Reading Borough Council v Tina Holland
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Edwin Johnson |
| Judgment Date | 24 July 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWHC 1902 (Ch) |
| Court | Chancery Division |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. CH-2023-000001 |
[2023] EWHC 1902 (Ch)
Mr Justice Edwin Johnson
Appeal No. CH-2023-000001
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
CHANCERY APPEALS (ChD)
On appeal from the order of Her Honour Judge Melissa Clarke made in the County Court at Reading (sitting in the County Court at Oxford) on 15th December 2022 — Claim Number H00RG424
Rolls Building
7 Rolls Buildings
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
Daniel Clarke (instructed by Turpin & Miller LLP) for the Defendant/Appellant
Sarah McKeown (instructed by Legal Services of Reading Borough Council) for the Claimant/Respondent
Hearing date: 21 st June 2023
Remote hand-down: This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Monday 24 th July 2023 by circulation to the parties and their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.
Introduction
This is an appeal against an order made by Her Honour Judge Melissa Clarke on 15 th December 2022 in the County Court at Reading (sitting in the County Court at Oxford). By paragraph 1 of that order the Judge ordered the Defendant/Appellant, Ms Tina Holland, to give the Claimant/Respondent, Reading Borough Council, possession of the flat known as Flat 24, Liebenrood Road, Reading RG30 2DX ( “the Flat”) on or before 4.00pm on 11 th January 2023.
By appellant's notice filed on 4 th January 2023 the Defendant/Appellant, to whom I will refer as “the Appellant”, sought permission to appeal against the order for possession ( “the Possession Order”). I refused permission to appeal on the paper application, by an order made on 23 rd February 2023. The Appellant exercised her right to renew the application for permission at an oral hearing. At the oral hearing on 2 nd May 2023, where the Appellant was represented by counsel (Daniel Clarke), I was persuaded to grant permission to appeal, by an order of 2 nd May 2023.
At the hearing of the appeal ( “the Appeal”) the Appellant was again represented by Mr Clarke. The Claimant/Respondent, to which I will refer as “the Respondent”, was represented by Sarah McKeown, counsel. I am most grateful to both counsel for their written and oral submissions in relation to the Appeal.
The trial of this action was heard by Judge Clarke ( “the Judge”) over two days on 10 th and 11 th November 2022. The Judge handed down her reserved judgment ( “the Judgment”) on 14 th December 2022. For the reasons set out in the Judgment, the Judge concluded that the Respondent was entitled to possession of the Flat pursuant to Section 127 of the Housing Act 1996.
The Appellant contends that the Judge was wrong to dismiss the two grounds upon which the Appellant resisted the making of a possession order at trial. The first ground was that the Respondent, in seeking possession of the Flat, breached its public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The second ground was that the claim for possession constituted discrimination against the Appellant, who has a disability, contrary to Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010. As such, the Appellant contends that the Judge was wrong to make the Possession Order, which should be set aside.
As matters stand the Appellant remains in occupation of the Flat pursuant to a stay of execution which I granted, and which continues until the determination of the Appeal.
Unless otherwise indicated all references to Paragraphs in this judgment, without more, are references to the paragraphs of the Judgment. Italics have been added to quotations.
Relevant background
The Judge set out the factual background and evidence in the case, with commendable detail and clarity, in Paragraphs 29–89. I am substantially indebted to the Judge for the following summary of the relevant background to the Appeal. I have confined the summary to that which is necessary to set the scene for what I have to decide in the Appeal. The full factual background is to be found in the Judgment.
The Appellant has a disability, within the meaning of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 ( “the Act”). Specifically, the Appellant, who is aged 62, has a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder ( “EUPD”). The Judge had the benefit of expert evidence in respect of this disability at the trial. This evidence, in the form of a written report and addendum report, was provided by Dr Iles, a specialist in forensic psychiatry. Dr Iles was appointed as a joint expert, to give evidence of whether the Appellant had a disability within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act, as part of a set of case management directions given in the action by Judge Rochford, by order made on 23 rd August 2021. Quoting directly from Dr Iles' report to the court dated 9 th December 2021, EUPD is a condition characterised by traits including “impulsive behaviour, a tendency to verbal outbursts (particularly when one is criticised for [or] one's actions are thwarted), difficulty maintaining enduring relationships, disturbances in self-image, emotional dysregulation, and threats of [or] recurrent acts of self-harm”.
I mention the Appellant's EUPD at the outset because it is central to the history of this case, and to the issues which the Judge had to decide at the trial, and to the issues which I have to decide in this Appeal.
The Appellant was originally living in a privately rented flat in Reading. Her three year tenancy of this flat came to an end on 25 th February 2019. As the Judge recorded, at Paragraph 30, a notice seeking possession of this flat from the Appellant was given against a background of complaints of anti-social behaviour from other residents in the same block of flats, and complaints made by the Appellant against the other residents. On the termination of this tenancy, the Appellant lived first in temporary accommodation in Reading, for a period of about five months. The Appellant made an application for sheltered housing with the Respondent and, on 7 th November 2019, the Appellant was granted an introductory tenancy ( “the Tenancy”) of the Flat by the Respondent. In referring to an introductory tenancy, I should make it clear that the Tenancy was an introductory tenancy within the meaning of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Housing Act 1996.
The Flat is a studio flat on the first floor of a two storey block of flats, all of which comprise sheltered accommodation. A particular feature of this block of flats ( “the Block”) and other sheltered accommodation provided by the Respondent is that it has the Tunstall system installed. This is a physical communications system with a speech module activated by a pull cord or push button installed in each flat. This connects the tenants in the Block to a 24-hour emergency call monitoring service provided by a third party called Forest Care. The Respondent pays a fee to Forest Care for every call made through the Tunstall system. The Tunstall system also connects to and monitors the fire alarm and lift in the relevant blocks of flats, including the Block.
From the outset of the Tenancy the Appellant's behaviour gave rise to substantial problems for the Respondent, the other residents in the Block, and those involved in the management and provision of services to the Block. The latter category of persons included, in particular, those at Forest Care responsible for dealing with the Block. This was because the Appellant's conduct included repeated interference with the Tunstall system, and repeated abuse of Forest Care's operators. The Appellant's conduct is described in detail in the Judgment. For the purposes of the trial the allegations of anti-social behaviours and breaches of the Tenancy were reduced to a Scott Schedule of 15 items. The order of 15 th December 2022, made by the Judge consequential upon the Judgment ( “the Order”), recited that the Appellant admitted breaching the terms of the Tenancy “largely as alleged”.
The Judge provided the following summary of the Appellant's conduct, at Paragraph 109. I will need to return to Paragraph 109 later in this judgment. For present purposes I only quote from this Paragraph for the purposes of the setting out the Judge's summary of her findings in relation to the conduct of the Appellant:
“I have set out the history of allegations of antisocial behaviour and other complaints and behaviours very extensively – perhaps too extensively – for fear of not painting a fair picture of what the Claimant's staff and contractors, neighbours and others such as Forest Care staff have had to deal with from the Defendant over the years. In fact it does not paint a full picture because the sheer volume of calls, voicemails, texts and their abusive content to staff and contractors cannot be understood from my history, and nor, no doubt, can the extent of difficulties, disruption and abuse that has been experienced by the neighbours. The Defendant has made those over-55 neighbours, some elderly and vulnerable themselves, who have been assessed as suitable for sheltered housing, feel unsafe and insecure in their homes such that some of them have asked to leave it. They and other users of the Tunstall system have been put in danger by the Defendant's excessive use of, and damage to the Tunstall system. When it is damaged it cannot be used by some residents to call if they fall or have another emergency, it puts the fire warning and monitoring system at risk: these are real dangers.”
On 10 th February 2021 there was a multi-agency meeting ( “the Multi-Agency Meeting”) for the purposes of discussing the Appellant's situation. Those attending the Multi-Agency Meeting were as follows:
(1) Kane Roberts-Doyle, Sheltered Support Team Leader employed by the Respondent, who chaired the Multi-Agency Meeting. Following the Multi-Agency Meeting Mr Roberts-Doyle...
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