Van De Velde v Special Educational Needs Tribunal
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | MR JUSTICE POPPLEWELL |
| Judgment Date | 18 August 1995 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1995] EWHC J0818-5 |
| Date | 18 August 1995 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO 1670-95 |
[1995] EWHC J0818-5
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(CROWN OFFICE LIST)
Before: Mr Justice Popplewell
CO 1670-95
MR J FRIEL (Instructed by A.E. Smith & Son, Frome House, London Rd, Stroud, GL5 2AF) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
MR B SILVESTER (Instructed by Essex County Council, Chelmsford, Essex) appeared on behalf of the Education Authority.
MR S KOVATS (Instructed by the Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
(As Approved)
Friday, 18th August 1995
MR JUSTICE POPPELWELL: This is an application made by the present applicants to extend the time for service of the Notice of Motion and entry of an appeal as a result of an order given by Mr Justice Judge on 13th June 1995.
The Applicant, who was aged about 14, had a special educational need and that matter was argued before the tribunal on 4th April 1995 and a decision adverse to her case was given.
There is a statutory right of appeal which is 28 days. That 28 days expired on 2nd May 1995. On 18th April 1995 the solicitor acting for the Applicant, who has some experience of these matters, applied to the Legal Aid authorities for Legal Aid for his client, in order to bring judicial review proceedings against the Tribunal. It is accepted now that those proceeding by way of judicial review were misplaced. It may well be that the arguments based on an application for judicial review would have been precisely the same as the arguments based in relation to a statutory appeal but, of course, the time limit for an application for judicial review under Order 53 is that it should be made promptly and, in any event, within 3 months.
On 2nd May 1995 the 28 days expired. Nothing had been heard from the Legal Aid authority by the solicitors and the Respondents were wholly unaware that an appeal was being contemplated.
On 10th May 1995, nothing having been heard, the solicitor got in touch with the Legal Aid authority and on 11th May a decision was sent to the Applicant that Legal Aid was refused on the ground that there was no reasonable ground for taking, defending or being party to the proceedings.
The solicitors got in touch with Mr Friel, who is very experienced in this class of work, and he advised them, on a non-commercial basis, that there were proper grounds of appeal and, armed with that advice, the solicitors reapplied to the Legal Aid authorities for Legal Aid.
On 25th May 1995 Legal Aid was granted and notification of that was received by the solicitors. On 5th June 1995 the application or the appeal notice of it was given; that is said to be some 62 days after the actual decision. The application before me today is under Order 3, rule 5, to extend time. The principles on which time can be extended are comparatively easy to state. Firstly, that it is very important that time limits are complied with. That applies not only to civil litigation inter partes but most particularly to cases involving public administration, and that is the reason why very strict time limits are laid down in statutory appeals and why, in judicial review, the three-month outer limit is imposed.
Secondly, that ignorance of the law by the legal advisor is not a ground which necessarily attracts judicial dispensation. It is the fact that there...
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