Saunders v Soper
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Lord Reid,Viscount Dilhorne,Lord Wilberforce,Lord Diplock,Lord Simon of Glaisdale |
| Judgment Date | 27 November 1974 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1974] UKHL J1127-2 |
| Date | 27 November 1974 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1974] UKHL J1127-2
House of Lords
Lord Reid
Viscount Dilhorne
Lord Wilberforce
Lord Diplock
Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Upon Report from the Appellate Committee, to whom was referred the Cause Saunders (Respondent) against Soper (Appellant) (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), that the Committee had heard Counsel on Monday the 4th day of this instant November, upon the Petition and Appeal of Frances Maynard Soper praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice of the 8th of May 1974, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen, in Her Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament, might seem meet; and Counsel having been heard on behalf of Dennis Brian Saunders, the Respondent to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, of the 8th day of May 1974, complained of in the said Appeal, be, and the same is hereby Set Aside, and that the convictions imposed on both Informations by L. W. Johnson Esquire, A. J. Gowlett Esquire and Norah Lee, three of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the County Borough of Southend-on-Sea sitting as a Magistrates' Court at Southend-on-Sea on the 14th day of August 1973, be, and the same are hereby, Quashed: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondent do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Appellant the Costs incurred by her in the Divisional Court, and also the Costs incurred by her in respect of the said Appeal to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments: And it is also further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment.
My Lords,
For the reasons given by my noble and learned friend, Viscount Dilhorne, I would allow the appeal.
My Lords,
The Appellant, it was not disputed, carries on and has carried on for some 6 1/2 years a highly respectable agency under the name of Wilson's Accommodation Bureau. On the 25th January, 1973, a Miss Christine Nichols came to see her, wanting accommodation for herself and two friends. The Appellant at that time did not know of any likely to suit but agreed to try and find some and asked Miss Nichols to call on her again. Miss Nichols did so on a number of occasions.
The Appellant or someone on her behalf inspected premises at 27, Dawlish Drive, Southend-on-Sea and thought they might suit Miss Nichols, and so Miss Nichols was given that address.
On the 13th February, 1973, Miss Nichols signed an agreement in writing which contained the following paragraph:
"In consideration of the services of Wilson's Accommodation Bureau in finding or introducing accommodation acceptable to me/us, I/We agree to pay to Wilson's Accommodation Bureau a Fee of the equivalent of one week's rent (minimum £5·25) for the accommodation accepted by me/us. No fee is payable to Wilson's Accommodation Bureau unless and until I or We become the tenant(s) of the accommodation found or introduced by Wilson's Accommodation Bureau to me/us."
Miss Nichols, having inspected the premises, entered into an agreement to rent them for £7·00 a week. She thereupon under the agreement into which she had entered became liable to pay to the Appellant £7·00 and she paid that sum on the 20th February, 1973.
Later Miss Nichols again came to see the Appellant and again told her that she wanted accommodation for three persons. Again, the Appellant had no suitable accommodation on her books and Miss Nichols was asked to call again. She did so on a number of occasions and on the last occasion was given an address, 34 Retreat Road, Westcliff-on-Sea. On the 16th March, 1973, she signed an agreement similar in all respects to that which she had previously made with the Appellant. She became tenant of those premises at a weekly rent of £16·00 a week and so became liable under the agreement to pay the Appellant £16·00, This she did not do and has not done although payment was demanded.
On the 12th July, 1973, the Respondent, a Police Inspector, preferred two informations against her, the first alleging that she had on the 20th February, 1973, accepted from Miss Nichols £7·00 in consideration of supplying her with addresses of houses to let contrary to section 1(1)( b) of the Accommodation Agencies Act, 1953; and the second alleging that she had demanded £16·00 in consideration of supplying Miss Nichols with addresses of houses to let contrary to that subsection of that Act.
The Appellant was convicted of both offences and her appeal to the Divisional Court was dismissed. She now appeals to this House with the leave of that Court.
That she accepted £7·00 from Miss Nichols and demanded payment of £16·00 by her is not disputed. The question to be decided is whether by doing so, she committed offences against this subsection.
The Act is entitled:
"An Act to prohibit the taking of certain commissions in dealings with persons seeking houses or flats to let and the unauthorised advertisement for letting of houses and flats."
It is to be noted that the object of the Act is not stated to be the prohibition of the taking of all commissions in dealings with such persons but only of the taking of certain commissions.
The Act is a short one, containing only two sections, the first of which, so far as material, reads as follows:
"1 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any person who, during the continuance in force of this Act,—
( a) demands or accepts payment of any sum of money in consideration of registering, or undertaking to register, the name or requirements of any person seeking the tenancy of a house;
( b) demands or accepts payment of any sum of money in consideration of supplying, or undertaking to supply, to any person addresses or other particulars of houses to let; or
( c) issues any advertisement, list or other document describing any house as being to let without the authority of the owner of the house or his agent,
shall be guilty of an offence" (punishable by a fine not exceeding £100 or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months or both).
(2) A person shall not be guilty of an offence under this section by reason of his demanding or accepting payment from the owner of a house of any remuneration payable to him as agent for the said owner."
The first matter to consider is what was the mischief at which this Act was aimed. One can only deduce that from its terms. Section 1(1) was clearly directed to preventing persons desirous of accommodation being charged merely for the registration of their names or their requirements. Section 1( 1)( b) was, in my view, equally clearly directed to preventing charges being made just for supplying addresses. It is obvious what section l(1)(c) was intended to prevent.
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