellant's having given her evidence through a Kibajuni interpreter; he concluded that no specific findings of fact could be salvaged from the Immigration Judge's determination. He made a number of directions in relation to evidence, and adjourned the reconsideration for oral evidence to be taken and the appeal to be re-determined. Subsequently, although the respondent had expressed reservations about this course of action, the present appeal was selected as an appropriate one in which to look in more general terms at linguistic evidence and the Sprakab approach.
The matter came before us on 24, 25 and 26 February 2010. At the end of the hearing, the respondent sought leave to put in further evidence (which was awaiting translation), subject to an opportunity for the appellant to comment on it. We agreed to that. After the hearing, we became aware that the Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA) had recently sent a circular to its members including statements about Sprakab analysis. We circulated the material to the parties, inviting any further comment. Both parties made submissions on that material.
It is convenient at this point to summarise the conflicting reports on the appellant's language, which have been compiled since her screening interview at the Home Office.
The first ‘Linguistic Analysis Report’ on the appellant is dated 24 June 2007, and is based on a tape recording made on 20 June 2007. This report is cited in the ‘reasons for refusal’ letter of 20 July 2007, and is said to provide “ strong evidence” that the appellant does not come from Somalia and is not a Bajuni. The analyst is ‘EXP 249’, who is said to originate from Kenya and to have completed the analysis “in co-operation with Sprakab linguist 03.” The conclusion is that the appellant knows quite a bit about the Bajuni islands but speaks a variety of Swahili spoken in Kenya. Although she does use some Kibajuni words, her pronunciation, intonation and grammar are typical of Kenyan Swahili, indeed with a level of grammatical rectitude which shows her to be highly educated.
A different conclusion was reached by Margaret Kumbuka, who had been instructed by those representing the appellant. She interviewed the appellant on 11 July 2008...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
N v Advocate General for Scotland
...case raising similar issues, and gave guidance on the use of such reports in the future. Their judgment, dated 15 September 2010 ( [2010] UKUT 329 (IAC)), reviewed detailed evidence on Sprakab's operations and methodology, including oral evidence from their manager, Ms Fernquist. In the li......
-
RM (Sierra Leone) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
...case-law about the admissibility of evidence from Sprakab. In a case called RB (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKUT 329 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal had heard full evidence about Sprakab's methodology, including the training and supervision of its analysts, and sou......
-
Anord Anele Mbulawa (ap) V. The Advocate General For Scotland
...is of high quality and its opinions are entitled to very considerable weight" (RB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKUT 329 (IAC), at para 168). Initially the reclaimer declined to undergo such an analysis, but that was apparently only so that he might first take legal ad......
-
M.ab.n.+k.a.s.y. V. The Advocate General For Scotland Representing The Secretary Of State For The Home Department+the Advocate General For Scotland Representing The Secretary Of State For The Home Department
...Immigration Tribunal on 15 February 2010) by the Upper Tribunal on 15 September 2010 as RB (Linguistic Analysis - Sprakab) Somalia [2010] UKUT 329 (IAC). Although under the then prevailing régime the order granted by Lord Macphail in the Court of Session was for "reconsideration", the effec......