Read v Obe
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | LORD JUSTICE THORPE |
| Judgment Date | 05 April 2001 |
| Neutral Citation | [2001] EWCA Civ 596 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Civil Division) |
| Docket Number | B1/01/0713 |
| Date | 05 April 2001 |
[2001] EWCA Civ 596
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE BOURNEMOUTH COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Chalkley)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Lord Justice Thorpe
B1/01/0713
MR. C. McCOURT (instructed by Messrs Moore & Blatch, Southampton) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
MR. PIERSON (instructed by Messrs Thomas, Loughborough) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
This is an application by Pamela Read for permission to appeal a consent order made in the Bournemouth County Court by the late Judge Chalkley on 29th June 1998. The application for permission was directed in for an oral hearing on notice, since its essential element is that the respondent husband, having achieved a consent order on 29th June on the premise that he was on the verge of insolvency, may have received up to £3.8m on the sale of a company, Computer Aided Medical Systems Limited, in August 1999. There is no doubt that the respondent owned the shares in that company at the date of compromise, but it is only an inference that he owned the shares 14 months later and was accordingly the recipient of the consideration for sale.
Mr. McCourt, who has brought the application to this court, has relied upon the decision of the House of Lords in Barder v Barder [1988] AC 20, asserting that the August sale was a supervening event enabling the court to resume its jurisdiction within the narrow parameters established by their Lordships. Mr. Peirson, who has responded to the skeleton at relatively short notice, says that this is not a Barder case. In that submission he may well be right. But on reading the skeletons, it seemed to me that what was really being asserted by the wife was that the consent order was vitiated by misrepresentation or by material non-disclosure. Such an assertion can always be raised to apply to set aside a consent order without meeting the strict tests set out in Barder. Mr. Pierson in responding says, with justification, that that was not the case that he prepared to meet, and further that those acting for the wife are open to serious criticism for having made no efforts to...
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