UBS AG New York and Others v Fairfield Sentry Ltd ((in Liquidation)) and Others
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Lord Hodge |
| Judgment Date | 20 May 2019 |
| Neutral Citation | [2019] UKPC 20 |
| Court | Privy Council |
| Docket Number | Privy Council Appeal No 0082 of 2018 |
| Date | 20 May 2019 |
[2019] UKPC 20
Easter Term
Privy Council
From the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (British Virgin Islands)
Lord Reed
Lord Hodge
Lord Briggs
Lady Arden
Lord Kitchin
Privy Council Appeal No 0082 of 2018
Appellants
Lord Falconer QC
Tom Smith QC
Henry Phillips
(Instructed by Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP)
Respondents
Gabriel Moss QC
Stephen Midwinter QC
William Hare
(Instructed by Forbes Hare LLP (London))
Heard on 25 and 26 February 2019
This appeal, which comes to the Board with the leave of the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (“the ECCA”), is an appeal against the judgment of the ECCA dated 20 November 2017 (Pereira CJ and Blenman and Thom JJA) dismissing the appeal by the appellants (referred to collectively as “UBS”) against Leon J's judgment dated 11 March 2016. The subject of the appeal to the Board is the ECCA's upholding of Leon J's refusal to grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain the liquidators of Fairfield Sentry Ltd (“the liquidators”) from pursuing proceedings in the United States under section 249 of the British Virgin Islands' Insolvency Act 2003 (“the IA 2003”). This section empowers the High Court of the BVI (“the High Court”) to set aside voidable transactions, such as an unfair preference or an undervalue transaction, and to make orders to restore the position to what it would have been if the company had not entered into such transactions.
The dispute arises out of the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme which Bernard L Madoff operated through his company Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“BLMIS”). Fairfield Sentry Ltd (“Sentry”), Fairfield Sigma Ltd (“Sigma”) and Fairfield Lambda Ltd (“Lambda”) were “feeder” funds. Sigma and Lambda invested in Sentry which in turn invested over 95% of its funds in BLMIS. Between 1997 and 2008 Sentry invested some US$7.2 billion in BLMIS. After Mr Madoff's fraud came to light following his arrest in December 2008, the High Court made orders to wind up each of Sentry, Sigma and Lambda.
Ponzi schemes have in common with many asset bubbles, including share speculations, that those who invest early and realise their investment before the crash can make significant profits, while those, who invest later or otherwise retain their investment in the scheme when it crashes, lose everything. It is, as an anonymous pamphleteer during the South Sea Bubble of 1720 stated, a case of “devil take the hindmost”. The liquidators' claims are an attempt to modify that unfortunate result and share the pain among investors.
In the case of Sentry the matter arose in this way. Investors purchased redeemable shares in Sentry, which were offered at the net asset value per share (“NAV”) of Sentry's mutual fund (“the Fund”) at the opening of business on the effective date of purchase. Those investments provided funds for Sentry to invest principally in BLMIS. Investors could withdraw their investment in Sentry by redeeming their shares in accordance with article 10 of Sentry's articles of association. The redemption payment on a share was based on the NAV of the Fund on the day of the request to redeem or the following day and certificates of NAV were issued by Sentry's administrator on behalf of the directors, giving a binding valuation of the shares which were redeemed. Those valuations of the Fund by the Fund's administrator on behalf of the directors of Sentry were based on fraudulent reports created by BLMIS, which did not have assets under its management which could give rise to the purported valuations.
The liquidators by raising proceedings in the United States under section 249 of the IA 2003 and on common law grounds are seeking to recover funds paid out to investors in Sentry who redeemed their shares at valuations which, as hindsight reveals, bore no relationship to the actual value of their shares. Proceedings have been commenced against several hundreds of defendants in the United States and they are currently before the US Bankruptcy Court in New York. The proceedings relating to UBS concern redemptions of shares in Sentry made between 2004 and 2008. By order dated 6 December 2018 United States Bankruptcy Judge, Bernstein J, dismissed the liquidators' claims at common law against all defendants except to the extent that the claims alleged a constructive trust against defendants who had knowledge of the Madoff frauds but allowed the statutory avoidance claims under section 249 of the IA 2003 to proceed.
The liquidators were appointed by the High Court by order dated 21 July 2009. They raised the proceedings in the United States with the permission of the High Court in an order dated 10 November 2010. UBS did not challenge that order at the time. Sanction to proceed with the litigation in the United States was removed and later restored in proceedings in the BVI. The liquidators are officers of the High Court ( section 184(1) of the IA 2003) and are subject to the direction of that court.
The dispute between the liquidators and investors who redeemed their investments before the crash has been strenuously undertaken both in the BVI, including an appeal to the Board in 2014, and in the United States. It is not necessary to set out the varied skirmishes and battles which have led to this appeal to the Board. Nor is it necessary to discuss the merits of the liquidators' claims. It suffices to state that UBS as a potential debtor of the liquidators' claims under section 249 of the IA 2003 seeks an anti-suit injunction from the BVI courts to restrain the liquidators from proceeding with their claims in the United States. After Leon J dismissed UBS's application for an anti-suit injunction and the ECCA dismissed its appeal, UBS appeals to the Board with the leave of the ECCA.
Lord Falconer QC in a skilful presentation urged the Board to grant an anti-suit injunction, which failing, declaratory relief. The core of his submission was that section 249 of the IA, properly interpreted, conferred a right to grant relief only on the High Court which was the domestic court charged with the supervision of the winding up, enabling it to alter the consequences of concluded transactions which would otherwise remain binding on the insolvent company. As a result, no foreign court was empowered to grant such relief. The High Court had no authority to delegate power to grant such relief to a foreign court and had not purported to do so. Accordingly, it would involve a misapplication of the insolvency regime of the BVI if a foreign court were to exercise powers under section 249, would introduce commercial uncertainty and would be oppressive to the interests of alleged debtors of the insolvent company. Further, the BVI courts were the natural forum for the claims and the liquidators had put forward no evidence that proceedings in the United States would enable them to obtain more assets for the liquidation than proceedings in the BVI.
Gabriel Moss QC for the liquidators in a powerful submission submitted, first, that UBS had already argued in the US Bankruptcy Court the question whether the section 249 claims can be pursued in the United States and had lost. It was an abuse of process to attempt to relitigate the issue in the BVI. Secondly, UBS offered no coherent basis on which it could be argued that the US proceedings were vexatious or oppressive so as to justify an anti-suit injunction. Thirdly, UBS had no standing before the High Court to invoke the anti-suit injunction. Fourthly, there was no basis for the declaratory relief, which UBS sought for the first time before the Board, because it was for the US Bankruptcy Court to decide under US rules of private international law whether it would apply BVI insolvency law in dealing with the liquidators' applications. Section 249 of the IA did not bear the meaning which UBS advanced. It was not unusual for courts to assist foreign liquidation proceedings by applying the law of those proceedings, including a statutory power to adjust or reverse voidable transactions. As Pereira CJ had held, there was no reason why BVI law should wish to prevent a foreign court from applying BVI insolvency rules in the context of cross-border cooperation relating to an insolvent BVI company.
Section 249 of the IA 2003 so far as relevant provides
“(1) Subject to section 250, where it is satisfied that a transaction entered into by a company is a voidable transaction the Court, on the application of the office holder,
(a) may make an order setting aside the transaction in whole or in part;
(b) in respect of an unfair preference or an undervalue transaction, may make such order as it considers fit for restoring the position to what it would have been if the company had not entered into that transaction; …”
Subsection (2) lists some of the powers which may be exercised under subsection (1)(b), including payment to the office holder of such sums as the court...
To continue reading
Request your trial