Sadowski v Circuit Court in Plock (Poland)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Dingemans |
| Judgment Date | 26 October 2017 |
| Neutral Citation | [2017] EWHC 2861 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | CO/2634/2017 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 26 October 2017 |
[2017] EWHC 2861 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Mr Justice Dingemans
CO/2634/2017
APPEARANCES
Mr M Hawkes (instructed by Kaim Todner) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
Miss H Hinton (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
Introduction
This is an appeal against the judgment of Deputy Chief Magistrate Tan Ikram delivered on 31 st May 2017 following a hearing which took place on 19 th January 2017.
The judicial authority sought the extradition of the Appellant in relation to an extradition European arrest warrant issued on 30 th March 2016, which was certified on 22 nd April 2016. The warrant related to convictions for theft from a motor vehicle and street robbery, the offences for which had occurred in May 2011.
The Appellant resisted his extradition on two grounds, namely that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of his mental health and physical condition pursuant to s.25 of the Extradition Act and that any extradition would impermissibly infringe his Art.8 European Convention on Human Rights rights contrary to s.21 of the Extradition Act.
Legal principles
So far as the law is concerned, the principles were effectively common ground. The relevant principles relating to s.21 incorporating Art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights so far as this extradition is concerned have been established: see Norris v USA [2010] UKSC 9, [2010] 2 AC 487; H(H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338; and Poland v Celinksi [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin); [2016] 1 WLR 551.
Article 8 provides a right to a private and family life, which is qualified. The question is whether interference with that right is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. There is no test of exceptionality in the balance. There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition. People should have their trials and the United Kingdom should honour treaty obligations. Delay since the commission of the crime may diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and the impact on private life may be increased by that delay. The question for me in that respect on Art.8 is whether the balance struck by the District Judge was wrong.
Section 25 of the Extradition Act 2003 prevents extradition where the physical and mental condition of a person is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him. Again, the relevant principles were effectively common ground. What is unjust or oppressive was considered by Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 799.
There was reference in the skeleton arguments to Turner v Government of the USA at paragraph 28 where Aikens LJ said that:
“The court has to form an overall judgment on the facts of the particular case… A high threshold has to be reached in order to satisfy the court that a requested person's physical or mental condition is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him… The court must assess the mental condition of the person threatened with extradition and determine if it is linked to a risk of a suicide attempt if the extradition order were to be made. There has to be a “substantial risk that [the Appellant] will commit suicide”. The question is whether, on the evidence the risk of the Appellant succeeding in committing suicide, whatever steps are taken is sufficiently great to result in a finding of oppression… The mental condition of the person must be such that it removes his capacity to resist the impulse to commit suicide, otherwise it will not be his mental condition but his own voluntary act which puts him at risk of dying and if that is the case there is no oppression in ordering extradition… On the evidence, is the risk that the person will succeed in committing suicide, whatever steps are taken, sufficiently great to result in a finding of oppression… Are there appropriate arrangements in place in the prison system of the country to which extradition is sought so that those authorities can cope properly with the person's mental condition and the risk of suicide… There is a public interest in giving effect to treaty obligations and this is an important factor to have in mind.”
It might be noted that that passage was in relation specifically to a risk of suicide, but the principles are the same.
Reference was also made before me to Wrobel v Poland [2011] EWHC 374 (Admin) at paragraph 17 where Bean J considered Art.3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and s.25. He said that the test was:
“whether the risk that the fugitive will succeed in committing suicide, whatever steps are taken, is on the evidence sufficiently great to result in a finding of oppression.”
Again, that was in relation to suicide specifically, but the relevant test for Art.3 is the same.
Relevant facts
The Appellant was arrested and convicted. He was sentenced to a term of three years and three months' imprisonment. He has two years and seven months still to serve. This is because, as described in his statement adopted in evidence, in September 2012 the Appellant whilst in prison pushed a pen through his eye. The Appellant said that he was made to do this because he had been bullied and beaten by a prison gang, having been unable to join a gang because he was ethnic Roma. The Appellant said that he believed that unless he put the pen through his eye, the gang would do this to him.
I take that from paragraph 11 of the Appellant's skeleton argument, but it was also recognised that this might have been a suicide attempt. I should say that the medical evidence before me suggests that it was a suicide attempt, which is why there is reference to those authorities dealing with a risk of suicide.
In any event, the Appellant was not discovered until the next morning. It appears that his cellmates did not raise the alarm. The Appellant developed a blood clot and went into a coma. He was blinded in his left eye and he has developed left sided paralysis. His mobility is restricted and at various times he could walk only a short distance, but he needed support to walk that distance. He takes antidepressants and painkillers. The Appellant was granted leave to go from the prison because of his injuries, but he left for the United Kingdom without telling the Polish authorities. It is common ground that that act made him a fugitive.
The Appellant moved with his family to the United Kingdom in October 2013. He has a wife, a daughter aged 5, nearly 6, and a son now aged 4. The Appellant got work in a meat factory, although he was absent from work for periods because of his health. He left his work in December 2015 because he could not cope with the demands of the job. The Appellant has not committed any offences in the UK since his arrival.
The Appellant requires full-time care from his wife with washing and dressing.
At the hearing before the District Judge the Appellant relied on a report from Dr Harriss dated 18 th September 2016, a consultant in rehabilitative medicine. His symptoms were listed as crude movement patterns; dysarthria, i.e. a difficulty articulating words with slurring and impaired phrasing; dysdiadochokinesia, namely an inability to perform rapid alternating movements; left eye blindness; mildly impaired cognition and cerebellar trauma effecting the left side.
Dr Harriss described those impacts as profound. The Appellant could no longer get up, stand up and walk. He was now entirely dependent on others, primarily his wife, for all aspects of daily living. Dr Harriss concluded that imprisonment would constitute a grave risk. He could not manage without his carers and would be extremely vulnerable to psychological or physical abuse.
Dr Harriss gave evidence and was cross-examined, as was the Appellant. The Appellant's wife gave evidence was by a statement which was read.
The Appellant also relied on reports from Dr Nabavi, who is a psychiatrist. Those are dated 17 th December 2016 and 24 th February 2017. Dr Nabavi noted that the Appellant had not embellished his symptoms and concluded that the Appellant suffered from major depression caused by his imprisonment and that depression and mental state had deteriorated following his suicide attempt and the injury to his eye and brain. He had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder from the abuse suffered in prison. He had a heightened startled response, part illustrated by an irrational fear of going outside.
Dr Nabavi commented on further information which was given by the Polish authorities on 17 th February 2017, shortly before the hearing before the District Judge. The further information said that: the Appellant could be placed in a cell for disabled persons. He could be placed in a hospital ward for chronically ill persons; he might be the subject of increased supervision and could be offered more...
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Sadowski v Circuit Court in Plock (Poland)
...of the Extradition Act. 4 His appeal against extradition was heard and dismissed by Dingemans J on 26 th October 2017, reported at [2017] EWHC 2861 (Admin). His application to reopen the appeal was refused on the papers by Elisabeth Laing J on 16 th November 2017. 5 On 22 nd November at an......