ST v The Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Cotter |
| Judgment Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Neutral Citation | [2022] EWHC 1280 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Appeal Ref No: BM10101A |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
[2022] EWHC 1280 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
On Appeal from the Order of HHJ Godsmark QC
Sitting in Mansfield County Court
Case Number: F18YM451
Birmingham Civil Justice Centre,
33 Bull Street, Birmingham B4 6DS
Mr Justice Cotter
Appeal Ref No: BM10101A
Sarah Hemingway, Counsel (instructed by Gregsons Solicitors) for the Appellant
Cecily White, Counsel (instructed by East Midlands Police Services) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 23 March 2022 (& further written submissions on 21st April 2022)
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED
Introduction
This is an appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Godsmark QC made on 11 th June 2021 at the conclusion of a jury trial of the Appellant's claim of false imprisonment. At the date of arrest on 20 th December 2011 the Appellant was aged 14 years. He was arrested at just after 5.30am in his own home and taken to a Police station where he was placed in an adult cell for several hours before an interview after which he was released on bail (which was later cancelled). He was never charged with any offence.
The Judge found that, whilst the arrest and detention were “reprehensible”, the way the police powers had been exercised “lamentable” and it was doubtful that the actions would be “justified in the court of public opinion”, there had nevertheless been reasonable grounds to suspect the Appellant of an offence of robbery and there had been reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest and detention were necessary.
Facts
On Thursday 8 th December 2011, just outside the Ellis Guildford school gates, a mobile phone was snatched from a 12 year old pupil (“EB”) by another pupil at her school (“J”). The Appellant spoke to EB after the phone was snatched and chased after J. Although, after a short space of time, J returned the phone to EB, the Tesco SIM card and pink phone case were missing. The victim informed the school attendance officer, Samantha Law, and the incident was reported to the police.
On Monday 12 th December 2011, the school headmaster met with J and his parents and it was decided that he should be excluded from the school.
On 14 th December 2011, the school headmaster met with the Appellant and his mother. The Appellant set out in his statement that;
“I explained what had happened and that I had nothing to do with the theft of the phone. The teacher and police officer told me that they believed me that I was not involved. I thought that it was the end of the matter and I did not expect to hear anything more about it.”
No further action was taken by the school against the Appellant.
On 16 th December 2011, the victim made a witness statement in which she named the perpetrator as J and identified the Appellant as having also been present. She stated that after J had taken her phone the Appellant came over to her and asked if she was ok, then he said he would go and get J, before running off in the same direction. EB was helped by another older pupil and her mother. They drove and located J and the Appellant, and the phone was handed over but without the pink case (value £5) and Tesco Sim card (which valueless as it was on contract and stopped immediately). She stated of the involvement of the Appellant:
“I know that ST did not actually take my phone off me but I do not know who stole my case and SIM card.”
On 19 th December 2011, PC Lilliman attended at the school and the acting head teacher (Richard Pierpont) and the school attendance officer (Samantha Law) made police statements. They both stated that they agreed that J could be dealt with by the Restorative Justice System but supported whatever decision the police made. Mr Pierpoint explained within his statement that J had already been excluded from the school following an internal investigation (so PC Lilliman was fully aware of this).
On 19 th December 2011, J was arrested by the investigating officer PC Lilliman in the presence of his father at 14.25 (presumably at home) and interviewed at 16.01. He said that the Appellant had told him to steal the phone. He also said that he had handed the phone to the Appellant who had taken out the SIM card and removed the phone cover before handing the phone back to J. I pause to observe that this would have been a curious step as the value lay in the phone not the pink case and EB's sim card. In any event J was bailed at 17.38. The bail would have presumably been with a non-association requirement with the Appellant if there was any concern that there may be contact between J and the Appellant (if there was such no bail condition then PC Lilliman must not have considered it a potential problem).
It is of significance to note that although (on his own account) J had snatched the phone from EB (and before any attempt had been made to speak to the Appellant) a decision was taken that J was to be bailed pending a Restorative Justice Program. This gives a guide to the seriousness of the offence in the eyes of PC Lilliman. Considerable reliance was placed during submissions by Ms White upon the fact that at all material times the officers concerned with the subsequent arrest and detention of the Appellant, were dealing with the “ very serious indicatable offence of robbery”. This was, in abstract terms, correct. However, offences of robbery cover a very wide spectrum and the decision as to what to do with J puts the seriousness of the Appellant's alleged offending into perspective before the decision to arrest him was made.
A decision was made, presumably by PC Lilliman to arrest the Appellant. The only record of the decision making process is:
“decision taken to arrest ST the next day, to search for the stolen property before he left for school. E-mail sent to night shift to arrest ST and search for outstanding property and I would deal with him in the morning when I started work at 8.00am.”
The task was allocated to PC Laughland and PC Turnbull who were working a night shift (10.00pm-7.00 am). It is unclear to me if other officers worked different night shift hours.
As Ms Hemingway pointed out this was the only record produced of a justification for an arrest and there is no record of any consideration of whether, rather than an arrest, a search warrant should be obtained and/or a voluntary interview requested.
PC Lilliman knew that the pink phone case (value £5) and the Tesco SIM had been taken by either J or the Appellant twelve days previously. The item of value, the phone, had been almost immediately handed back to EB devoid of the personal elements (the case and SIM) which most obviously linked it to the victim. In my view any reasonable officer would have regarded the likelihood that the cover and SIM had been quickly discarded, or discarded after the phone was handed back, or after the matter was investigated by the school, as quite high. Objectively speaking, it is very difficult to see why they would have been retained. PC Lilliman also knew that the school (which objectively would ordinarily have some knowledge about the usual conduct of its pupils) had investigated matters and expelled J and not the Appellant (who, it appears, had been spoken to by/in the presence of a Police officer).
Whilst J's allegation was the first time that the Police had become aware of the Appellant's potential involvement in taking the phone/items, the decision to arrest appears to have been taken without any or any adequate consideration of;
(a) Appellant's welfare given his young age, taken against the context of the overall circumstances including the seriousness of the alleged offence (reflected in the decision to refer J, who snatched the phone, to a Restorative Justice meeting);
(b) that the offence had occurred 12 days previously and
(c) that the Appellant would not be difficult to locate.
The request for an arrest, communicated by an “arrestogram” was that the Appellant be arrested during the night and held until PC Lilliman came on duty. It appears that the timing was largely, if not solely for the officer's convenience. Even stopping the facts at this point the basis for the Judge's trenchant criticism can be readily understood.
The arrest, search and detention
At about 5:30am on 20/12/2011, PC Turnbull and PC Laughland attended at the Appellant's home in order to effect the arrest request.
As the Judge noted in his judgment it was “common practice” to arrest suspects at 5.30 am as it was a good time to catch “people” at home. He found this explanation to be “rather glib” and got the strong impression that arrests at this time were commonplace. In the case of the Appellant, a 14 year old schoolboy, the risk that he would be otherwise difficult to find was, at its highest, negligible. It appears that the reality was that arrests were regularly undertaken at this time so that suspects were available when CID came on duty (as PC Lilliman had requested) and the Judge found it “extraordinary” that the arrest of a 14 year old boy was tied to the convenience of a particular officer's shift. He stated:
“In my time sitting as a Judge in both civil and criminal jurisdictions I have not heard of such a thing before. I really wonder how many members of the community would agree with such an arrest.”
PC Turnbull and PC Laughland had been provided with limited information about the arrest. They had the Appellant's details and that he had been named as responsible for a robbery of EB on 8 th December 2011 on Bar Lane where a mobile, a case and SIM card were stolen. There is no evidence of any further grounds for arrest or the necessity for arrest being communicated to the officers prior to their arrival at the Appellant's home.
When the officers attended at the...
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