Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeThe Honourable Mr Justice Thomas,Mr Justice Thomas
Judgment Date07 March 2002
Neutral Citation[2002] EWHC 321 (QB)
Docket NumberCase No: SA 110040
CourtQueen's Bench Division
Date07 March 2002

[2002] EWHC 321 (QB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

SWANSEA DISTRICT REGISTRY

Before

The Honourable Mr Justice Thomas

Case No: SA 110040

Between
Ceri Ann Walters
Claimant
and
North Glamorgan Nhs Trust
Defendants

Mr Robert Weir (instructed by Hugh James Ford Simey) for the Claimant

Mr Gregory Chambers (instructed by Welsh Health Legal Services) for the Defendants

Approved Judgment

I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this

Judgement and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

The Honourable Mr Justice Thomas Mr Justice Thomas

Mr Justice Thomas

Introduction:

1

The claimant suffers from pathological grief reaction, a recognised psychiatric

illness within the International Classification of Diseases; it was the agreed

opinion of the psychiatrists that the pathological grief reaction was caused by

events in July 1996 when the claimant's son Elliot died. It was accepted by the

defendants that Elliot died as a result of negligent treatment at the Prince Charles

Hospital, Merthyr, a hospital operated by the defendants.

2

Although it was also common ground that the claimant had suffered special

damages in the sum of £1216 and was entitled to a further sum by way of

general damages (in an amount determined by me as set out at paragraphs 63 to

66 below), the defendants denied that the claimant fell within a category of

victims that, on the existing state of the law, was entitled to recover. It was the Claimant's primary argument that she was entitled to recover on the basis of the

existing authorities (or a small incremental step forward within those

authorities). If not, then there was advanced by her the novel argument that by

reason of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the case law

on "nervous shock" had to be reconsidered & to see whether it was permissible to

deny recovery to those to whom a duty of care was owed; that on such

reconsideration, the claimant was someone who was owed a duty of care and

there was no reason to deny her recovery. This second argument is an argument

of far reaching significance for the law of England and Wales, if correct.

3

The claimants' primary argument turned on the application of legal principles to

underlying facts that are not in dispute; it is therefore convenient to set out the

facts in a little more detail.

The facts

4

The claimant was born in July 1967. For five years she worked as an Auxiliary

Psychiatric Nurse in South Wales and thereafter did a variety of jobs including

shop work and working in a psychiatric hospital in London. She returned to

South Wales and worked in a factory. She became pregnant and on 15

September 1995 she gave birth to Elliot. By that time she had stopped working.

5

On Tuesday 16 July 1996 she noticed that the colour of Elliot's eyes looked

different. On 17 July 1996 she took him to see her general practitioner. He

referred Elliot to the Prince Charles Hospital at Merthyr. Elliot was seen that

day at the Prince Charles Hospital. Thereafter he was treated under the care of

the Prince Charles Hospital, most of the time as an in-patient, but part of the

time as an outpatient. The claimant was with him during his treatment.

6

Elliot was in fact suffering from acute hepatitis which led to fulminant hepatic

failure. It is accepted by the defendants that he was not properly diagnosed or

treated by the Prince Charles Hospital. The defendants also accept that if Elliot

had been properly diagnosed and treated, he would have undergone a liver

transplant and lived. It is not therefore necessary to set out the precise course of

treatment and events until the period immediately preceding his death. It is,

however, necessary to set out the events of the last two days as it is common

ground on the psychiatric evidence that they caused her psychiatric illness.

7

The final events leading to Elliot's death started at about 3 am on Tuesday 30

July 1996 when his condition deteriorated significantly. The claimant was at

that time sleeping in the same room as Elliot at the Prince Charles Hospital. She

awoke at about 3 am to hear Elliot making small choking noises in his cot; the

claimant saw that there were large amounts of what was described as "a coffee

ground blood substance"; his body was stiff. She took Elliot to a nurse. The

nurse told the claimant that Elliot was having a fit, though she did not appreciate

that the fit had lasted an hour. The hospital notes record Elliot as being in a

Grade 3 coma, responding only to deep pain. Elliot was transferred to the

Intensive Care Unit of the Prince Charles Hospital at 4:15am. The claimant was

told by a doctor at 4:45 am that it was very unlikely, and it would be very

unlucky, if Elliot had any serious damage as a result of the fit. After speaking to

the doctor she thought that Elliot might at worst be slightly brain damaged; she

did not think it was life threatening. In fact Elliot had suffered a major epileptic

seizure leading to a coma and irreparable brain damage.

8

At about 11 am that day the claimant was told by a doctor at the Prince Charles

Hospital after a CAT scan that there was no damage to Elliot's brain, but that he

wanted him transferred to King's College Hospital, London for a liver

transplant. Eventually later that day an ambulance arrived and a medical team

took Elliot to London where he was admitted at 6:30 pm; a further CAT scan

was carried out which showed universal attenuation in both cerebral

hemispheres; it was interpreted as showing diffuse brain injury consistent with a

profound hypoxic ischaemic insult.

9

The claimant had followed the ambulance in a car with Elliot's father and

arrived at King's College Hospital at about 9 pm that evening. She was seen by

three doctors. They told her that Elliot had suffered severe brain damage as a

result of the fit and he was on a life support machine. They told her that if a

liver transplant was undertaken, the chances of survival were only 50 - 50 and

he would be severely handicapped. The claimant described her feelings as being

numb, panic stricken and terrified at the sudden turn of events; she had been told

at the Prince Charles Hospital that he could have a liver transplant and she had

been told then he could not. The consultant paediatric heptologist at King's

College Hospital described her as "stunned".

10

On the following day, Wednesday 31 July 1996, Elliot underwent a further CAT

scan. A consultant neurologist told the claimant that Elliot's brain was damaged so severely that he would not have any sort of life or be able to recognise his parents; he would have no quality of life. This shocked her greatly. They were asked whether or not they felt it was in Elliot's best interest to continue with life support. She discussed this with Elliot's father and they decided they would

terminate the life support. Shortly thereafter, the life support machine was turned off and Elliot died in the claimant's arms at approximately 4.30pm. She was told after his death that if Elliot had been transferred for a liver transplant at any time before 30 July 1996, he would have stood a far better chance of survival.

11

The consultant psychiatrists instructed on behalf of the claimant and the defendants, Dr L.E. Webster and Dr P.L. Jenkins, jointly answered a series of questions; there were no substantial areas of disagreement between them. They did not give oral evidence. They were agreed that the claimant had suffered a pathological grief reaction and that the events witnessed and experienced by her over the two days prior to Elliot's death caused the pathological grief reaction; this reaction differed by reason of the severity and duration of its symptoms from the normal grief reaction. They were agreed that without the events of those two days the pathological grief reaction would not have occurred. They were agreed that the psychiatric impact of the claimant being exposed to distressing circumstances for two days was more severe than if Elliot had died suddenly. They were agreed that the psychiatric impact was compounded by uncertainties over the diagnosis and the admission to various hospitals. It was also compounded by the fact that the couple had to make a decision about the withdrawal of life support. The psychiatrists also responded affirmatively to the following question:

"Has the claimant suffered shock due to what was witnessed, experienced and participated in by her."

12

During the course of legal argument it became apparent that emphasis was being placed by the claimant upon the effect on the claimant of awakening to find Elliot had suffered a fit shortly after 3am on Tuesday 30 July 1996. It was therefore agreed that the psychiatrists would be asked further questions. Two questions were formulated by the parties after the hearing and the psychiatrists produced agreed answers:

i) "Q: When they began their consideration of the events of those two days,

which was the first event in time that the psychiatric experts considered

to have been relevant to the claimant's pathological grief reaction?

A: Shortly before admission on 17 June 1996 when [Elliot] was noted to be jaundiced, the claimant began to become emotionally disturbed

ii) Q: If the relevant events included the claimant witnessing the seizure

suffered by Elliot at 3:20 am on 30th July 1996 did this materially

contribute to the onset of the claimant's psychiatric symptoms or is it rather to be regarded as one of a series of materially contributory events that occurred over the period of two days?

A: It should be as one of a series of materially contributory events"

13

In September 2001, the claimant was still suffering from symptoms of an unresolved pathological grief reaction; these symptoms caused...

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8 cases
  • Walters v North Glamorgan NHS Trust
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 6 December 2002
  • Taylor v A Novo (UK) Ltd
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 18 March 2013
    ...hand he might find that the flexibility to which Lord Scarman referred indicated that they were.” 19 15. The next case is North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792, [2003] PIQR P16 which is the authority on which Mr Bartley Jones places most reliance. The claimant suffered ......
  • D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust and Another
    • United Kingdom
    • House of Lords
    • 21 April 2005
    ...and of the baby's struggle for life: Tredget and Tredget v Bexley Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 178. Similarly, in North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters [2003] Lloyd's Rep Med 49, a mother recovered damages for the pathological grief reaction which she suffered as a result of witnessing,......
  • Toth v Jarman
    • United Kingdom
    • Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
    • 19 July 2006
    ...principles established in Allcock v The Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1AC 310 at 399, as explained and applied in North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters CA, 6 December 2002 [2002] EWCA Civ 1792. He assessed the damages to which Mr Toth would have been entitled in the sum of £30,0......
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