Stephanie Rebecca Hayden v Bronwen Dickenson
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Nicklin |
| Judgment Date | 02 December 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 3291 (QB) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Docket Number | Case No: QB-2020-003750 |
| Date | 02 December 2020 |
[2020] EWHC 3291 (QB)
THE HONOURABLE Mr Justice Nicklin
Case No: QB-2020-003750
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA & COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Claimant appeared in person
The Defendant appeared in person
Hearing date: 11 November 2020
Judgment Approved by the court for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)
On 28 October 2020, the Claimant was granted an interim injunction against the Defendant. The injunction application was made without notice to the Defendant. The injunction was granted until a return date, which was fixed for 11 November 2020. On that date, I heard the renewed application by the Claimant for a continuation of the injunction (in modified terms). I discharged part of the injunction that was no longer sought by the Claimant and I reserved judgment on the balance of the application.
The Claim
The Claim Form was issued on 30 October 2020. It claims damages and an injunction against the Defendant for alleged harassment by publication, defamation, and misuse of private information. The Claimant alleges that these torts have been committed by the Defendant through her use of Twitter and Facebook from 17 October 2020.
The Interim Injunction
In her Application Notice, dated 25 October 2020, the Claimant sought an interim injunction to restrain alleged harassment and misuse of private information. The Claimant provided a witness statement, her first, also dated 25 October 2020. She exhibited the postings on Twitter and Facebook that she contended were harassment of her and a misuse of private information. The Claimant's Twitter username is @flyinglawyer73. The Defendant's username is @BtTreacle. At the time, the Defendant was displaying a name on Twitter: “ The 30th Victim of lolsuit Fluffy Bunny”. As will become clear, that name appears to have been chosen by the Defendant as a reference to the Claimant, whom the Defendant believed had issued a large number of legal claims which she considered to be vexatious.
I have set out the messages in Appendix 1 to this judgment. For ease of reference, each message is given a number. There are other messages exhibited to the Claimant's first witness statement which I have not included (including messages from a second Twitter account which the Claimant contends was also operated by the Defendant). I have attempted to gather those upon which the Claimant has particularly relied, and others that are important for context and to understand the nature of the dispute.
One of the Claimant's principal complaints is about the Defendant's repeated reference in her messages to a previous conviction of the Claimant. The Claimant was candid in her first witness statement about the details of this previous conviction. The Claimant is legally trained and so is familiar with her duty of full and frank disclosure on an ex parte application. She stated that the conviction – which led to the imposition of a fine – dates back over 20 years and is spent under the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (“the spent conviction”). Importantly, the Claimant confirmed: “ I have not committed any further such offence and 22 years have passed since my conviction. The conviction is long spent… [and] there are no contemporary reports or indeed any credible reports of my previous spent conviction. I have been able to put this conviction behind me for almost 2 decades.” The Claimant stated in her witness statement that the only publicly available document that records the previous conviction is a transcript of a Court of Appeal decision and that this is “ only available on specialist legal databases and not accessible to the public at large without a subscription” (“the CA Transcript”).
The Claimant also, quite properly, disclosed in her first statement that she had other spent convictions also dating back some 20 years. The details of these previous convictions are not material for the present application.
The Claimant contends that she has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the spent conviction. That is an issue that will have to be resolved later in the proceedings. Until then, it would not be right, in a public judgment, to record any further details of this previous conviction. To do so, would destroy one of the things which the Claimant, in these proceedings, is seeking to protect. I have also therefore redacted parts of some of the messages that appear in Appendix 1 to remove details relating the spent conviction.
The application was heard by Julian Knowles J during the afternoon of 28 October 2020. Although the hearing was conducted remotely, it was a public hearing. In her first witness statement, the Claimant had indicated an intention to apply for a reporting restriction in relation to her spent conviction, but the Claimant told the Judge at the hearing that she was not seeking “ any general reporting restriction order”. A transcript of the hearing has been obtained, which has now been provided to both parties.
The interim injunction application was made without notice having been given to the Defendant. The Judge considered the provisions of s.12 Human Rights Act 1998 and was satisfied that there was a compelling reason why the Defendant should not be notified of the application. That reason was the Defendant had posted on Twitter and Facebook part of correspondence – marked ‘private and confidential’ – which had been sent to her by the Claimant.
In her witness statement and her submissions to the Judge, the Claimant accepted that, to an extent, she had a public profile. She said this in her first witness statement:
“I am a minor public figure known for my involvement with the ongoing debate surrounding transgender issues. I have been harassed for 2 years. One woman has been convicted of a criminal offence for targeting me online. This court has issued 2 interim injunctions restraining 2 women from harassing me. I have a number of ongoing claims proceeding in this court for harassment… It is accepted that I am, to some extent, a public figure. I am a well known and controversial contributor on the ongoing debate on transgender issues…”
At the hearing, The Judge had asked her whether, as a result, this meant that she had to accept a certain degree of criticism. The Claimant responded:
“Absolutely… when you put yourself in the public eye you expect a certain extent, a degree, of criticism and you have to be robust and you have to have thick skin. However… there comes a point where the line gets crossed. Just because one engages in a debate does not mean that one has to sit there whilst someone screams effectively in your face, albeit in a digital platform, that [redacted reference to the spent conviction] from 25 years ago or you've killed someone or responsible for someone's death… Nobody, whether it's the prime minister to the most junior public figure in the land should be expected to put up with that…”
The Claimant provided the following further information in her first witness statement about other litigation she had brought, again as part of her duty of full and frank disclosure:
“The Defendant is also likely to argue that I have a record of litigation. She may seek to argue that I am a vexatious litigant (I am not) and make a living from suing those with whom I disagree (I do not). The Court is invited to note that I was granted an ex parte injunction on 22 October 2020. The Defendant may argue that I am seeking to use the Courts to silence my critics or prevent disclosure of my previous offending conduct, which the Defendant might argue should be disclosed as being in the public interest. I would disagree.”
Later in the hearing, the Judge asked the Claimant what effect the alleged harassment was having on her. The Claimant responded:
“To be blunt…, apart from it being a complete and utter pain in the backside, it's distressing. Because I am involved in this debate, I have to develop a thick skin and accept, you know, a level of criticism. But in the last two weeks with this defendant, and of course what happened last week, to have this constantly thrown in your face about something that happened a quarter of a century ago… I just think there's a real issue now that if this is allowed to get a head of steam…”
In her first witness statement, the Claimant had said this about the effect of the alleged harassment on her:
“[The Tweets] have caused (and continue to cause) me significant distress. The Defendant repeatedly references [the spent conviction]. I am accused of targeting women for harassment as well as operating the Twitter account @ReporterLAL… There is a noticeable escalation in content and frequency after I send my first warning letter on 23 October 2020… Some of the Defendant's tweets are transphobic…”
Under a heading “Balancing Exercise”, the Claimant said this, in her first witness statement:
“49. The Defendant's conduct has caused my family and me significant alarm and distress… To be publicly referenced as [having the spent conviction]… is alarming, distressing and constitutes a total disregard for my privacy and my legal right to be considered a rehabilitated person.
50. I am required to travel abroad as part of my professional duties. If the Defendant is allowed to continue tweeting about me in this way then I risk being unable to do so.
51. There is no legitimate public interest in the Defendant continuing to tweet about me in this matter. I have never tweeted about the Defendant, I do not know her, I have never met her. My conviction dates back decades and there has been no repeat of the offending conduct. I am entitled to be treated as a person of good character.”
It is apparent, from the...
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