Re F
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE TUCKER |
| Judgment Date | 14 January 1999 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1999] EWHC J0114-1 |
| Date | 14 January 1999 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/66/99 |
[1999] EWHC J0114-1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(CROWN OFFICE LIST)
Mr Justice Tucker
CO/66/99
MR I WISE (instructed by Price Watkins Solicitors, 21 St George Road, Bristol BS1 5UU) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MS K STEYN (instructed by Legal Depart of North Somerset Council) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
I have before me an application by Mrs F, which relates to the education of her son, who is now 14-and-a-half years old. He unfortunately has learning difficulties and requires special educational needs. Mrs F, represented by her solicitor, appeared before a Special Educational Needs Tribunal on 6th November 1998. The decision of the Tribunal was contained in a letter dated 20th November. Mrs F's appeal was dismissed.
In the final paragraph, the letter very properly reminded Mrs F and her husband of their right to appeal on a point of law to the High Court. The letter then continued:
"There is a strict time limit for appealing. The notice must be served and entered within 28 days of the date on which you were given the Tribunal's decision."
I am by no means certain that that is a correct interpretation of the law. Rules of the Supreme Court Order 55, rule 4(2), provides as follows:
"The notice must be served, and the appeal entered within 28 days after the date of the judgment, determination or other decision against which the appeal is brought."
If that interpretation were strictly applied, then time would have expired on 18th December. However, the courts have applied a more benign interpretation to the rule, and, in view of the terms of the letter to which I have referred, that is the interpretation which I apply in the present case. In my view, the time limit expired on 21st December, that is to say, 28 days from receipt of the letter which was received by the Applicant's solicitor on 23rd November. Therefore that was when the 28 days began to run.
What happened? I have a very useful chronology which is not in dispute. Nine days elapsed, as has been pointed out, and on 2nd December the Applicant's solicitors sent Mrs F Legal Aid forms for her to sign and complete. A further nine days elapsed, and on 11th December those forms were delivered to the Legal Aid Board in Bristol. Because of previous unfortunate experiences with the Legal Aid Authorities, the Applicant's solicitors delivered the documents by hand. Nevertheless, there was no immediate response. On 20th December (that is to say, the day before the expiry of the 28-day limit) the solicitors telephoned the Legal Aid Board in order to chase them up on their application. Still there was no response (and, of course, by this time the Christmas holiday period was upon them). They tried as best they could to make contact with the Legal Aid Authorities over the holiday period, but, perhaps not surprisingly, it proved difficult to contact anyone who knew about the case.
Accordingly, it was not until 5th January 1999 that the Applicant's solicitor received the Legal Aid Certificate, which was itself dated 30th December.
On the same day the Applicant's solicitor sent instructions to Mr Ian Wise. Having received his instructions, Mr Wise, promptly and very efficiently discovered by means of the Internet certain significant information. That information related to the school nominated by the Special Educational Needs Tribunal as the appropriate school for the Applicant's son.
In this case there is no dispute between the parties that F has learning difficulties and disorders which do require special needs. The only contention is as to the proper school which should be allocated to him. The school which was allocated has been found by Mr Wise to be subject to an extremely critical OFSTED Report. That report is before me, and it makes what in Mr Wise's submission are damning criticisms of the running of that school. The report itself is dated November 1996, but it was still in effect at the time which is material to these proceedings.
Having obtained that information, Mr Wise immediately notified those instructing him, who confirmed that the information was correct. On 9th January (that is to say, last week) a summons was issued seeking an extension of time. On 12th January a draft Notice of Appeal was faxed to the Respondent, the Local Education Authority of North Somerset Council.
So the matters before me relate to the question as to whether or not I should now extend time.
By the provisions of Order 3, rule 5:
"(1) The Court may on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorised by these rules, or any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in any proceedings.
(2) The Court may extend any such period as referred to in paragraph (1) although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period."
I have a discretion, therefore, as to whether or not I should extend time. However, the discretion should be exercised in accordance with certain principles. Those have been set out in particular in the case of Phillips v Derbyshire County Council [1997] ELR 461 and are as follows:
"1. The court should be reluctant to extend time in public law cases where the interests of good administration require challenges to tribunal's decisions to be brought within limited timescales.
[This is the important part in my view.]
2. The court will only extend time where—-
(a) it is satisfied that there is an acceptable reason for the delay; and, if so
(b) the delay is not substantial and has not caused significant prejudice to the respondent."
Dealing with (b) first of all, the delay here is, as is acknowledged by Mr Wise, one of 19 days. Having regard to the intervention of the Christmas period and the law vacation, I do not regard that as a substantial delay.
Has it caused significant prejudice to the Respondent?
Despite Miss Steyn's efforts, I am unable to detect any prejudice to the Respondent. There may have been prejudice to the Applicant, but that is not a matter I...
To continue reading
Request your trial